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ABSTRACT  
 
   
This is a study of the plight of smallholder agriculture in Northwest Costa Rica. More 
specifically, this is the story of 689 rice farms, of an average size of 7.2 hectares and 
totaling just less than 5,300 hectares within the largest agricultural irrigation system in 
Central America. I was able to define the physical bounds of this study quite clearly, but 
one would be mistaken to think that this simplicity transfers to a search for rural 
development solutions in this case. Those solutions lie in the national and international 
politics that appear to have allowed a select few to pick winners and losers in Costa Rican 
agriculture in the face of global changes. In this research, I found that water scarcity 
among smallholder farms between 2006 and 2013 was the product of the adaptations of 
other, more powerful actors in 2002 to threats of Costa Rica's ratification of the Central 
American Free Trade Agreement. I demonstrate how the adaptations of these more 
powerful actors produced new risks for others, and how this ultimately prevented the 
rural development program from meeting its development goals. I reflect on my case 
study to draw conclusions about the different ways risks may emerge in rural 
development programs of this type. Then, I focus on the household level and show that 
determinants of successful adaptation to one type of global change risk may make 
farmers more vulnerable to other types, creating a "catch-22" among vulnerable farmers 
adapting to multiple global change risks. Finally, I define adaptation limits in smallholder 
rice farming in Northwest Costa Rica. I show that the abandonment of livelihood security 
and well-being, and of the unique "parcelaro" identities of rice farmers in this region 
define adaptation limits in this context. 
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DEDICATION  
 
   
To those parcelaros who opened their homes and lives to me because they believed their 
story should be told. I have tried to tell that story. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This is a study of the plight of smallholder agriculture in Northwest Costa Rica. 
More specifically, this is the story of 689 rice farms, of an average size of 7.2 hectares 
and totaling just less than 5,300 hectares within the largest agricultural irrigation system 
in Central America. I was able to define the physical bounds of this study quite clearly, 
but one would be mistaken to think that this simplicity transfers to a search for rural 
development solutions in this case. Those solutions lie in the national and international 
politics that appear to have allowed a select few to pick winners and losers in Costa Rican 
agriculture in the face of global changes. 
This story is told in part by the farmers, and by those tasked by the Costa Rican 
government to promote smallholder agriculture in the name of rural development. My 
choice to use the word ‘plight’ in this description of their story is not hyperbole. Faced 
with increasing aridity and a withering rice market, many of the farmers represented here 
have begun questioning the utility of smallholder agriculture in a globalizing world as 
their livelihoods are undermined. Agriculture and water managers are largely aware of 
these rural development failures, but are seemingly powerless to implement change. This 
powerlessness is largely a product of an institutional architecture designed through 
neoliberal politics driven by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the U.S. Agency 
for International Development (USAID) in Central America in the 1980s. However, the 
economic liberalization of Costa Rica is not to blame for the failure of this country’s 
largest agrarian rural development program, although this is the popular belief among 
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Costa Ricans and policy-makers alike. Rather, the current economic model is the result of 
powerful actors exploiting the neoliberal policies to avoid risks of global changes and to 
profit at the expense of the overall population, particularly the poor.  
In this study I describe the processes by which Costa Rica’s largest agrarian rural 
development program ceased meeting the needs of its most vulnerable. I focus on the 
actions of a select group of politically powerful actors and describe how they were able to 
redistribute risks of trade liberalization and increasing drought. I show that through these 
processes the powerful were able to profit while the poor were made more vulnerable, 
and were often forced to abandon their livelihoods. I end with an analysis of smallholder 
farmer perspectives of their futures in this context. 
 
1. Research context 
Costa Rica has undergone sweeping economic reforms over the past three 
decades, but poverty rates have remained relatively stable at approximately 20% since the 
early 1990s (INEC, 2014). Equally disturbing, and perhaps more concerning is the fact 
that economic inequality has steadily risen across the country since 2000. Only three 
countries across Latin America have seen inequity increase over the past decade, and 
Costa Rica is among them (CEPAL, 2014). The United Nations Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) reported that Costa Rica’s Gini Index (a 
comparison of income distribution used to measure inequity) increased from 0.47 to 0.50 
between 2000 and 2011. This trend is nowhere more apparent than in Guanacaste, one of 
the two poorest provinces in the country. Within Guanacaste, this trend persists even as 
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the government continues to fund agrarian development projects with the goal of using 
agriculture to boost households out of poverty. 
The Arenal-Tempisque Irrigation Project (Projecto de Riego del Arenal-
Tempisque, PRAT) was established in 1983 by the Costa Rican government as the 
country’s largest agrarian development project. Approximately 1125 farms benefit from 
the project; these farms primarily produce rice and sugarcane. In 2000, almost all 
smallholder farmers in the PRAT grew rice. The PRAT (Figure 1.1) supplies farmers 
with 100% of their irrigation water for five months of each year during the dry season 
(November-March), but due to prolonged drought in combination with a changing global 
rice market, smallholder farmers have suffered livelihood setbacks.  
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Figure 1.1 – Arenal-Tempisque Irrigation District (shown in bordered region) within the 
Tempisque River Basin in Guanacaste, Costa Rica; this map shows topography, PRAT 
canal infrastructure, Lake Arenal, and the Tempisque and Bebedero Rivers. 
 
The risks faced by smallholder farmers in the PRAT stem from the interactions 
between regional drought and threats of international trade liberalization. From 2005-
2012, approximately 40% of rice consumed in Costa Rica was imported. The Costa Rican 
agency overseeing these imports sells the imports to rice mills (the same mills that 
smallholder farmers use). Along with these sales comes a transfer of economic rents (i.e., 
a return in excess of the resource owner's opportunity cost; Tollison, 1982); rice on the 
global market is less expensive for rice mills to buy compared with domestically 
produced rice because domestic production is less efficient and state mandated price 
supports exacerbate this price difference for buyers. Imported rice is allocated to these 
industrial mills based on production and acquisition of domestic rice. This has initiated a 
rapid consolidation of industrial rice mills in the PRAT, which grows 45% of the rice in 
Costa Rica. This in turn has displaced many smallholder farmers from the rice market 
because mills no longer need to buy rice from local smallholder farmers. The situation is 
expected to become worse as Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free 
Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) increasingly requires Costa Rica to diminish their import 
tariffs on rice, and ultimately to abolish them by 2025. As smallholder farmers are 
displaced from the rice-production supply chain, they either leave farming or switch to 
sugarcane, which is much less lucrative.  
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The Central American Bank of Economic Integration loaned approximately $20 
million to the Costa Rican government in 2014 to expand the PRAT by 8,000 ha. The 
government claims that this irrigation expansion will benefit the region in three ways. 
First, it will increase the competitiveness of Costa Rican agriculture. It will increase 
agricultural innovation and development. Finally, the expansion will promote the 
livelihoods of smallholder farmers outside the PRAT who rely on rain-fed crops in this 
increasingly arid region because they will be provided with steady supplies of irrigation 
water. However, both water managers and smallholder farmers increasingly worry that 
the expansion will further over-allocate scarce water and exacerbate the conflicts and 
multiple risks faced by smallholder rice farmers in the PRAT. 
 
2. Research questions 
This study was designed to answer four questions in the context of this case. Each 
research question may stand alone and I provide unique answers for each. Each question 
was answered to gain increased insight into the barriers and limits on smallholder 
agriculture in Northwest Costa Rica. Taken as a whole, the answers to these questions 
provide insights into the sustainability of Central American smallholder agriculture in the 
context of global change processes. My questions are: 
1. How did we get here? (What constrains farmer efforts in adaptation to drought? 
Why were the constraints imposed, and how do the constraints impact 
vulnerability among farmers?) 
2. Why are smallholder farmers, targeted by an industrial-based rural development 
program designed to spread global change risks evenly among all farmers, 
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negatively impacted by these risks while other more powerful farmers, presented 
with the same risks, profit? 
3. How do socio-economic determinants of adaptive capacity among smallholder 
farmers in Northwest Costa Rica determine their ability to avoid adaptation limits 
in the face of the impacts of multiple global change risks? 
4. What are adaptation limits in smallholder rice farming in the region? How do 
farmers perceive adaptation limits given plausible impacts of future global change 
risks? 
 
3. Research approach 
My approach to this study was equal parts participatory rural appraisal, case study 
analysis, and interview and survey research. In the study of complex, or ‘wicked’ 
problems such as those that exist in the PRAT, the scope and aim of research must be 
continuously revised as the researcher builds an understanding of the processes and actors 
within the context of these problems. The goal of my research approach was to critically 
explore the processes and drivers of change in smallholder agriculture in Northwest Costa 
Rica that were obscured, either deliberately by those who could benefit from the 
obscurity, or inadvertently behind a complex and complicated tangle of truths and 
contexts. I used this style of hypothesis-based inquiry to provide an analysis of these 
processes in such a way as to offer potential next-steps toward achieving a fairer 
distribution of risks and rewards from global changes. 
The theoretical foundations of my study are in human dimensions of global 
change, political economics, and hydrological engineering. I began this study with a 
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problem-based political economy assessment of smallholder rice farming in Northwest 
Costa Rica to expose the multiple risks and drivers of those risks faced by farmers in the 
region. I explained how these risks developed in such a way as to redistribute 
vulnerability to global change risks across Costa Rican agriculture. Then, I proposed a 
theoretical concept that I used to perceive and understand processes of risk redistribution 
in industrial-based agrarian development programs, which includes the PRAT. I used 
quantitative methods to pinpoint the impacts of global change risks that are undermining 
the livelihoods of smallholder rice farmers, and I viewed my case study through my 
newly proposed perspective. 
In the second half of this study I relied on household-level data, collected through 
surveys and interviews, to determine why differences exist in smallholder rice-farm 
vulnerability to multiple interacting risks. I also determined how farmers perceived limits 
in their abilities to adapt to these risks. I present the results of my surveys and interviews 
and I discuss my findings using both quantitative and qualitative methods. 
 
4. Dissertation organization 
This dissertation is organized into chapters based on my four research questions.  
Each chapter is designed to stand-alone, but each builds on the analysis presented in the 
other three chapters.  In CHAPTER 2, I argue that we cannot assume that the same 
hindrances to successful rural development programs, including inequity, power 
differentials, and exclusivity, will not inhibit climate change adaptation programs in less-
developed countries. I explore the relationship between the political pressures on trade 
liberalization and local climate change impacts in the Arenal-Tempisque Irrigation 
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Project in Northwest Costa Rica. I use this case study to elucidate both the existence and 
the complexity of a national political economy, which I show must be addressed in local 
climate change adaptation plans if Costa Rica is to address the development concerns of 
the most vulnerable in the region. In this chapter I argue that Costa Rican rice politics, 
not drought, poverty, or failed public policy, created inadequate water access for 
smallholder farmers throughout the irrigation system. I use a problem-processes approach 
to political economy assessment to investigate the political progresses across scales by 
which some groups of farmers became vulnerable to water scarcity. I explain, “How did 
we get here?” by analyzing the changes in rice-market and water allocation institutions 
that have shaped farmers’ vulnerabilities. I discuss the current problems in the context of 
these changes and describe the political maneuvers that have reformed and reinforced the 
distribution of risks, wealth and power.  
In CHAPTER 3, I argue that the rural poor are increasingly subjected to risks 
from the impacts of climate change and globalization. As industrial-based rural 
development programs increase in scope, scale, and application, made possible by 
increases in agricultural investment and trade liberalization, new risks to the rural poor 
may emerge from the adaptations of more powerful farmers. In this chapter, I describe a 
new type of idiosyncratic risk and advance its development by applying political 
economic theory to a framework based in the human dimensions of global change. I then 
provide an initial example of its application to the agricultural irrigation system in 
Guanacaste Province, Costa Rica. With this case study I ask: Why are smallholder 
farmers, targeted by an industrial-based rural development program designed to spread 
risks evenly among all farmers, negatively impacted by risks from global changes while 
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other more powerful farmers, presented with the same risks, profit? I use statistical 
regression modeling to pinpoint and quantify the impacts that are driving smallholder 
farmer livelihood losses. I demonstrate how the adaptations of some farmers produced 
new risks for others, and how this ultimately prevented the rural development program 
from meeting its goals of increased living standards and equitably distributed resources, 
benefits, and risks. I end by reflecting on my case study and on the theoretical 
underpinnings of idiosyncratic risks to draw conclusions about the different ways these 
risks may emerge in industrial-based rural development programs. 
In CHAPTER 4, I build on research on the effects of multiple, interacting 
impacts of global change risks on rural livelihoods in lesser-developed countries and seek 
to understand socio-economic determinants of adaptation limits. I ask:  How do socio-
economic determinants of adaptive capacity among smallholder farmers in Northwest 
Costa Rica determine their ability to avoid adaptation limits in the face of the impacts of 
multiple global change risks? I compare my findings to theoretical determinants of 
adaptive capacity. My data were based on workshop proceedings, focus groups, and 
survey responses from 94 smallholder rice-farming households within the PRAT. I 
analyzed my survey responses using logistic regression models to determine which socio-
economic variables may be used to determine farmer abandonment of valued livelihood 
goals, which I define as an adaptation limit. My analysis showed that farm size, cattle 
ownership, and the diversification of household income were determinants of farmer 
abilities to successfully adapt or cross of adaptation limits. I also show that determinants 
of successful adaptation to one type of global change risk may make farmers more 
vulnerable to other types, creating a “catch-22” among vulnerable farmers adapting to 
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multiple global change risks. I discuss the significance of these results in the context of 
solutions in the PRAT and broader research on the general determinants of vulnerability 
among smallholder farmers. 
In CHAPTER 5, I argue that the abilities of rural households to avoid adaptation 
limits in the face of impacts are largely dependent on their valued goals and capacities to 
adapt to changes and transform their livelihoods. I argue that adaptation-limit research is 
crucial to sustainable rural development, and a focus on adaptation limits may allow 
researchers to better understand limits and support successful adaptation, before and after 
adaptation limits. I found the forced abandonment of livelihood security of well-being, 
and of the unique “parcelaro” identities of rice farmers in this region define adaptation 
limits in this context. I also found that farmers may revise their attitudes about what is a 
valued livelihood goal, or they may greatly change their behavior and perception to avoid 
intolerable risks, which modifies limits to adaptation. This is a key insight into the nature 
of adaptations to risks, as it speaks to the fluidity limits to adaptation. However, I argue 
that much suffering and hardship may accompany these transitions, and this cannot be 
discounted from adaptation-limit research. 
Finally, in CHAPTER 6 I conclude this study with a short discussion of the 
future of smallholder agriculture in Costa Rica in the context of changes in climate, 
international trade, and domestic politics. I argue that the evaluation of smallholder 
agriculture in Northwest Costa Rica must incorporate regional and national level politics, 
as well as rural development goals.  
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CHAPTER 2 
POLITICAL ECONOMIC BARRIERS TO CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATIONS: A 
STUDY OF AGRARIAN RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN NORTHWEST COSTA RICA  
 
1. Introduction 
Rural development has slowly emerged as a new theme of research in the global 
change community (Dow, Berkhout, & Preston, 2013; World Bank, 2013). At the same 
time, recent research by this community has argued that barriers to the implementation of 
adaptation plans have not been adequately addressed (O’Brien & Wolf, 2010; Pelling, 
2011). Much of the global change research on rural development has focused on 
mainstreaming adaptation (Huq & Reid, 2004; Klein et al., 2007; Sietz, Boschütz, & 
Klein, 2011), but much can be gained by focusing a critical lens on barriers to the 
implementation of climate change adaptation plans in rural development settings. The 
need to incorporate global changes into rural development plans necessitates that 
adaptation researchers confront many longstanding political barriers to development 
including inequity, power differentials, and exclusivity. Barriers to climate change 
adaptations are intertwined with institutions at different decision-making scales (Adger, 
Paavola, Huq, & Mace, 2006). To address these barriers, we must ask questions about 
who is allowed to make decisions about how a development program will respond to the 
impacts of climate changes, how are these decisions made, and how do the outcomes of 
these decisions affect the distribution of risks?  
Research linking rural development with global change adaptation has shown that 
the concept of vulnerability is a common theoretical bond across the disciplines (Lemos 
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et al., 2007). To date, much of this research has not addressed how political economic 
relations may create barriers to the success of these adaptation plans (Milman & Arsano, 
2013). I define adaptations as responses to observed or expected global change risks—
their effects and impacts—in order to alleviate adverse impacts of change or take 
advantage of new opportunities (Adger, Arnell, & Tompkins, 2005; IPCC, 2001). For the 
purpose of this study, I define vulnerability as the degree to which any group or 
community can be adversely impacted by the consequences, or the potential 
consequences of risks (Eriksen & O’Brien, 2007; Eriksen et al., 2011). Large questions 
remain regarding the ability of any adaptation plan to address the needs of vulnerable 
groups in the context of socio-political relations. We should assume that the same 
political economic barriers to the success of rural development projects would present 
themselves in climate change adaptation programs.  
The goal of this paper is to explore and elucidate the extent to and processes by 
which economic politics may be responsible for climate change impacts at the local level 
within a rural development project in semi-arid northwestern Costa Rica that has been 
heavily impacted by trade liberalization, neoliberal politics, and drought. Relying on the 
concepts of vulnerability, I focus on local outcomes in this case to ask: What constrains 
farmer efforts in adaptation to drought? Why were the constraints imposed, and how do 
the constraints impact vulnerability among farmers?  
To answer my research questions, I use a problem-driven political economy (PE) 
assessment that includes not only consideration of the current problems and their 
institutional foundations, but also examination of the drivers of the problems and an 
analysis of their solutions. Using this approach, I explain, “How did we get here?” by 
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analyzing the institutional legacies that have shaped the distribution of vulnerability to 
global change processes among farmers. I discuss the current distribution of vulnerability 
within rural development in northwestern Costa Rica in the context of my historical 
analysis. I describe how those with the will and political power to do so reformed Costa 
Rica’s political economic institutions, and how this process reformed and reinforced the 
distribution of climate change risk and political power in Northwest Costa Rican 
agriculture.  
I build from of the definition provided by Moe (2005), and define of political 
power as the ability of any one player to change the development program context for 
other users. I view this process as a reflection of power. Water, land, agro-inputs, and 
market access are often scarce resources, and are often controlled by select groups at key 
points in agrarian development programs. As risks of scarcity increase—and these are 
often driven by trade-liberalization, agro-investments, or climate change—farmers 
controlling limited resources may adapt within the confines of their capacity to do so. 
This can limit resource access to other farmers and leave them more sensitive or exposed 
to global change risks.  
 
2. Research site and design 
2.1 Research site 
The Arenal-Tempisque Irrigation Project (Projecto de Riego del Arenal-
Tempisque, PRAT) in Guanacaste, Costa Rica provides up to 5,616,000 m3/day of water 
to farmers in the Tempisque River Basin from Lake Arenal in the east. Water provision 
occurs through a series of irrigation canals and aqueducts. The irrigation infrastructure, in 
  14 
relation to the Tempisque River Basin is shown in Figure 2.1. In 1973, the Sandillal-
Tempisque-Arenal Hydroelectric Complex was constructed to provide energy to the 
growing population of San Jose. Discharge from the hydroelectric plant allowed the 
PRAT to become a reality in 1980, when the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) 
extended a loan of US$15.1 million to the Costa Rican government. Initially, the PRAT 
covered 6006 hectares of the Tempisque River Basin. Today, the PRAT irrigates 
approximately 28,000 ha, of which 10,000 ha were included in 2006. Water exits the 
system through evapotranspiration or it drains into Palo Verde National Park, and finally 
into the Gulf of Nicoya in the south. 
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Figure 2.1 – Arenal-Tempisque Irrigation District (DRAT), Tempisque River Basin, 
Guanacaste, Costa Rica topography, canal infrastructure, and water source 
 
The PRAT is the largest irrigation-based rural development program in Central 
America. As stated by the Costa Rican government, the specific goals of the project are 
(Edelman, 1992): (1) to utilize the waters discharged by the hydroelectric plants supplied 
by Lake Arenal; (2) to improve living conditions in the semi-arid Tempisque River Basin 
by generating agro-employment, redistributing income, and changing cropping systems; 
(3) to increase agricultural production and productivity; (4) to promote integrated 
regional development with complementary smallholder and agro-industrial sectors; and 
(5) to contribute to the improvement of the country’s economic situation by exporting 
agricultural products. The Inter-American Development bank, which funded the project 
at an estimated US$67 million, states that 1125 farms benefit from the project, generating 
income of approximately US$163 million annually. The Agricultural Development 
Institute (Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, IDA) transferred at little or no cost, 689 of 
those farms, totaling just less than 5,300, to smallholder farmers through the PRAT’s 
agrarian reform initiatives. The configuration of smallholder farmers parcels within the 
larger irrigation system is shown in Figure 2.2. The remaining 22,700 hectares were 
brought under irrigation through a series of public-private agreements requiring lands to 
be used “effectively” in exchange for subsidized water.  
  
  16 
 
Figure 2.2 – IDA Parcels in the DRAT; parcels number 689 and account for 
approximately 25% of the total irrigated hectares shown in Figure 2.1 
 
The idea of the PRAT was to provide smallholder farmers with plots of land, and 
to provide them with governmental extension services. The PRAT was to supply farmers 
with irrigation water during the dry season (November-March) to allow them to obtain 
higher crop yields. Market access for rice (Costa Rica’s most heavily utilized grain in 
both 1980 and today) was to be provided to smallholder farmers by the government. 
Agro-industries funded in part and regulated by the state were to provide milling and 
refining capacity for the smallholder farmers. While the original goals of the PRAT never 
changed, the government’s capacity to see them through to fruition did. The Latin 
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American debt crisis, beginning in 1982 brought a restructuring of Costa Rica’s political 
economy. Costa Rica’s government abandoned many of their public-private partnerships 
in the PRAT in order to meet the economic restructuring demands of the International 
Monetary Fund, World Bank, U.S.AID and the Inter-American Development Bank in 
return for financial support.  
As of 2012, one successful rice harvest on a 10-hectare farm brings approximately 
US$33,000. Over 75% of their gross income covers input and milling costs, which 
provides smallholder farmers with a stable livelihood above Costa Rica’s average gross 
national income of US$8,820 (World Bank, 2012). Ten-hectare smallholder farms in the 
PRAT average two harvests per year to gross just over US$16,000 (CONARROZ, 2012). 
When the same farmer is unable to sell a harvest, they lose US$2,679 per hectare (ibid). 
The inability to sell a 10-hectare rice harvest leaves farmers with a debt of over 
US$26,000 per harvest. In comparison, the production of sugarcane on the same 10-
hectare parcel would pay, on average, US$3000 per year. This is one-fifth what they 
would gain through successful rice production. However, 40% of smallholder farmers 
within the PRAT have transferred their crop production from rice to sugarcane over the 
last six years, thereby undermining the Costa Rican government’s primary development 
goals as listed above.  
The transition of smallholder rice farms to sugarcane production was driven by 
two interrelated factors: (1) foreign and domestically owned, large-scale industrialized 
rice farm adaptations to trade liberalization, and (2) smallholder farmers’ adaptations to 
irrigation water scarcity during rice planting. Rice, being a very water-intensive crop, has 
become more difficult to produce in the region. As drought increasingly affects the 
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region, industrialized farms’ adaptations to international trade liberalization have changed 
Costa Rica’s rice production institutions. The combination of these two processes has 
driven livelihood losses among smallholder farmers in the Tempisque River Basin. These 
recent changes in the PRAT are good for some, but bad for the most vulnerable 
smallholder rice farmers.  
 
2.1.1 Defining sustainability problems in the Arenal-Tempisque Irrigation Project  
Different groups of farmers, policy-makers, and researchers perceive changes in 
the Tempisque River Basin differently. Some argue the future of farming in the PRAT 
should be efficient, industrial farms that export high value crops. Others argue that the 
State’s rural development goals should be valued more highly than increased production 
efficiency. It is the difference in these perspectives that has made the search for solutions 
to agrarian development problems in the region difficult. 
In a series of two interdisciplinary workshops focused on water sustainability in 
the Tempisque River Basin, researchers and local stakeholders were asked to define and 
map drivers and outcomes of sustainability challenges. The first workshop, entitled 
Interdisciplinary workgroup on water sustainability in the Tempisque Basin, NW Costa 
Rica Workshop #1, was held on December 2, 2011 at the University of Florida, 
Gainesville, FL. Attendees included 29 researchers and policy-makers from the 
University of Florida, Arizona State University, the Organization for Tropical Studies 
(OTS), NASA, Texas A&M, the Technical University of Costa Rica (ITCR), and the 
Costa Rican government. Participants worked to define sustainability problems and 
understand knowledge gaps around sustainability in the Tempisque River Basin. 
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Participants developed many drivers and types of sustainability problems in the Basin; 
those most relevant to agrarian development included (1) the neoliberal model that 
replaced the historical communal model, introduced through the free trade agreement 
CAFTA-DR in 2004/2009, greatly impacts smallholder farmers rice-market access, water 
extraction, allocation, use, treatment, etc.; and (2) the central government provides little 
enforcement of laws around water extraction, allocation, use, treatment, etc. in the 
Tempisque Basin. The institutional and stakeholder map used to structure this study was 
drafted in this workshop, based on these findings, and was further revised in workshop 
#2. 
Workshop #2, entitled Interdisciplinary workgroup on water sustainability in the 
Tempisque Basin, NW Costa Rica Workshop #2, was held on April 24-27, 2012 at the 
OTS Palo Verde Biological Field Station, Guanacaste, Costa Rica. Participants included 
20 collaborators from the four participating US universities and organizations and 5 
Costa Rican collaborators from the University of Costa Rica, ITCR, MarViva, Texas 
A&M’s Soltis Center, and ProDesarrollo Internacional. In this second workshop, causal 
linkages between sectors in the institutional and stakeholder map were further defined 
and clarified. This map defined the boundaries of my PE assessment of changes in 
smallholder farmer livelihoods in the PRAT (Figure 2.3).  
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Figure 2.3 – Institutional and stakeholder map for the Tempisque River Basin. Actors 
and decision makers are depicted within each component. Arrows represent causal 
relationships. Outcomes are show from generally good, depicted in green, to bad, 
depicted in red. The map was organized around drivers of water use change, and it 
distinguishes the actors, their interactions, and their outputs, as defined by Kuzdas et al. 
(2014). Land use change is considered a driver because decisions about agriculture in the 
PRAT are made by policy-makers in San Jose’. This map was modified from Murcia et 
al. (2012) to include additional actors. 
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2.2 Methodology 
My methodology was comprised of two components. I applied an (1) explanation 
building case study analysis (Yin, 2014, p. 147) within a (2) problem-driven PE 
assessment (Fritz, Kaiser, & Levy, 2009; Social Development Department, 2008). My PE 
assessment consisted of three steps:  
1. I structured a case study and defined the social-ecohydrological components 
relevant to changes in PRAT smallholder agriculture using the institutional and 
stakeholder map (Figure 2.3); 
2. Using this map as a guide, I explored the development and history of the 
underlying political economic drivers, including stakeholders, economic rent 
distributions, institutional inertias, and outcomes. I structured this third step by 
combining spatial and temporal scales, beginning first with an historical analysis 
at the global and country scales, and then moving to the regional-scale and finally 
to local-outcomes (as described by Fritz et al., 2009). I began by investigating the 
relevant global changes, country-scale institutions, and stakeholders to understand 
the main drivers of the political economy around smallholder farmer livelihood 
losses. I then directed my focus to a regional analysis of my case, thereby linking 
country- and regional-scale actors and institutions.  
3. As my analysis converged on precise outcomes of livelihood losses among 
smallholder farmers, I identified drivers of both reforms to, and reinforcements of, 
the distribution of vulnerability, wealth and power in rice production.  
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2.3 Data collection and analysis 
I relied on a combination of evidence including a literature review, a national 
archival review, interviews and focus groups with key stakeholders (e.g. governmental 
officials, farmers and local researchers), hydrologic and climate data, socio-economic 
census data, and direct observation (Table 2.1). Evidence was initially collected based on 
themes and variables depicted in my institutional and stakeholder map, and then I 
continued collecting evidence until multiple sources corroborated like findings. Using 
this method of triangulation, described by Yin (2014, p. 120), I ensured that each finding 
was supported by more than one source. 
 
Table 2.1 – Evidence collected for case study analysis 
Variable Justification Type/ 
Units 
Sources  
Socio-economic, 
agricultural and census 
data 
Provides trends about 
changes in livelihood 
status 
Varies INEC (The 
National Statistics 
and Census 
Institute) 
www.inec.go.cr 
GIS data for the PRAT 
and surrounding region 
Provides agricultural 
land-use and hydrologic 
data 
Spatial Provided by OTS 
and SENARA. 
Additionally, OTS 
provided access to 
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the 2008 Digital 
Atlas of Costa Rica  
PRAT water allocation 
policy  
Provides details about 
the role of water in 
livelihood outcomes 
Description  5 semi-structured 
interviews with 
PRAT water and 
agricultural 
managers**; 
national archive 
records 
Description of rural 
development history 
and goals 
Provides an indicator for 
the success of the PRAT 
Description 5 semi-structured 
interviews with 
PRAT water and 
agricultural 
managers**; 
national archive 
records 
Average irrigation 
water deficit during rice 
planting  
Represents climate 
change risk and water 
policy efficacy 
Cubic 
meters/sec 
SENARA database 
access (SENARA, 
2012) 
Yearly total rainfall in 
Tempisque River Basin  
Represents climate 
change risk 
Millimeters
/Year 
Instituto Meteoroló
gico Nacional 
database access 
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/Organization for 
Tropical Studies 
database access 
(IMN, 2006; OTS, 
2014) 
Total rice planted in 
Costa Rica from 1993 – 
2012  
Indicates changes in 
political protection from 
imports, and national 
demand  
Hectares CONARROZ 
database access 
(CONARROZ, 
2006 – 2013) 
Total demand to buy 
producers rice at 
Guanacasteca rice mills  
Indicates the existence 
of rice market in the 
Tempisque River Basin; 
is function of rice 
consumption, total rice 
production, and total 
rice imported into Costa 
Rica 
Metric 
tonnes 
CONARROZ 
database access 
(CONARROZ, 
2006 – 2013) 
Average price paid to 
farmer for harvest from 
one hectare of rice  
Indicates farmers' 
incentive to grow rice 
U.S. dollars CONARROZ 
database access 
(CONARROZ, 
2006 – 2013) 
Average price paid to Indicates farmers' U.S. dollars LAICA database 
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farmer for harvest from 
one hectare of 
sugarcane  
incentive to grow 
sugarcane 
access (LAICA, 
2010, 2013) 
Number of rice mills in 
Guanacaste  
Indicates vertical 
integration and 
consolidation of large 
rice farmers 
Amount Arroyo, Lucke, & 
Riveara, 2013, & 
CONARROZ 
database access 
(CONARROZ, 
2006 – 2013) 
Description of farmers' 
responses to reduced 
irrigation allocations 
Provides understanding 
of LSCF responses to 
climate risks 
Description 8 unstructured 
interviews with 
LSCF employees 
Description of LSCF 
responses to changes in 
national rice politics 
Provides understanding 
of LSCF responses to 
globalization risks 
Description 8 unstructured 
interviews with 
LSCF employees; 
national archive 
records 
Description of 
responses to changes in 
national sugarcane 
politics 
Provides understanding 
of LSCF responses to 
globalization risks 
Description 8 unstructured 
interviews with 
LSCF employees; 
national archive 
records 
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Description of 
smallholder farmer 
responses to decreased 
irrigation 
Provides details about 
responses to water-
related impacts 
Description 5 unstructured 
interviews with 
smallholder 
farmers*** 
Description of 
smallholder farmer 
responses to rice 
production changes 
Provides details about 
responses to changes in 
rice politics 
Description 5 unstructured 
interviews with 
smallholder 
farmers*** 
Smallholder farmers' 
rice yield in PRAT from 
1993 – 2012  
Function of total area 
planted with rice by 
smallholder farmers and 
their yearly average 
yield per hectare 
Metric 
tonnes 
Arroyo, Lucke, & 
Riveara, 2013, & 
CONARROZ 
database access 
(CONARROZ, 
2006 – 2013) 
*National archive records include Ley 6877 de creación del SENARA: Artículo 15; 
Decreto 15321-MAG: Artículo 1. Creación del Distrito Arenal; Ley 7096 Contrato 
Préstamo II Etapa: Artículo 2° y 3°; Ley 8685 de Aprobación del Contrato de Préstamo 
entre el Gobierno de Costa Rica y el Banco Centroamericano de Integración Económica 
(BCIE), Contrato de Préstamo 1709; CÓDIGO DE REFERENCIA: CR-AN-AH-
CODESA-000001-000528, Corporación Costarricense de Desarrollo. 
** Institutions represented in interviews included Instituto de Desarrollo Rural (INDER), 
Servicio Nacional de Aguas Subterraneas, Riego y Avenamiento (SENARA), Ministerio 
de Agricultura y Ganadería, (MAG), Instituto Tecnológico de Costa Rica (ITCR), and the 
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Municipalidad de Cañas, Guanacaste, Costa Rica. Each interview lasted from 1.5 to four 
hours in length. Interviews were held at the offices of interviewees during January and 
February 2013.  
 
3. The Arenal-Tempisque Irrigation Project, “How did we get here?” 
3.1 Establishment of Costa Rica’s neo-liberal agrarian development model, 1974 to 
1992 
Costa Rica’s free-market policies of the 1980s were the result of both neoliberal 
measures taken by the President Monge Álvarez administration (1982-1986), that were 
driven by the country’s economic collapse in 1980-1982, and by outside pressures calling 
for increased liberalization of trade and foreign investment with the U.S. and Europe. 
While the interplay among geopolitics, globalizing capital markets, and the lending terms 
of development banks produced Costa Rica’s free-market policies of today (Marois, 
2005), the catalyst for this change began in 1981 when Costa Rica suspended payment on 
its international debts. This suspension coincided with the onset of the Latin American 
debt crisis. Given the severity of Costa Rica’s depressed economy in 1982, the IMF, the 
World Bank, USAID, and the Inter-American Development Bank were the only 
organizations that could negotiate between the Costa Rican government and the private 
banks to restructure debt (Honey, 1994). They were also the only organizations willing to 
lend money to support existing heath care and education governance systems as incomes 
dropped, economic growth stagnated, unemployment rose, and inflation reduced the 
buying power of the middle classes across the whole of Central and South America 
during this time (Bernal & Cristina, 1991).  
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The countries of Central America faced a larger disadvantage in renegotiating 
their debts, compared with South American countries, because economies were less 
diversified and repayment obligations were more highly scrutinized by the IMF and the 
World Bank. Thus, Costa Rica and other Central American countries were forced to 
agree to cross-conditionality agreements with the World Bank (Edelman, 1999). In these 
agreements, Costa Rica was required to fulfill IMF and USAID requirements in order to 
borrow money from the Bank. These requirements focused on reductions in government 
services and increased trade liberalization. This process of externally driven debt 
restructuring began Costa Rica’s transition to free-market politics (ibid). While Costa 
Rica shared many similarities with Nicaragua, Panama, and its other neighbors in terms 
of the free-market demands placed on them during their debt restructuring, Costa Rica 
was much more heavily influenced by the U.S. geopolitical policy for the region. The 
U.S. used Costa Rica as an example of neoliberal economic success in contrast to the 
Sandinista government of Nicaragua. In return, throughout the early 1980s during Costa 
Rica’s debt restructurings, the country received increased support from USAID relative to 
other Central American countries. USAID provided large grants and loans to Costa Rica 
for debt relief and policy reform (Honey, 1994).  
Throughout the 1980s, USAID’s investment in Costa Rica reflected the U.S.’s 
perceived importance of political stability in in Costa Rica (Edelman, 1999). Between 
1983 and 1985, USAID gave US$592 million to Costa Rica, equal to roughly 35.7 % of 
Costa Rica’s entire national budget (Honey, 1994; Marois, 2005). With this investment 
came the demand for an extensive restructuring of the country’s ‘nonproductive’ social 
welfare spending (Edelman, 1999). The strings attached to the USAID money included 
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an expanded role for private banks, the privatization of state-owned agricultural 
companies, and the creation of new private organizations that intentionally duplicated the 
functions of public-sector institutions to showcase privatization of government services. 
The ultimate goal appeared to be validation of a conservative vision of ‘civil society’ 
(Edelman & Seligson, 1994). In the context of agriculture, the most controversial of these 
USAID ‘parallel state’ institutions was a funded private agricultural school with the 
English acronym EARTH (Escuela de la Agricultura de la Region Tropical Humeda), 
which duplicated many of the programs already provided by the Costa Rican university 
system, as well as other new USAID-supported institutions that competed with 
underfunded programs in the Ministries of Agriculture and Livestock (Edelman, 1992). 
IMF loans and USAID funds were used to make payments on Costa Rica’s 
international debt (Honey, 1994). In contrast, the IDB and World Bank loans (see Table 
2.2 for a summary of loaned amounts) were used for large agricultural and energy-related 
infrastructure projects. As with so many of these projects, the primary goal was to 
harness or harvest natural resources and increase farmer competitiveness through access 
to larger markets (Marois, 2005). By accepting these loans the Costa Rican government 
had to agree to a drastic liberalization of its agrarian economy. For example, the World 
Bank Structural Adjustment Loan I program of 1985, an $80 million loan, required Costa 
Rica to phase out subsidies for maize and beans. These measures were intended to match 
domestic food prices with international agricultural markets, thus improving efficiency, 
and to discourage food production for household use, thus freeing land and capital for 
agricultural export activities (Edelman, 1999).  
 
  30 
Table 2.2 - Costa-Rican Foreign Aid, 1980–90 ($US millions) (Honey, 1994) 
 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 
USAID 14 13 50 212 168 207 157 181 102 115 75 
WB 30 29 0 25 0 84 0 26 100 95 4 
IMF 60 330 100 0 0 52 0 66 0 53 0 
 
The World Bank also required a reorientation of agricultural extension programs 
by the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería, 
MAG) away from food crops for domestic consumption and toward the nontraditional 
export crops such as ornamental plants, coconut oil, aquaculture, citrus, nuts, mangos, 
and melons. These new agricultural exports expected to take advantage of the newly 
formed U.S. Caribbean Basin Initiative, designed to provide access to the U.S. market. 
The World Bank Structural Adjustment Loan II, signed in 1988 and paid through 1992, 
was a US$200 million loan agreement with the World Bank that continued the 
reallocation of state-owned agricultural resources to the private sector and their 
rededication to agricultural export activities (Honey, 1994). By accepting the loan, the 
Costa Rican government agreed to reduce domestic prices for many basic grains to match 
international market prices (Picciotto, Ingram, Ramirez, & Lamdany, 2000), but to keep 
subsidies for the nontraditional export crops. This agreement opened the domestic 
agricultural market to grain imports from across the globe, thus flooding the domestic 
market with cheap grains and undermining smallholder producers across the country. 
However, tariff protections for rice remained in place.  
 
  31 
3.1.1 Agrarian development in Guanacaste Province: water, electricity, and neo-liberal 
politics 
To explain the current characteristics of the Arenal-Tempisque Irrigation Project, 
it is necessary to consider the legacies of Costa Rica’s neo-liberal economic restructuring 
of the 1980s and 1990s. The project was designed around the concept of integrated rural 
development, and was ostensibly focused on the modernization and industrialization of 
smallholder farmers in the Province of Guanacaste. However, the development path 
changed course during Costa Rica’s neoliberal shift, resulting in a new direction for 
irrigated agriculture in Northwest Costa Rica. As agricultural land use doubled across 
Costa Rica, beginning in 1960 and continuing through 1983 (Carr, Barbieri, Pan, & 
Iravani, 2006), the province of Guanacaste remained largely unchanged. Guanacaste was 
shielded from the political shifts occurring across Costa Rica by the region’s semi-arid 
climate and by its location remote from the capital, San Jose. While Guanacaste, and 
specifically the Tempisque River Basin were rich in arable land, with large expanses of 
flat, fertile alluvial soils, agricultural development was limited because of the relatively 
dry climate. Furthermore, the province was devoid of key infrastructure—many of the 
roads in the region were only passable in the dry season, further complicating 
development challenges. 
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3.2 Effects of neo-liberal policies on the design and development of the Arenal-
Tempisque Irrigation Project, 1974 to 1992 
3.2.1 Design of the Arenal-Tempisque Irrigation Project 
In 1974, the Inter-American Development Bank extended a US$50.5 million loan 
to Costa Rica to build a hydro-electric generating facility on the Arenal River, on the 
Atlantic slope, creating Lake Arenal, at 530 meters above sea level, with an area of 75 
square kilometers, and a capacity of 1.5 billion cubic meters (IICA, 1993). The facility 
was to provide electricity to San Jose’ during periods of peak demand, from March to 
June of each year (SENARA, 2013). In an effort to manage this flow, and coinciding with 
the publication of the administration’s National Agribusiness Development Plan (Plan 
Nacional de Desarrollo de los Agronegocios, PNDA) in 1978, President Oduber Quirós’s 
administration (1974-1978) developed the Arenal-Tempisque Irrigation Project Master 
Plan (1978). They coordinated with engineers from the U.S. Department of the Interior to 
design a 33-by-5 kilometer irrigation system along the Tempisque River (Jimenez, 1996). 
The PNDA was designed to promote ‘agribusiness’ among smallholder farmers 
across the country. It was touted as the solution to problems of livelihood stagnation 
throughout the Tempisque River Basin (Villalta, 1994). The plan was developed to move 
smallholder and subsistence farmers from poverty by providing them with irrigation 
infrastructure and through increased market access. President Oduber Quirós’s 
administration (1974-1978) assumed irrigation water from Lake Arenal would enable 
farmers in Guanacaste to increase output, transforming summer seasonal agriculture into 
a continuous activity. The Arenal-Tempisque Irrigation Project Master Plan was the 
mechanism through which the Costa Rican government planned to achieve the goals of 
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the PNDA. These goals were two fold: (1) to increase the availability of a regular supply 
of raw materials for agriculture including, water, land, and agro-inputs, and (2) to 
reorganization the marketing system for agriculture in Costa Rica by providing 
smallholder farmers direct access to agricultural markets (IICA, 1993). Not surprisingly, 
the goals outlined in the Arenal-Tempisque Irrigation Project Master Plan aligned closely 
with those of the PNDA (in order of descending priorities): (1) to take maximum 
advantage of the waters discharged by the Lake Arenal hydroelectric dam; (2) to improve 
living conditions in the region by generating employment, redistributing income, and 
changing cropping systems; (3) to increase agricultural and livestock production and 
productivity; (4) to promote integrated regional development with complementary 
agricultural and industrial sectors and an expanded service sector; and (5) to contribute to 
the improvement of the country’s economic situation by exporting fresh and processed 
agricultural products (Edelman, 1992).  
In 1978, President Carazo Odio was elected into the presidency (1978-1982). 
Carazo Odio continued Oduber Quirós’s legacy and he began designing the legislative 
framework for the PRAT using the goals defined in both the Arenal-Tempisque Irrigation 
Project Master Plan and the PNDA. Carazo Odio created a special Department of 
Irrigation and Drainage with an executive decree in 1979 to provide an institutional basis 
for planning and building necessary the infrastructure throughout the Tempisque River 
Basin. However, the newly formed department did not have the power to manage the land 
acquisition issues needed to meet Carazo Odio’s rural development goals, which were 
based on a redistribution of land and income from large landowners to poor families. 
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Without the support of the legislature, Carazo Odio was unable to pass a land 
redistribution policy.  
President Luis Monge Álvarez (1982-1986) took office on May 8th, 1982 as a 
member of the National Liberation Party (Partido Liberación Nacional, PLN). The more 
progressive PLN was able to generate the support necessary to pass two agrarian reform 
bills in 1982 and 1983. The Agrarian Development Institute (Instituto de Desarrollo 
Agrario, IDA, in 2011 the Institute’s name was changed to the Instituto de Desarrollo 
Rural, INDER) was created in 1982, and the National Subterranean Waters, Irrigation, 
and Drainage Service (Servicio Nacional de Aguas Subterraneas, Riego y Avenamiento, 
SENARA) was created in 1983, replacing the Department of Irrigation and Drainage. 
These new agencies were given legal authority to dictate land use objectives.  
Costa Rica began the largest rural development program in its history with the 
creation of IDA and SENARA, but the changing political climate in San Jose that 
coincided with the debt restructuring by the IMF gave private land owner lobbyists 
enough influence to strike one key element from the legislation. All wording in the 
legislation that would have made it illegal for any one landholder to own more than 100 
hectares within the new irrigation system was struck from the law (Edelman, 1992). This 
allowed large landholders to retain large tracts of land that would now be irrigated by the 
government. While Monge Álvarez ultimately signed the bill into law, the administration 
considered the failure to establish legal limits on land ownership concentration in the 
district a defeat. He worried that private land speculation would undermine their 
development program and further separate the ‘haves from the have-nots.’ However, 
though the IDA’s ability to redistribute irrigated lands from large landholders to 
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smallholder farmers was hampered, a slow redistribution of land did unexpectedly occur 
in the PRAT throughout the mid to late 1980s. This was due to the newly gained power 
of SENARA’s water managers to dictate land-use, as stipulated by the legislation that 
created the organization in 1983 (Edelman, 1992).  
No cap was placed on the size of irrigated land holdings in the PRAT, but the new 
regulation did provide the following land use requirement: all lands receiving irrigation 
water from Lake Arenal must be used efficiently for irrigated agriculture. Congress, 
through SENARA’s enforcement, legislated that large landholders must, if provided 
water, use the land efficiently. This clause, overlooked by private lobbyists during the 
passing of the development legislation, transferred much of the power for rural 
development to the PRAT’s water managers. As a result, the government was able to use 
SENARA to meet the goals of their reform program. Throughout the 1980s SENARA 
ferociously enforced the efficient land use stipulation across the PRAT, and as large 
landholders realized they did not have the capacity to utilize irrigation water efficiently, 
they sold their lands to IDA. IDA then distributed the acquired lands to smallholder 
farmers as part of the country’s rural development program (Edelman, 1992). At the time, 
large landowners did not have the capacity to bring large tracts of land into production 
with or without irrigation because transportation infrastructure within Guanacaste was 
still the limitation. They had very restricted access to large-scale planting and harvesting 
equipment, and the agricultural labor market had not yet developed. By the end of the 
1980s, smallholder farmers had become the most efficient producers in the region, 
producing more rice per hectare than any other agricultural region in the country. 
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3.2.2 Development of the Arenal-Tempisque Irrigation Project in the context of Costa 
Rica’s economic restructuring 
IDA and SENARA were designed and passed into law as a means to redistribute 
and provide agricultural resources including land, water, and agro-inputs to the 
smallholder farmers throughout the Tempisque River Basin, but this would only address 
half of the National Agribusiness Development Plan (see above). If smallholder farmers 
were to be able to base their livelihoods on agriculture, reorganization the agro-marketing 
system would be needed to provide smallholder farmers with access to agricultural 
markets. Of the three administrations responsible for the design and early development of 
the PRAT (Oduber Quirós 1974-1978, Carazo Odio 1978-1982, and Monge Álvarez 
1982-1986), President Carazo Odio did the most to reorganize Costa Rica’s agricultural 
market system to promote smallholder agriculture. He co-opted a pre-existing federal 
program called the Costa Rican Development Corporation, S.A. (Corporación 
Costarricense de Desarrollo, CODESA), and reoriented it to promote the goals of the 
National Agribusiness Development Plan, as was typical of integrated rural development 
planning of this era throughout Latin America. CODESA was originally a state 
development agency established by Act No. 5122 in 1972 to promote the economic 
development of the country. CODESA was originally designed to develop and implement 
programs and projects of economic development on regional and national scales 
(Alvarado-Quesada, 2012). Carazo Odio began establishing agricultural subsidiaries of 
CODESA. These subsidiaries included processing plants and agro-resource facilities 
within the boundaries of the PRAT that provided assistance to smallholder farmers and 
operated as buyers and sellers of farmers’ rice and agro-inputs.  
  37 
In 1984 and 1985, CODESA underwent drastic changes due to the IMF/World 
Bank/USAID restructuring program. These changes undermined much of Carazo Odio’s 
efforts regarding CODESA, and farmers in the PRAT ultimately received little 
government support from the CODESA subsidiaries. The Monge Álvarez administration 
was obligated to reduce funding to and sell off CODESA assets that had been established 
by Carazo Odio four years prior, as a condition of the restructuring. On January 18, 1985, 
a Memorandum of Understanding between the Monge Álvarez administration and 
USAID was signed as a condition of increasing USAID support, which required Monge 
Álvarez to privatize CODESA. By Executive Decree No. 16520-P-MCE, on February 25, 
1985, Monge Álvarez created the National Commission for Restructuring CODESA that 
began the sale of CODESA and its subsidiaries to private investors. By the early-1990s, 
all rice mills located in Guanacaste were privately owned. In this new economic 
environment smallholder farmers’ were required to rely solely on private mills to access 
markets.  
Limited technology, agricultural extension services, and credit access coupled 
with limited options for market access prohibited smallholder farmers from reconfiguring 
their farms to produce the nontraditional export crops promoted by USAID throughout 
the 1980s. Sugarcane, the most widely produced crop in the PRAT as of 2013, was not 
yet commonly produced, and Guanacaste farmers could not compete in the regional fruit 
and vegetable market with farmers in the more fruit-friendly climates of Tilaran, Arenal, 
and further south toward the Central Basin. For these reasons, smallholder farmers 
continued to rely on the production of rice for both household consumption and 
livelihood preservation. Throughout the 1980s into the early 1990s, as IDA acquired land 
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and established new smallholder parcels, new farmers overwhelmingly relied on rice 
production, as shown Figure 2.4.  
 
 
Figure 2.4 – Rice and sugarcane production in the PRAT from 1983 to 1991; in 1989 
farmers started producing two crops per year using irrigation water (SENARA; 1989; 
1990; 1992; IICA, 1992). 
 
3.3 Smallholder rice farming in the Arenal-Tempisque Irrigation Project, 1992 to 
2002 
Throughout the remainder of the 1990s until 2002, smallholder farmers were 
generally able to sustain their livelihoods through the utilization of SENARA’s irrigation 
water. They were able to sell their rice harvests to many of the larger private mills 
throughout Guanacaste. Rice did not bring the high profits received by fruit and vegetable 
farmers in the Central Basin, but smallholder farmers in the Tempisque River Basin were 
able to find buyers because most of the newly privatized mills were not vertically 
integrated (i.e. amassed control over each step in the supply chain including the 
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production, processing, and sales of agricultural products), and most of the rice consumed 
in Costa Rica was produced domestically. At the turn of the century, almost all 
parcelaros (i.e. smallholder farmers who were given land or who were sold land at 
discounted rates by the IDA) in the PRAT grew rice (Arriagada, Sills, Pattanayak, 
Cubbage, & González, 2010).  
The substantial reliance on rice production by smallholder farmers in the PRAT 
was the product of limited extension services for other crops, limited market access for 
anything except rice and sugarcane, and a historical precedence for growing rice. 
Fortunately, rice was still wielding a high price on the domestic market throughout the 
1990s; IDA and SENARA made rice production a priority during this time for this 
reason, and they financed extension projects for farmers to support farmer rice producing 
goals throughout the 1990s. In some IDA sectors (i.e. each continuous tract of land 
purchased by IDA from large landholder was considered a different sector, there are 
currently seven sectors as shown in Figure 2.2), such as Bagatzi, rice production was 
almost necessary. Rice production on small plots requires collective action between 
farmers to be profitable. In Bagatzi, where rice was cultivated on adjacent 10 hectare 
plots, parcelaros intricately coordinated planting, harvesting, watering, and fumigation 
schedules. No one parcelaro could afford areal fumigation, so all-96 parcels in the 
Bagatzi reform project coordinated.  
During the 1990s, larger landholders, able to maintain their holdings throughout 
the 1980s, began industrializing rice production on their farms, which were between 50 
and 500 ha in size. Industrialized rice farms also established additional arrozarias (i.e. 
industrialized rice mills) that purchased rice from other farmers, thereby diversifying 
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market access for smallholder farmers. The increasing rice production throughout the 
PRAT both by small- and large-sized farms hinged on the provision of irrigation water by 
SENARA, and this reliance made the region’s agricultural sector particularly vulnerable 
to changes in water availability and rice commodity policies. 
 
3.4 Effects of trade liberalization and climate change on the Arenal-Tempisque 
Irrigation Project, 2002 to 2013 
3.4.1 Large rice producers’ response to threats of trade liberalization  
In 2002, the rice market in Costa Rica changed. As the third largest rice consumer 
per capita across the globe (IRRI, 2013), rice was at the center of legislative politics as 
debate began on the ratification of the Dominican Republic – Central America Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA-DR), designed to create a free trade area among the USA, Central 
America and Caribbean countries. While Costa Rica did not ratify the treaty until 2009, it 
drew attention to vulnerable sectors of the Costa Rican economy (Frajman, 2012). When 
talks of CAFTA-DR first began in the early 2000s, both large rice producers and 
arrozarias lobbied policymakers in San Jose, claiming that Costa Rica should keep its 
tariff protection for direct rice imports intact, thereby supporting domestic producers 
(Monge-González, Rivera, & Rosales-Tijerino, 2010).  
The Costa Rican National Association of Rice Millers (La Asociación Nacional 
de Industriales del Sector Arrocero de Costa Rica, ANINSA) and the National Chamber 
of Rice Producers (Cámara Nacional de Productores de Arroz) funded the lobbying 
effort, and they proposed a set of improvements to the Rice Office (Law 7014). They 
claimed changes to Costa Rican rice policies were necessary to protect rice producers, 
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millers, and consumers from volatile international rice markets. Their proposed changes 
included a rice-price fixing scheme to ensure profitability for domestic rice producers; 
they proposed a transfer of decision-making power on rice industry policies to a board of 
private producers and rice mills. They also lobbied to change the Rice Office’s legal 
status from a government organization to a publicly funded, non-governmental 
organization. Realizing that rice production in Costa Rica was not able to meet the 
increasing domestic consumption demands, ANINSA also argued that the new rice office 
should be granted the sole right to import rice from the international market into Costa 
Rica with zero tariffs to supplement domestic production as needed.  
The debate on the proposed changes to the Rice Office took more than two years. 
On May 23, 2002, the lobbying effort prevailed, and Law 8285 was passed by the 
legislature, creating the National Rice Corporation (Corporacion Arrocera Nacional, 
CONARROZ). The main opposition to the creation of CONARROZ came from 
lawmakers opposed to granting CONARROZ exclusive rights to import rice with no 
tariff, which they claimed contradicted the principle of free competition and would 
negatively affect consumer welfare (Monge-González et al., 2010). The objective of 
CONARROZ was to manage a hedge fund created by the government to stimulate the 
price margins of Costa Rican rice producers and enhance their competitiveness by 
protecting rice producers from competition. It was supposed to protect domestic 
producers from fluctuations in international rice prices and to improve their yearly rice 
yields through extension services. Legislators, through the passing of Law 8285, provided 
CONARROZ, which was managed in its entirety by large producers and mills owners, 
two key decision-making rights within the rice sector (ibid): (1) decision-making 
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authority for the type and application of publicly funded agricultural extension services 
was granted to CONARROZ’s board of rice producers and rice mills, and (2) 
monopolistic rights were granted to the board to import paddy rice with no tariffs (Article 
40 of Law 8285). The passage of CONARROZ constituted the privatization of public 
benefits, from a heavy public subsidy and investment in rural development with the 
assumption of a poverty alleviation to one in which the primary beneficiaries were 
private producers and mills with commercial identities. This represented a shift in the role 
of the state in agrarian rural development policy. 
The passage of CONARROZ also initiated Costa Rica’s rice-price fixing scheme. 
Even though Law 8285 was passed to protect domestic producers from fluctuations in 
international prices, rice imports from the international market have increased over the 
last decade. This increase is the logical result of lower international prices and higher 
domestic-fixed prices, given the import incentive dictated in Article 40 of Law 8285:  
CHAPTER VI, Article 40: The charge of importing paddy 
rice falls to the Rice Corporation (CONARROZ). For the 
purpose of marketing imported rice in the country, priority 
will be given to processing plants in proportion to 
domestically acquired rice. (translated by authors, for 
original wording see National Archives, 2002). 
 
As stipulated, CONARROZ must sell rice imports to rice mills, and with this sale 
comes a transfer of economic rents, which are the price differences between rice bought 
on the domestic market and rice bought by the mills from the international market 
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through CONARROZ. Rice on the world market is consistently less expensive than 
domestically produced rice. This is due to (1) the high fixed prices of domestically 
produced rice, and (2) the production efficiency of rice produced in the USA, China, and 
Thailand, which averages 7 metric tonnes per hectare, compared with Costa Rica’s 
average production of 4 metric tonnes per hectare (Arroyo, Lucke, & Riveara, 2013). 
Two years after the Law 8285 went into effect, in 2004 the economic rent transferred to 
rice mills through CONARROZ was US$6.7 million (Polo-Cheva et al., 2006). The rents 
won by CONARROZ and transferred to industrial producers and mills reached US$104 
million in 2012 (Barquero, 2013). 
Article 40 also stipulates that tariff-free rice imports be distributed to “processing 
plants in proportion to domestically acquired rice.” This clause was included in Law 
8285 in an attempt to ensure that imported rice is processed and sold as efficiently as 
possible. In actuality, what this clause did was create an incentive for agro-industrial 
consolidation and vertical integration (i.e., the combination in one agro-business of two 
or more stages of production). Because tariff-free rice is allocated based on acquisition of 
domestic rice (regardless of producer size) and milling capacity, economic rents from 
imported rice are also transferred based on domestic rice acquisition and milling capacity. 
Industrial mills were incentivized to begin producing rice, because they could gain 
increased rents from imported rice without paying the high fixed rice prices for 
smallholder yields. This successful rent seeking by the National Chamber of Rice 
Producers and ANINSA, which today represents 11 of Costa Rica’s 15 rice mills, began 
the gradual displacement of smallholder farmers from the rice market. This trend was 
most significant in the Tempisque River Basin, which produces 45% of the country’s rice 
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(CONARROZ, 2012). Large mills throughout the basin drastically consolidated to gain 
the rents from CONARROZ imports and avoid paying high prices for smallholder yields. 
In 2002, there were 11 agribusinesses with milling capacity operating in the Basin, but by 
2012 there were only 5 (Figure 2.5 depicts this trend). 
 
 
Figure 2.5 – Rice mills in the Tempisque River Basin from 2003 to 2012 (CONARROZ, 
2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012) 
 
With this concentration came a drastic vertical integration of rice production in 
the Tempisque River Basin. Mills increased their private land holdings and direct 
production using rents from imported rice, allowed within the PRAT because no 
limitation on land holdings was stipulated in the passing of the Agrarian Development 
Institute (Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, IDA) legislation in 1983. Mills can produce 
rice more cheaply because they are able avoid the high-fixed prices that must be paid to 
purchase smallholder harvests. Also, mills are able to avoid the high transactions costs 
associated with purchasing rice from smallholders through vertical integration in the rice 
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market. This process has greatly impacted smallholder rice farmers in the PRAT who rely 
on private mills for market access. Because mills are now relying on imported rice and 
increasingly producing their own harvests, they eliminated many of their production 
contracts with smallholder farmers, which effectively means that these farmers cannot 
sell their crop.  
As of 2013, most smallholder farmers are unable to gain rice contracts, which 
would ensure the successful sale of their harvests. The lack of contracts among 
smallholder farmers increases their business risks because they have no guarantees that 
their harvests will be purchased. The consolidation of agribusinesses that purchase 
imported rice from CONARROZ and supplement this supply with their own domestic 
harvests has changed rice production for smallholder farmers in the PRAT. Some 
smallholder farmers are still able to find buyers for their rice harvests, but these 
arrozarias will only purchase others’ harvests if imports and industrially produced 
supplies do not meet demand. 
Between 2007 and 2012, the total hectares planted with rice across the entirety of 
Costa Rica increased by 40% because large producers switched from sugarcane to rice as 
a result of increasing fixed domestic rice prices (Stange & Gonzalez, 2013; Figure 2.6). 
However, traditionally stable rice production among smallholder farmers in the PRAT 
followed an entirely opposite trend. While producers across the entirety of Costa Rica 
switched 40% of their arable land from sugarcane and other crops to rice production, 
smallholder farms switched approximately 30% of their planted land from rice to 
sugarcane production (Figure 2.6).  
 
  46 
 
Figure 2.6 – Total rice planted in Costa Rica (CONARROZ, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012) and rice production among smallholder farmers in the PRAT (Arroyo et al., 
2013; CONARROZ, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012); this planted area data is the 
summed total of up to three rice harvests per year per farm; smallholders in the PRAT 
typically grow two crops per year, and some grow three, and this is reflected in this 
figure.  
 
Three sugarcane mills operate within the boarders of the PRAT, and together they 
control approximately 65% of Costa Rica’s sugar milling capacity (LAICA, 2013). The 
companies that own and operate these three mills are also vertically integrated, and they 
own approximately 25% of the 28,000 irrigated hectares in the PRAT; in 2012, the area 
planted with sugarcane in the PRAT was estimated by SENARA to be nearly 53% of that 
area.  
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It is increasingly difficult for smallholder farmers to secure contracts with rice 
mills due to the mills’ vertical integrations, but many try to continue to plant rice without 
securing a contract, and then they search for dwindling demand at regional mills. This has 
led to increased competition to sell rice among smallholder farmers. Some have switched 
to fast growing rice varieties in order to harvest before mills stop buying rice for the 
season. Mills only purchase smallholder rice harvests to supplement their expanding 
production. They purchase “non-contract” rice on a “first-come-first-served” basis, and 
then they stop purchasing for the season. Many smallholder farmers have been unable to 
sell their harvests and therefore many have assumed debts since 2002 due to their 
inability to sell their harvests. These debts are being purchased by the three sugarcane 
mills in return for full land-management contracts in an effort to increase hectares planted 
with sugarcane to meet domestic processing capacities. The sugarcane mills then manage 
and farm smallholders’ plots, and smallholder landowners receive a flat fee per hectare 
depending on their debt, but on average they receive approximately 150,000 colones 
($300 US) per hectare per year. One successful rice harvest on a 10-hectare farm brings 
approximately US$33,000 as of 2012 (CONARROZ, 2012). Over 75% of their gross 
income covers input and milling costs, which provides smallholder farmers with a stable 
livelihood above Costa Rica’s average gross national income of US$8,820 (World Bank, 
2012). Ten-hectare smallholder farms in the PRAT average two harvests per year to 
profit just over US$16,000 (CONARROZ, 2012). When the same farmer is unable to sell 
a harvest, they lose US$2,679 per hectare (ibid). The inability to sell a 10-hectare rice 
harvest leaves farmers with a debt of over US$26,000 per harvest. In comparison, the 
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production of sugarcane on the same 10-hectare parcel would pay, on average, US$3000 
per year. This is one-fifth what they would gain through successful rice production. 
 
3.4.2 Effects of increasing regional drought on the Arenal-Tempisque Irrigation 
Project 
Water availability has always been a barrier to agriculture in the Tempisque River 
Basin due to the region’s semi-arid climate, but recent scarcity has not been the product 
of fluctuating rainfall. SENARA’s allocation scheme, based on equality (i.e. every 
hectare receives an equal allocation regardless of ownership), was designed in 2006 after 
the fourth expansion of the PRAT brought water demand within reach of water supply. 
At the same time, the region began suffering from one of the worst droughts in recorded 
history.  
The Tempisque River Basin operated under drought conditions in six of the eight 
years between 2006 and 2014. In 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
reported strong consensus among climate models that temperature will increase and 
precipitation will continue to decrease in much of Pacific Central America over the next 
four decades (Magrin et al., 2007). Downscaled regional climate models for Northwest 
Costa Rica predict higher temperatures and water deficits (i.e. yearly evapotranspiration 
will be greater than yearly precipitation) in the region within the next two decades 
(Anderson, Flores, Perez, Carrillo, & Sempris, 2008). Wet season precipitation is 
expected to decrease as much as 27%, creating soil-moisture deficits and reducing the 
amount of surface water available for irrigation. Dry season river flow is also expected to 
decrease due to reduced cloud cover on mountain ridges (Karmalkar, Bradley, & Diaz, 
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2008). This trend towards increasing aridity is already evident in the Tempisque River 
Basin, as the average annual rainfall in the Tempisque River Basin has decreased by 
approximately 100 mm since 1950 (Figure 2.7). This increasing aridity has started to 
impact agriculture and water availability (Poveda et al., 2006; Waylen et al., 1996).  
 
 
Figure 2.7 – Monthly precipitation trend in the Tempisque River Basin from 1950 to 
2012, recorded at the Santa Cruz and Bagaces, Guanacaste weather stations and averaged 
between the two; regression line slope = -0.0024.  
 
In September 2006, for the first time, the PRAT operated under conditions of 
water scarcity. Reductions in rainfall increased irrigation demand in the PRAT, but the 
low water volume in Lake Arenal dictated that SENARA could not meet farmers’ 
demands for water. This decreased water availability to farmers was been driven by the 
fact that San Jose’s rainy-season electricity demand took precedent over Guanacaste’s 
dry season irrigation demand (see prioritized goals for the system above). While there 
was enough water in Lake Arenal to meet farmers’ demands, the increasing drought led 
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the hydroelectric facility managers to hold back water for hydroelectric production to 
ensure San Jose’s electricity demands could be met, rather than turning it over to 
SENARA for allocation to farmers. The Arenal-Tempisque Irrigation Project Master Plan 
of 1978 authorized this water-right prioritization. Both farmers and the water manager 
were forced to adapt quickly. SENARA devised a plan to irrigate by sector to provide 
farmers with enough water to plant and harvest and suffer yield decline. The theory was 
that rice only requires a “flooding” during planting; it does not need a consistent influx of 
water. While SENARA was not able to provide this initial flooding to all rice farmers 
across the PRAT at once in early December, it was able to provide individual sectors with 
the water necessary to flood farmers’ fields, and all sectors would receive their full 
planting allocation of water between December and January. SENARA informed farmers 
that irrigation would be provided in ‘shifts’ by sector. SENARA then alternated irrigation 
between sectors on a 14-day cycle until planting was completed.  
Since 2006, water shortages throughout the PRAT have worsened (Figure 2.8), 
and supplies cannot fulfill the demand during the high water demand months of 
December and January, during which time both rice and sugarcane are planted. Both 
crops must be planted near the start of the dry season so they can be harvested prior to the 
beginning of the next rainy season. Many smallholder rice farmers have had to wait over 
a month to plant, which then pushes their harvest dates back. Because few smallholder 
farmers have sales contracts with arrozarias, a later harvest date reduces the probability 
that they will find remaining capacity at any one of the five remaining arrozarias. Larger 
farms and smallholder farmers near rivers overwhelmingly adapt to this situation by 
relying on illegal wells and illegally pumping from the numerous rivers that exist 
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throughout the region. Many smallholder farmers have resorted to building illegal dams 
in canals downstream from their farm to increase the water level in the canal at the 
entrance gate to their fields; they then break the locks on their entrance gates to gain 
access to the water. This practice has incited conflict and violence among farmers as 
those further downstream lose their access to water. Dozens of related conflicts have been 
reported throughout the system over the last eight years. Many smallholder farmers have 
been forced to abandon their rice fields because there simply is not enough water left in 
the irrigation canals, and many others have been unable to sell their harvests because they 
harvest too late to find buyers for their crop. 
 
 
Figure 2.8 – Water supply and water demand in the PRAT (data provided by SENARA) 
 
Unprecedented drought during the 2012 rainy season caused the PRAT to 
experience its largest irrigation water deficit to date because there was insufficient water 
being discharged from Lake Arenal to meet irrigation demands. From September 2012 to 
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February of 2013, SENARA spent over one million colones (approximately US$2000) 
per month replacing locks that farmers broke to gain access to water. In December of 
2012, this water scarcity conflict in the PRAT reached a boiling point when farmers 
began threatening SENARA employees. One farmer was charged with attempted murder 
for his alleged assault of a SENARA canalaro (i.e., SENARA employee responsible for 
managing irrigation infrastructure) who was shutting a sluice gate after the farmer had 
received his reduced allocation of water. The farmer confronted the SENARA employee, 
rolled his bike into the irrigation canal, and then attempted to run him down with his farm 
truck. Needless to say these events have strained the relationship between SENARA and 
smallholder farmers. SENARA requires irrigation payments from farmers to maintain 
infrastructure. These payments average US$100 per year for smallholder farmers. For a 
typical smallholder farmer, they account for 2.5% of rice production costs, and they are 
highly subsidized. By contrast, the annual cost of unsubsidized irrigation water from 
Lake Arenal has been estimated to be approximately US$400 per irrigated hectare 
(Umaña, 2011). However, 65% of farmers owning less than 10 hectares of irrigated land 
submitted requests to defer their payments in 2013 due to strained relationships between 
farmers and water managers. This increase in deferments has forced SENARA to 
postpone infrastructure repairs, further stressing the entire system.  
 
4. Adaptations in the PRAT to global changes: reforms to, and reinforcements 
of the distribution of risk, wealth, and power 
The IMF, World Bank and USAID economic restructuring demands greatly 
changed Costa Rica’s socio-economic development model that created and legitimized 
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IDA/SENARA, and they have effectively dictated the PRAT’s development trajectory 
since. The restructuring impacted the PRAT in three primary ways. First, the liquidation 
of CODESA made smallholder farmers dependent on private rice mills for market access. 
Second, the creation of private agricultural extension services that replaced state 
agricultural agencies constrained smallholder farmer production options throughout the 
1980s and 1990s, requiring them to rely on rice or leave farming. And third, the lack of 
land size restrictions in the PRAT allowed vertical integration by private farms and mills 
and enabled a competitive advantage for some farmers by removing resource access 
protections for many smallholder farmers; this ultimately excluded many smallholder 
farmers from lucrative agricultural supply chains. As the national political economy 
changed, so did the PRAT’s development path. The shift to a neoliberal development 
model eliminated the potential for meaningful wealth redistribution across the PRAT. 
The initial agrarian development goals of wealth, land, and water redistribution were 
never realized due to the inability of the State to prioritize rural development over 
agricultural efficiency. IDA and SENARA continued to work toward the original goals of 
the project, but within the changed institutional structure, what has resulted is a 
resettlement program that has redistributed land to the rural poor without providing them 
with the capacity to use that land for their own good or to respond to changing climate 
and crop markets, thereby making them vulnerable to these changes. 
Costa Rica’s economic restructuring also instilled an institutional structure that 
ultimately disproportionately burdened the most vulnerable farmers in the PRAT by 
redistributing the impacts of global change risks. Global changes, specifically trade 
liberalization, drove rice mills to adapt which limited smallholder farmers’ market access. 
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Increasing drought in the Tempisque River Basin exacerbated smallholder farmers’ 
vulnerability. President Oduber Quirós’s vision of agriculture in the Tempisque River 
Basin brought livelihood security to 680 smallholder farmers and almost 2,500 farm 
hands (chambaros), but this, combined with the restructuring also created a dependence 
on government-supplied irrigation water and market access. As the economic 
restructuring stripped away state provisions in the PRAT, smallholder farmers and the 
larger agrarian economy were left dependent on larger, private farms. Smallholder 
farmers were left vulnerable to risks created by larger farms’ adaptations to the impacts 
of global changes. These risks included the vertical integration of rice mills and industrial 
farms to gain increased access to economic rents, made possible through the passage of 
CONARROZ. This integration then, unintentionally, created water scarcity among 
smallholder farmers, driven by decreased rice-market access. The heavy reliance on rice 
production, industry for market provision, and irrigation water made smallholder farmers 
vulnerable to any changes in the rice market or in the regional climate. These 
vulnerabilities were exposed as the debate on CAFTA-DR began.  
As CAFTA-DR began the debate on trade liberalism in Costa Rica, smallholder 
farmers, while very aware of the debate, were largely powerless to weigh in, due to their 
lack of influence on legislators in San Jose. Rice mills and large producers in the 
Tempisque River Basin were able to lobby legislatures through the efforts of ANINSA, 
and thereby adapt to increasing trade liberalization and secure their goals by changing the 
institutional structure. The institutions governing the rice market in Costa Rica were 
changed with the passage of CONARROZ, and smallholder farmers had no real voice in 
these changes. This political process gave rise to a new institution that was good for a 
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small and select group of farmers and ultimately bad for others. Members of ANINSA 
exercised their political power to adapt to conditions of changing global trade. The 11 
rice mills in the Tempisque River Basin in 2002 were made less vulnerable to an influx of 
cheaply produced rice onto the global market. They were simultaneously able to secure a 
larger share of the domestic production market, allowed because no limitations on land 
ownership existed in the PRAT as a result of the lobbying efforts of Guanacaste’s private 
landowners during the passage of the IDA legislation in 1982. Beginning in 2003, a slow 
redistribution of wealth occurred across the PRAT as rice mills gained profits from 
imported rice and domestic production, and smallholder farmers competed for decreasing 
rice contracts and scarce water. 
 
4.1 Political production of water scarcity for the most vulnerable 
Water shortages primarily occur in the PRAT during the high water demand 
months of December and January, during which time both rice and sugarcane are planted. 
Both rice and sugarcane require large inputs of water during planting, and both crops 
must be planted near the start of the dry season so they can be harvested prior to the 
beginning of the next rainy season. The water-cycling program, developed by SENARA, 
was designed to spread farmer-planting dates across a series of 6 weeks, thereby allowing 
all farms to successfully plant and harvest prior to the beginning of the next rainy season, 
which usually begins in May of each year. While the water-cycling program could allow 
all smallholder farmers to plant their rice crops and harvest before the rains begin, 
farmers who are forced to wait to plant have more difficulty selling their harvests because 
their later harvest dates limit their ability to sell their harvests before mills stop buying 
  56 
smallholder rice harvests for the season. And, while it is possible for smallholder farmers 
to store their harvests, the debts accrued through the planting and harvesting process 
necessitate the timely sale of their harvests. 
Delayed water allocations, in combination with limited access to the rice market 
during harvest, have caused water piracy among farmers throughout the PRAT. This has 
created water scarcity for some. Farmers upstream in the PRAT illegally modify 
irrigation infrastructure to gain early access to downstream-farmer water allocations. 
Many farmers furthest downstream plant rice but then lose their water access as a result 
of the actions of upstream farmers, and therefore many downstream farmers have been 
forced to abandon rice crops. Water scarcity and the subsequent conflict among 
smallholder farmers can be attributed to the adaptations of more powerful rice farmers to 
the threat of trade liberalization. Those farmers downstream in the PRAT without illegal 
access to alternative water sources lose both their crop harvests and their access to the 
market. This redistribution of wealth and global change risks has undermined the 
development goals of the PRAT. 
 
4.2 Distribution of global change risks in the region 
This case of smallholder rice production in the PRAT has similarities with many 
other agrarian development programs throughout Central and South America that were 
brought about and changed during the “lost decade.” Eakin, Perales, Appendini, & 
Sweeney (2014) show that while the impact of neoliberalism and the North American 
Free Trade Agreement on smallholder production in Mexico has been widely conceived 
as negative, smallholder production continues twenty years after structural reforms. They 
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argue that adaptability in Mexican maize farming has allowed it to persist, and for a 
reconsideration of the assumptions of development policies to focus on unrecognized 
potential within heterogeneous smallholder-systems. Eakin, Bausch, & Sweeney (2014) 
show that smallholder maize production in Sinaloa has restructured Mexico’s white 
maize market, but they highlight the dangers of the emerging negative externalities 
associated with increased dependency on maize production. This is similar to the 
vulnerabilities produced through smallholder farm dependency on rice production in 
Northwest Costa Rica. Appendini (2014) shows that the transition a State-managed maize 
market to the ‘free market’ has been largely influenced by policy decisions that support 
private actors in the maize market, and as a result maize production is now concentrated 
in the hands of relatively few producers, similar to the Costa Rican rice market. 
These examples show commonalities in agrarian development in the Latin 
American case. As the redistribution of risk among groups of farmers to global changes 
drives differences in exposure, sensitivity and resilience in responding to these changes, 
those smallholder farmers without a voice are disproportionately burdened. Global 
change risks are frequently concentrated on the most vulnerable (Kasperson, Kasperson, 
Turner II, Dow, & Meyer, 1995). And, the most vulnerable typically do not have the 
means to participate in local or regional adaptation decisions. A discussion of the 
redistribution of global change risks in the PRAT, in the context of rural development for 
poverty alleviation, must include the procedures that dictate how and by who decisions 
about how the redistribution of risks are made. This discussion must include the 
mechanisms by which some actors’ can change the institutions that dictate this 
distribution of impacts. The threats of the ramifications of CAFTA-DR on the domestic 
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rice trade drove vulnerable farmers with a means to dictate the distribution of the treaty’s 
impacts by altering the State’s institutions and thereby preserve their valued goals. Their 
alterations of the Costa Rica’s rice markets were imposed on all farmers, even those who 
did not have a means to influence the debate. The adaptations by the more powerful, 
agro-industrial companies to international trade liberalization pressure imposed new 
institutions on other farmers. As drought began to limit water availability in the PRAT, 
this change in Costa Rica’s rice policy created water scarcity for some farmers, ultimately 
forcing them to abandon their valued livelihood goals. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The key lesson from this case is that the ability to enact adaptation policies within 
complex development programs requires a deep understanding of the interrelations 
between climate and the political economy. I show that these vulnerabilities were 
produced even as SENARA allocated water equally to all farmers because global trade 
liberalization drove some farmers to change Costa Rica’s rice policies, which drove 
competition among farmers vulnerable to these changes. Recent research on globe change 
adaptation argues that barriers to the implementation of adaptation plans have not been 
aptly addressed (O’Brien & Wolf, 2010; Pelling, 2011). I show that a political economic 
perspective can provide a valuable lens through which barriers to adaptation can be 
viewed. This perspective may allow researchers and development practitioners to 
understand the interrelations and feedbacks between global changes without which can 
lead to myopic development policies. Also, this perspective inherently focuses 
researchers on the barriers to the implementation of climate change adaptation plans in 
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rural development because questions of development inherently lead to questions about 
vulnerability in rural settings. This concept of vulnerability necessitates that adaptation 
researchers confront many longstanding barriers to development including inequity, 
power differentials, inclusivity and sustainability. Vulnerability, through a political 
economic perspective, may also provide insight into the complexity of interacting risks 
faced by the rural poor. 
There is growing recognition among global change researchers of the linkages 
between environmental change and economic activities (R. M. Leichenko, Brien, & 
Solecki, 2010; R. Leichenko & O’Brien, 2008; O’Brien & Leichenko, 2000). However, 
many feedbacks and synergies between these two processes are not well documented or 
understood. This case of the risks interactions of international trade liberalization and 
climate change in the context of the PRAT provides an example of the complexity that 
may exist in these feedbacks, and of the ways these feedbacks may redistribute risk over 
both space and time from politically and economically powerful actors to the most 
vulnerable. We have shown that adaptations reformed and reinforced the distribution of 
vulnerability in the PRAT. Farmers with the political ability to change Costa Rica’s status 
quo in an attempt to avoid impacts of trade liberalization benefited greatly from new rice 
policies. Farmers who had no voice in these change were heavily impacted by the 
interaction of increasing drought and decreasing market access. And, even as we 
understand how these complex interactions between global changes redistribute 
vulnerability and power across the DRAT, major barriers exist that will be difficult to 
overcome by rural development practitioners. In many rural development programs 
across Central America, the authority to make sweeping changes is not granted to 
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practitioners. While water policies could be altered to promote fairness in adaptation, 
those in charge of water distribution have little authority to alter agricultural extension or 
market policies.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE PRODUCTION OF IDIOSYNCRATIC RISKS IN INDUSTRIAL-BASED 
RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS: LESSONS FROM GUANACASTE 
PROVINCE, COSTA RICA  
 
1. Introduction 
The politics of land and water allocation are changing across the developing 
world as international commodity markets increasingly influence household decisions, 
and as international agro-investors demand more arable land and increased access to 
water (Borras et al., 2011). These processes of agricultural globalization (i.e. the 
tightening of coordinated agro-supply chains that increasingly operate on a global scale; 
IFAD, 2006; Najam, Runnalls, & Halle, 2007; Reardon & Barrett, 2000) offer potentially 
increased affluence to investors, cost efficiencies and lower food prices to consumers, 
and more opportunities for rural development to countries. Recently, we have seen an 
increase in policymakers’ and researchers’ promotions of agro-industrialization projects 
as tools for rural development. On the heels of the “Lima Declaration” (UNIDO, 2013), 
the United Nations (UN) is increasingly supporting this development scheme. The “Lima 
Declaration: Towards inclusive and sustainable industrial development,” was adopted and 
signed at the 15th Session of the United Nation Industrial Development Organization 
(UNIDO) General Conference in Lima, Peru, on 2 December 2013. Through the 
declaration, the UN tasks UNIDO to assist Member States towards achieving sustainable 
industrial development by expanding manufacturing and competitiveness in rural areas. 
Development banks and NGOs are also increasingly relying on industrial- and 
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agribusiness-based development projects to meet their objectives, which are often 
established based on Millennium Development Goals (UN, 2013), because these projects 
appear to offer unparalleled opportunities for the development of previously marginal, 
often arid, agrarian lands. 
A renewed interest in agricultural investments, or agro-investments, by 
multinational agro-businesses and foreign governments, spurred by the food crisis of 
2007-2008 (Deininger & Byerlee, 2011), has created unparalleled opportunities for 
industrial-based rural development in regions where none had existed previously. 
Industrial-based rural development links agricultural supply chains between smallholder 
farmers to those of larger commercialized farms in order to increase production 
efficiency and access to markets. These projects also generally advance the use of agro-
technologies with the aim of increasing the resilience of farmers to climate hazards such 
as droughts (for examples see IDB, 2011; World Bank, 2012, 2013b; 3ADI, 2010). The 
availability of new agro-technologies including more efficient irrigation schemes and 
drought-tolerant crop varieties has also contributed to investments in previously marginal 
agricultural production systems. These investments, most pronounced in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and Latin America, are driven by four factors (Deininger & Byerlee, 2011): 
1. Global population and income growth has increased demand for food and other 
industrial raw materials.  
2. Demand for biofuels has increased across the Americas and Europe.  
3. Many multinational agro-corporations are continually shifting production of bulk 
commodities to land-abundant regions where land rights and labor are cheaper.  
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4. The 2007–08 boom in food prices uncovered vulnerabilities in many import-
dependent countries, which spawned food acquisition programs and led to a 
“rediscovery” of the agricultural sector.  
Industrialization is quickly becoming the new paradigm in rural agricultural 
development for these reasons. However, some local farmers and development 
researchers are questioning the utility of liberalizing institutions to expand internationally 
owned, industrialized agriculture as a means of bolstering smallholder farmer livelihoods. 
Some smallholder farmers (i.e. rural producers in developing countries who rely mainly 
on family labor to produce crops for market as their primary source of income; Morton, 
2007) argue that this process actually produces new risks that threaten their livelihoods, 
natural environments, and quality of democracy (for examples see Bebbington, 2012). 
These worries have spawned spirited reactions from the rural poor throughout less-
developed countries (LDC) (Edelman, 1999). In Costa Rica, smallholder farmers have 
recently reacted to these new risks by staging protests (El Nuevo Diario, 2014), 
occupying government buildings (Inside Costa Rica, 2012), and staging road blockades 
(A.M. Costa Rica, 2011). 
Climate change further complicates the ability of development practitioners to 
provide livelihood security to smallholder farmers within industrializing development 
programs. Newly liberalized economic institutions, combined with often-lax 
enforcement, can allow opportunities for more politically or economically powerful 
farmers to adapt in order to gain access to dwindling resources. I define adaptations as 
responses to observed or expected global change risks—their effects and impacts—in 
order to alleviate adverse impacts of change or take advantage of new opportunities 
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(Adger, Arnell, & Tompkins, 2005; IPCC, 2001). There is evidence that this process may 
derail development programs (Byerlee, de Janvry, & Sadoulet, 2009; Deininger & 
Byerlee, 2011). And, while frequent arguments claim industrialization addresses 
agricultural market failures and inefficiencies (FAO, 2009), it is not sufficient to focus 
solely on economic costs and benefits. The removal of agricultural market failures 
through industrialization may not always improve production efficiency because doing so 
may change the local, regional, or national political equilibrium resulting in unintended 
power shifts that exacerbate other market failures (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013). I argue 
that the political, economic and physical power wielded by some groups in agro-supply 
chains (and the subsequent actions they take) may make others more vulnerable to 
climate and market hazards as they adapt to gain access to scarce resources. As more 
powerful resource users adapt their production and livelihood strategies to manage 
climate- and market-based risks, new risks may emerge to other groups from the changed 
context. I define these new risks as a specific type of idiosyncratic risk.  
Generally, risks are defined as the possibility of adverse consequences from 
events or activities with regard to something that people value (Kates, Hohennemser, & 
Kasperson, 1985), and they can be imposed from outside or taken on voluntarily in the 
pursuit of opportunities (World Bank, 2013b). For the purposes of this study, I focus on a 
particular type of idiosyncratic risks, defined as those that are endogenous to a system, 
and that are produced through the actions of others within the system in response to 
exogenous risks (for a more general definition of idiosyncratic risk see World Bank, 
2013). Within industrial-based rural development programs, these idiosyncratic risks may 
emerge from the adaptations of farmers, who control key components of agricultural 
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supply chains, to new, complex, and systemic risks produced from the interaction of 
market forces and climate changes; this is how the industrialization of development 
programs may exacerbate the exposure of the most vulnerable to idiosyncratic risks. We 
know little about how the responses of different groups to new complex risks from global 
changes may feedback to create new, endogenous, and unforeseen risks within 
agricultural supply chains for different groups of farmers. I argue that these idiosyncratic 
risks may force the most vulnerable to abandon their livelihood goals, resulting in the 
failure of the very programs that were put in place to enhance rural development. 
In this paper, I posit that agricultural globalization presents opportunities for 
industrial-based rural development, but the sustainability of these programs depends on 
the ability of policymakers and smallholder farmers to manage idiosyncratic risks. The 
sustainability of these development programs is based on their ability to secure desirable 
social outcomes including inclusive agricultural growth in the face of global change risks. 
I present and justify the study of this new type of idiosyncratic risk, viewed through a 
political economic lens (Moe, 2005), and analyze its emergence in rural development 
programs. I argue that industrial-based rural development programs are uniquely prone to 
these types of idiosyncratic risks. Then, I analyze a case study from an industrial-based 
rural development program in the semi-arid tropics of Northwest Costa Rica using mixed 
methods to begin to understand the pathways through which idiosyncratic risks may 
emerge within industrial-based development programs as different groups of farmers 
respond to systemic risks. I end with a theoretical analysis of idiosyncratic risk pathways. 
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2. Political economic justification for the study of idiosyncratic risks in 
industrial-based rural development 
While industrialization processes within any agrarian rural development program 
may be generally conceptualized as risks, practitioners, policymakers, and smallholder 
farmers often consider the opportunities they afford rural development as worthy of these 
risks. The expected consequences of industrialization, including rural development, are 
generally assumed to challenge some livelihood values of some rural people, but these 
tradeoffs are expected to be small, and these risks are implicitly or explicitly considered 
necessary in pursuit of opportunities. However, a threshold exists, across which 
opportunities for rural development through agro-industrialization are no longer worth 
assuming the adverse consequences. Agro-industrialization has been shown to increase 
inequity and exclusiveness between groups that limits its usefulness to rural development 
when development goals are not promoted and enforced by local institutions (FAO, 
2009). Uneven market power in agricultural supply chains can allow economic rents to be 
captured by one or a few farmers in a region. This often leaves other farmers worse off. A 
collapse of the competitiveness of smallholder farmers is the traditional risk of agro-
industrialization in rural development projects. Although agro-industries may provide a 
consistent channel for smallholder farmers to gain market access, the need to promote 
competitiveness typically favors larger farms that are better able to deliver large harvests 
more efficiently. To the extent that smallholder farmers are left out of supply chains, the 
equitable socio-economic benefits of agro-industries are reduced. However, development 
researchers and practitioners largely understand the strategies to overcome these risks in 
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absence of systemic risks from global changes. A summary of these strategies is provided 
by FAO (2003).  
The pace of agricultural globalization across LDCs has greatly increased over the 
last decade, which has coordinated supply-chains on a far larger scale and greatly 
changed the organization of local and regional agricultural markets (Byerlee, de Janvry, 
& Sadoulet, 2009). New technologies, more demanding markets, and the increasing 
frequency of climate extremes are creating new challenges for development practitioners 
and they may challenge the future success potential of the agro-industrial-based 
development model. The sustainability of smallholder farm competitiveness within 
industrial-based development programs may be compromised by increasingly restricted 
access to technological innovations, which are controlled by select farmers in agricultural 
supply chains. This limits their ability to compete in more demanding globalized markets. 
In arid and semi-arid regions, where much of the agricultural growth has occurred over 
the last five years, efforts taken to secure reliable water sources by new industrial farmers 
have often limited the access to water for small farms and escalated numbers of water 
conflicts (Miralles-Wilhelm, 2010). These new risks, which I contend can be classified as 
either systemic or idiosyncratic, may challenge the utility of industrial-based 
development programs in the future. Systemic risks are exogenous and are driven by 
climate change and globalization. Idiosyncratic risks are endogenously produced risks 
that are generated by the adaptations of others to exogenous risks of climate and market 
changes. 
The concept of risk has three common elements: first, outcomes that negatively 
affect what people value; second, the probability of their occurrence; and third, a function 
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for combining the two (Dow, Berkhout, & Preston, 2013). Conceptually, risk also 
provides a link between the concepts of rural development and global change adaptation. 
In this context, global change adaptations are actions taken by groups or individuals to 
secure valued attributes in the face of global change risks (Füssel, 2007). Global change 
adaptation and rural development are then ethical issues, aiming to protect and enhance 
what stakeholders value (i.e. profit, security, or livelihood). But, not all development-
program stakeholder values align with the goals of rural development programs, and 
adaptations occur unevenly. As different groups of stakeholders respond to systemic 
risks, the trajectory of a rural development program may change. Farmers may decide to 
pursue alternative livelihoods outside of agriculture, or farmers may take actions to 
secure resources that limit the ability of their neighbors to secure resources. These types 
of adaptations may increase the vulnerability (i.e. the degree to which a group or 
community is impacted adversely by the consequences, or potential consequences, of 
risk; Eriksen & O’Brien, 2007; Eriksen et al., 2011) of some individuals or groups being 
affected by rural development programs.  
As new systemic risks emerge, different groups adapt in different ways. Systemic 
risks play out as global changes impact the system, and thereby subject individual groups 
to impacts that produce their responses and outcomes. The outcomes of these impacts for 
each group depend on vulnerability to each risk, and whether and how a particular group 
can and does respond to systemic risks (Smit et al., 2001). These responses may create 
new idiosyncratic risks for some groups. Idiosyncratic risks develop as groups respond to 
systemic risks and create new risks for other groups. As the actions of one group may 
affect the outcomes of another group’s adaptations, some may reach their adaptation 
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limits—e.g. the point at which an objective that is valued by individuals or groups cannot 
be secured from risks by further adaptive actions (Dow et al., 2013). At this point, it may 
become more difficult for the development program to meet its goals. And, while no 
development programs ever “risk free,” I argue industrial-based rural development 
programs are at greater risk of derailment from new, idiosyncratic risks because of the 
necessarily large disparity in economic and political power differentials among farmers, 
and those farmers with the power to alter development institutions often control key 
sectors of local agricultural supply chains upon which the most vulnerable rely. As 
politically and economically powerful farmers adapt to global changes, they alter 
development institutions for all other farmers, for better or worse. 
 
2.1 Idiosyncratic risks: a political economic view of adaptations to systemic risks in 
the absence of ‘no-regrets’ approaches  
Climate adaptations are typically recognized as necessary or useful actions on the 
part of exposed or vulnerable populations (Füssel, 2007). Much of the research into 
climate change adaptations traditionally viewed these actions as the successful end goal 
for those managing the effects of global change (see Carter, Parry, Harasawa, & 
Nishioka, 1994; Jones, 2001). This was often the case because vulnerable populations 
were often viewed in isolation from the adaptations of other groups to the same risks 
(Voß & Bornemann, 2011). A critical political economic perspective may better allow us 
to include the goals of rural development programs in our evaluations of climate 
adaptations, and to view individual adaptations as part of a larger social-ecohydrologic 
system. We must evaluate the effects of any given adaptation on other groups that rely on 
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the same resources and markets because adaptations of one group may limit the ability of 
another group to adapt and pursue their goals. This process is likened to idea of 
‘disproportionately burdening the most vulnerable’ in global change literature (Barnett & 
O’Neill, 2010), but it is not as straightforward as this idea of maladaptation, which 
implies a mistake in the adaptation process. This process may also be considered a type 
of externality within a development program with respect to individual livelihood losses, 
but it may be difficult to valuate because it may simultaneously represent a shift on the 
Pareto frontier (i.e., a state of resource allocation in which resource managers cannot 
make any one individual better off without making at least one individual worse off) or 
even a Pareto improvement in terms of crop-production efficiency. The production of this 
specific type of idiosyncratic risk occurs when trade-offs are inherent, and when more 
politically powerful groups are able to deliberately change the social-ecohydrologic status 
quo by imposing their interests on a broader population, thereby and making others more 
vulnerable to global changes.  
This critical political economic perspective provides a useful lens through which 
to view the interconnectedness of farmer adaptations in rural development programs 
where collective action is difficult to achieve and meaningful ‘no-regrets’ adaptations are 
limited (see Heltberg, Siegel, & Jorgensen, 2009 for a definition of 'no-regrets' 
adaptations). Building from of the definition of political power provided by Moe (2005), 
the ability of any one player to change the development program context for other users 
through adaptive actions can be viewed as a reflection of power. Water, land, agro-inputs, 
and market access are often scarce within the region that a given program is trying to 
influence, and within industrial-based development programs these resources are often 
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controlled by select groups (i.e., farmers, agro-input providers, resource providers, etc.) at 
key points in agricultural supply chains. As risks of scarcity increase—and these are often 
driven by trade-liberalization, agro-investments, or climate change—farmers controlling 
limited resources may adapt within the confines of their capacity to do so. This can limit 
resource access to other farmers and leave them more sensitive or exposed to global 
change risks. Some farmer adaptations may be considered Pareto improvements, which 
are benign in the context of a development program. Examples of these “no regret” 
approaches include switching to more drought resistant crop varieties, the adoption of 
new water saving agro-technologies, and the promotion of new collective actions to more 
efficiently allocate resources. These adaptive actions have been the focus of much 
adaptation research. 
Here, I am interested in development programs that have few options for no-
regrets approaches, and in which adaptive actions produce resource allocation trade-offs 
between farmers. In this way, adaptation may be viewed as a common pool resource. In 
these programs, formal institutions (i.e. anthropogenic constraints on resource access and 
use; North, 1990) designed by development practitioners and enforced by governments 
dictate the allocation of scarce resources based on the goals of the development program. 
However, the origin and sustainability of many of these formal institutions lies in politics 
(Bates, 1994), and their implementation is political, responding to informal norms and 
institutions (Dacin, Goodstein, & Scott, 2002). Furthermore, while the origin of many 
informal or collective action-based institutions may lie outside of politics, they may be 
interdependent with political institutions. Therefore the sustainability of rural 
development programs lies largely in politics. This idea stems from the underlying logics 
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that: (1) institutions directly affect the outcomes of resource allocation (distribution and 
growth); (2) individuals realize this, and; (3) they attempt to change institutions to service 
their ends more effectively (Ensminger, 1992). Within this perspective, the capacity to 
adapt can be seen as a function of power to change the status quo, and this power is 
derived from two sources (Mueller, 1980, 2003; Wagner, 1969): (1) the asymmetric 
possession of information about climate and market uncertainties, and; (2) the availability 
of capital (i.e., a stock of resources created through human action by investing current 
income streams, thereby increasing future benefits from labor or raw materials; Scoones, 
1999), cognitive capacities, and self efficacy to act upon the asymmetric possession of 
information.  
In some cases, differential in uncertainty among actors about the future creates the 
potential to exercise power, and information, capital, and ability provide the capacity to 
do so. So, groups of farmers seek information about climate and market changes, and 
those with increased means are better able to act within the legal bounds of development 
policies to secure access to resources. Others may lack the information to understand and 
anticipate risks, or they may lack capital or ability and be unable to respond. In other 
cases, some actors may be able to leverage power over others, legitimately or 
illegitimately, even in the absence of uncertainty. In both cases, over time, as farmers 
with more power adapt to secure more resources, others are left with fewer resources and 
may be more vulnerable to the impacts of globalization and climate change risks. This 
may exacerbate vulnerabilities of the already vulnerable. Following this logic, adaptive 
actions often aim to alter institutions and unintentionally or intentionally impose 
constraints on stakeholders with less decision-making power, and these constraints 
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provide the means for informed groups to extract larger transfers of rents and resources. 
In the context of the case here, these new institutions may provide seemingly productive 
outcomes in terms of overall crop yields and efficiency, but often at the expense of those 
groups that rural development programs were designed to benefit. These types of 
institutional changes that lead to an increase in inequality are shown to sometimes have 
counterproductive political implications (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013), that may call 
into question the sustainability of the agricultural system in question. 
 
3. Theoretical framework to structure political economic analysis of 
idiosyncratic risk 
This specific type of idiosyncratic risk, depicted in Figure 3.1, builds on and 
integrates into a global change framework developed to consider how adaptations, driven 
by multiple exogenous risks, can create winners and losers (e.g. Leichenko, Brien, & 
Solecki, 2010; Leichenko & O’Brien, 2008; & O’Brien & Leichenko, 2000) in order to 
understand how the adaptations of some groups can increase vulnerability of others. This 
concept helps to structure critical analysis of the interactions among the adaptations of 
different groups within a single system. In the framework that includes the concept of 
idiosyncratic risk, exogenous systemic risks from climate change and globalization 
manifest as gradual or sudden impacts (either positive or negative) to the entire system. 
Systemic risks play out as global changes impact the system, and thereby subject 
individual groups to impacts that produce their responses and outcomes. Impacts affect 
different groups (e.g. communities, social networks, families, etc.) in different ways, 
resulting in different outcomes for each group. The outcomes of these impacts for each 
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group depend on exposure and sensitivity to each impact, and whether and how a 
particular group can and does respond to systemic risks (Smit et al., 2001). These 
responses may create new idiosyncratic risks for some groups. These types of 
idiosyncratic risks develop as groups respond to systemic risks and create new risks for 
other groups. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 – Framework for understanding the of production of idiosyncratic risks in 
rural development programs and their related institutions including resources, 
technological extension, and infrastructure; rural development programs are 
conceptualized as articulated and maintained by regional, state, and international 
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governments, international development organizations, banks, NGOs, and public-private 
organizations with the aim to secure desirable social outcomes through inclusive 
agricultural growth. The production of idiosyncratic risks begins as exogenous risks from 
global change processes impact a development program, causing different groups to 
respond in different ways and potentially altering the physical or institutional 
environment for all actors. This may make other actors more vulnerable to risks. 
 
In this framework, global change and globalization processes overlap, and they 
individually affect rural development, posing interacting, systemic risks. Akin to the 
Leichenko & O’Brien (2008) conceptualization, exposure represents the condition of 
being sensitive to impacts from systemic risks. For example, if global rice prices 
decrease, rice farmers will be sensitive to this impact (e.g., sudden change) but sugarcane 
farmers likely will not. Exposure is also influenced by group responses. Responses to 
impacts are the adaptations (or lack of adaptations) taken either in anticipation of or in 
response to impacts. Outcomes, in turn, are then dictated by (1) the rural development 
program, (2) groups’ pursuit of valued goals, (3) the impacts from systemic risks, and (4) 
groups’ capacities to perceive and respond to risks. However, groups’ responses may feed 
back and potentially change the context (e.g., governing institutions) of the development 
program, which I conceptualize as idiosyncratic risk. This concept incorporates power 
structures and provides an additional pathway through which the impacts of risks may be 
critically seen to alter a contextual environment (see Leichenko & O’Brien’s, 2008, 
“feedback double exposure” and “context double exposure” for additional types of 
feedback loops). 
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Next, I use the components, processes, and theoretical underpinnings depicted in 
this framework to structure and analyze idiosyncratic risks that have driven recent 
livelihood losses among smallholder farmers in an industrial-based rural development 
program in Northwest Costa Rica. With this case study I ask: Why are smallholder 
farmers, targeted by an industrial-based rural development program designed to spread 
risks evenly among all farmers, negatively impacted by risks from global changes while 
other more powerful farmers, presented with the same risks, profit? Then, I conclude by 
presenting the pathways through which idiosyncratic risks have emerged within 
Northwest Costa Rican agriculture. 
 
4. Analysis of idiosyncratic risks in the Arenal-Tempisque Irrigation Project in 
Northwest Costa Rica  
4.1 Case background 
The Arenal-Tempisque Irrigation Project (Projecto de Riego del Arenal-
Tempisque, PRAT) provides up to 5,616,000 m3/day of water to farmers in the 
Tempisque River Basin from Lake Arenal in the east. Water is provided to users through 
a series of gravity-fed irrigation channels and aqueducts (Figure 3.2).  
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Figure 3.2 – Arenal-Tempisque Irrigation District (DRAT) topography, canal 
infrastructure, and Lake Arenal (irrigation water source) 
 
The idea of irrigated agriculture in the semi-arid Tempisque River Basin dates 
back to the 1940s, but it did not become a reality until 1980, when the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IADB) extended a multi-million dollar loan to the Costa Rican 
government (Ballestero et al., 2007). Today, the PRAT irrigates approximately 28,000 
ha. The PRAT is the largest irrigation-based rural development project in Central 
America. Over a 1,300 farms benefit from the project, generating over 20,000 jobs and 
income of approximately US$163 million annually (SENARA, 2013). The Agricultural 
Development Institute (Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, IDA), Costa Rica’s agrarian 
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reform agency, provided 689 farms, averaging 7.2 ha each and totaling just less than 
5,300 hectares (shown in Figure 3.3), to smallholder farmers through agrarian reform 
initiatives. The remaining 22,700 hectares in the PRAT were brought under irrigation 
through a series of public-private agreements requiring lands to be used “effectively” in 
exchange for irrigated water.  
 
 
Figure 3.3 – IDA Parcels in the DRAT; parcels number 689 and account for 
approximately 25% of the total irrigated hectares shown in Figure 3.2. 
 
The original intention of the PRAT was to provide smallholder farmers with plots 
of land and governmental extension services for support. The PRAT was to supply 
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farmers with irrigation water during the dry season (November-March) to allow them to 
produce two rice crops per year (as opposed only one crop without irrigation), promoting 
higher yields. Market access was to be provided to smallholder farmers by agro-industrial 
companies relying on smallholder farms for production. These companies, funded in part 
and regulated by the state, were to provide post-crop processing capacities for 
smallholder farmers. While the original goals of the PRAT have not changed, the ability 
of the government and PRAT managers to meet those goals has changed. The Latin 
American debt crisis, beginning in the early 1980s triggered a restructuring of Costa 
Rica’s political economy (see Edelman, 1992; Honey, 1994; Marois, 2005). 
Consequently, the government abandoned many of their pervious public-private 
partnerships in the PRAT in order to meet new demands from this economic restructuring 
and to placate financial support from international lenders (Edelman, 1999).  
 
4.1.1 Current state of smallholder agriculture in the PRAT 
Since the PRAT’s inception, until the mid 2000s, rice was the crop of choice for 
smallholder farmers, and virtually all smallholder farmers in the PRAT grew rice 
(Arriagada, Sills, Pattanayak, Cubbage, & González, 2010). This reliance on rice 
production developed through the inability of the government to provide extension 
services or market access for any other type of crop (see Chapter 2), combined with the 
provision of abundant irrigation water that allowed smallholder farms to produce two to 
three rice crops per year in the semi-arid region. Sugarcane, the other widely grown crop 
in the PRAT, was historically produced in the PRAT by three industrialized sugarcane 
industries, that together control approximately 65% of Costa Rica’s sugar milling 
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capacity (LAICA, 2013). The three industrial farms are vertically integrated, and they 
own approximately 25% of the 28,000 irrigated hectares in the PRAT, and they control 
all sugarcane produced in the in the PRAT. In 2012, the area planted with sugarcane in 
the PRAT was estimated to be almost 15,000 hectares, of the 28,000 total hectares 
(SENARA, 2012). This area increased from 2011 after smallholder farmers who have 
traditionally grown rice switched to sugarcane production.  
Between 2007 and 2012 hectares planted with rice in Costa Rica have increased 
by 40% as large producers increased rice production efforts to garner newly created 
government-rice subsidies. However, traditionally stable rice production among 
smallholder farmers in the PRAT followed an entirely opposite trend, in opposition to 
market signals. While rice production across Costa Rica was increasing by 40%, rice 
production among smallholder farmers decreased by almost 30%. Sugarcane now makes 
up this deficit. By switching from rice to sugarcane, smallholder farms in the PRAT also 
switch the mechanism by which they sell their harvests. Rice farmers operate 
independently from large rice mills. Most smallholder farmers secure contracts with rice 
mills to sell their harvests at a fixed price prior to planting. However, it has become 
increasingly difficult for smallholder farmers to secure contracts with rice mills. Many 
continue to plant rice without securing a contract, and then they search for a mill to sell 
their rice to post-planting. This has created increased competition among smallholder 
farmers.  
Smallholder sugarcane producers operate differently from rice producers because 
planting, harvesting and processing of sugarcane is closely tied to one of the three sugar 
mills in the PRAT. Rice farmers typically manage every stage of rice production, while 
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smallholder farmers who have switched to sugarcane production rely much more heavily 
on support from one of the three mills to plant, harvest, and process the sugarcane, the 
terms of which are specified in their production contracts. Over the past five years, 
sugarcane mills have been pushing full land management sugar contracts in an effort to 
bolster production. These contracts have been gained through the purchase of smallholder 
farmers’ rice debts, which smallholder farmers accrue through failed rice crops or 
through the inability of a rice farmer to sell their harvest. The sugarcane mills then 
manage and farm smallholders’ plots, and smallholder landowners receive a flat fee per 
hectare depending on their debt, but on average they receive approximately 150,000 
colones (US$300 US) per hectare per year.  
One successful rice harvest on a 10-hectare farm brings approximately 
US$33,000 as of 2012. Over 75% of their gross income covers input and milling costs, 
which provides smallholder farmers with a stable livelihood above Costa Rica’s average 
gross national income of US$8,820 (World Bank, 2012). Ten-hectare smallholder farms 
in the PRAT average two harvests per year to profit just over US$16,000 per year 
(CONARROZ, 2012). When the same farmer is unable to sell a harvest, they lose 
US$2,679 per hectare (ibid). The inability to sell a 10-hectare rice harvest leaves farmers 
with a debt of over US$26,000 per harvest. In comparison, the production of sugarcane 
on the same 10-hectare parcel would pay, on average, US$3000 per year. This is one-fifth 
what they would gain through successful rice production. In sum, as more smallholder 
farmers switch to sugarcane, the original development goals of the PRAT are being 
undermined.  
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4.2 Research design 
My research design was composed of three parts. First, I conducted a 
participatory rural appraisal (Chambers, 1994) to define possible drivers of change to 
smallholder rice production in the PRAT. Then, I tested for correlations between each 
hypothesized driver and changes in smallholder rice production using a linear regression 
model. This model was a critical element in this case study because it allowed me to 
determine which of the multiple, hypothesized drivers of change, determined in my 
participatory rural appraisal, predicted changes to the smallholder rice-farming sector. I 
was then able to focus on and analyze those drivers of change. I did this by examining the 
underlying processes that explained the statistical correlations using a process tracing 
case study analysis (Bennet, 2010; George & Bennet, 2004), also called explanation 
building (Yin, 2014). I structured this analysis using the framework shown in Figure 3.1. 
 
4.3 Data collection 
A qualitative participatory rural appraisal (Chambers, 1994) was used to define 
potential drivers of change among smallholder farms in the PRAT. The appraisal 
consisted of two-multiday workshops with researchers, farmers, and PRAT managers. 
The first workshop, entitled “Coordinating sustainability science research in the Rio 
Tempisque Basin,” was held on August 14th and 15th, 2010 in Palo Verde National Park, 
Guanacaste, Costa Rica. Attendees included 10 total researchers and farmers from 
multiple research organizations including CATIE, the Organization for Tropical Studies, 
and Arizona State University; all were engaged in sustainability research in the region. 
PRAT-sustainability problems raised throughout this workshop included (1) smallholder 
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rice farmers are demanding more water, but the PRAT has been operating under scarcity 
since 2006, (2) smallholder farmers are increasingly selling and renting their lands to 
large-scale sugarcane companies to escape both agriculture and the debts accrued through 
rice production, and (3) smallholder rice farmers are losing access to the regional rice 
market due to changing regulations brought about by CAFTA-DR. 
The second workshop, entitled “Guanacaste collaborative workshop on water 
governance,” was held on March 14th, 2013 at the National University of Costa Rica, 
Nicoya, Costa Rica. Forty-six total workshop participants included representatives from 
11 rural water administrations (ASADAs), farmers, agricultural water managers, and local 
water-environmental non-governmental organizations. Participants, including irrigation 
and agricultural managers, overwhelmingly agreed with farmers that a strong 
smallholder-farming sector is in Costa Rica’s best interest, but that the challenge was 
determining how water should be managed to support smallholder farming. Participants 
agreed that water scarcity was heavily impacting agriculture in a negative way. See 
Kuzdas, Yglesias, & Warner (2013) for a detailed summary of workshop findings. 
I reviewed findings about drivers of change and smallholder farm outcomes from 
each workshop and clustered my findings into like themes. To do this, I followed the 
coding and clustering methodology described by Yin (2014). Next, I collected data from 
multiple sources to create measurable variables based on each theme. These variables are 
shown in Table 3.1 as clustered according to the framework depicted in Figure 3.1.  
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Table 3.1 – Data type and collection summary 
Framework 
components 
Variable 
code 
Variable Justification Type/Units Sources  
Climate 
Change 
CC1 Average 
irrigation 
water 
deficit 
during rice 
planting 
Represents 
climate 
change risk 
and water 
policy 
efficacy 
Cubic 
meters per 
second 
SENARA 
database 
access 
(SENARA, 
2012) 
CC2 Yearly 
total 
rainfall in 
Tempisque 
River 
Basin 
Represents 
risk from 
changes in 
climate and 
weather 
Millimeters/
Year 
Instituto Mete
orológico Nac
ional database 
access 
/Organization 
for Tropical 
Studies 
database 
access (IMN, 
2006; OTS, 
2014) 
Globalizatio
n 
G1 Total rice 
planted in 
Indicates 
changes in 
Hectares CONARROZ 
database 
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Costa Rica 
from 1993 
– 2012 
political 
protection 
from 
imports, and 
expectation 
demand  
access 
(CONARROZ
, 2006 – 2013) 
G2 Total rice 
imported 
into Costa 
Rica 
between 
1993 – 
2012 
Indicates 
changes in 
the demand 
for 
domestically 
grown rice 
Metric 
tonnes 
CONARROZ 
database 
access 
(CONARROZ
, 2006 – 2013) 
G3 Average 
price paid 
to farmer 
for harvest 
from one 
hectare of 
rice 
Indicates 
farmers' 
incentive to 
grow rice 
U.S. dollars CONARROZ 
database 
access 
(CONARROZ
, 2006 – 2013) 
G4 Average 
price paid 
Indicates 
farmers' 
U.S. dollars LAICA 
database 
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to farmer 
for harvest 
from one 
hectare of 
sugarcane 
incentive to 
grow 
sugarcane 
access 
(LAICA, 
2010, 2013) 
Industrial 
rice farm 
responses 
IF1 Number of 
rice mills 
in 
Guanacaste 
Indicates 
vertical 
integration 
and 
consolidation 
of large rice 
farmers 
Amount Arroyo, 
Lucke, & 
Riveara, 
2013, & 
CONARROZ 
database 
access 
(CONARROZ
, 2006 – 2013) 
Smallholder 
rice farm 
outcomes* 
SF1 Total rice 
smallholder 
rice harvest 
from 1993 
– 2012, 
includes up 
to three 
plantings 
Reflects 
smallholder 
rice 
production 
between 
1993 and 
2012 
Metric 
tonnes 
Arroyo, 
Lucke, & 
Riveara, 
2013, & 
CONARROZ 
database 
access 
(CONARROZ
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per farm 
per year** 
, 2006 – 2013) 
**Indicates dependent variable in statistical regression model 
*Smallholder farms were represented in this data as those that grew rice or sugarcane on 
IDA plots ranging from 1.8 hectares to 50 hectares. 
 
4.4 Data analysis 
SPSS (IBM, 2013) was used for my quantitative data analysis. I used standard 
linear regression to identify correlations between globalization, global changes, and 
LSCF responses (all independent variables), and smallholder farmers' rice harvest in 
PRAT from 1993 to 2012 (dependent variable). All data was transformed into yearly 
averages, and then to avoid problems of 'random walk' and spurious regression I 
differenced my data across time beginning with the first time-step in 1993, and specified 
my regression in terms of these variations. By doing this, I explained changes in 
smallholder rice harvests on changes in the hypothesized drivers.  
Before conducting the regression, I checked for and found no violations of the 
assumptions of normality, multicollinearity, and homoscedasticity among the variables. 
All variables were continuous and linearity was assumed. Then, significant correlations, 
as determined by the results of the standard linear regression, were qualitatively 
evaluated using the assumed causal links depicted in the framework in Figure 3.1. 
Finally, pathways (defined as a series of causal links) through which risks produced 
outcomes in my case were traced using the process tracing method described by Yin 
(2014, p149). I relied on multiple sources and types of data, described in Table 3.1, to 
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trace the causal links in each pathway. I continued to collect evidence until multiple 
sources corroborated each causal link.  
 
5. Results  
Variables included in my linear regression model are shown in Table 3.2, and 
each was hypothesized to be a likely cause of livelihood losses among smallholder 
farmers during my rapid rural appraisal. Variables represent changes in climate (CC1 and 
CC2), changes in crop markets (G1, G2, G3, and G4) and LSCFs’ responses to changes 
in crop markets (LR1).  
 
Table 3.2 – Independent variables hypothesized to influence changes in smallholder rice 
harvests in the PRAT used in linear regression model, N=20 
      Percentiles 
Variable Unit Mean Range Min Max 25 50 75 
YEAR  -  -   -  1993 2012  -   -   -  
CC1 m3/s 2 11 0 11 0 0 4 
CC2 mm 1,430 1,750 714 2,464 1,088 1,243 1,773 
G1 Hect
-ares 
57,639 40,149 40,967 81,116 49,800 56,256 66,071 
G2 m 
tons 
165,81
9 
182,34
0 
51,268 233,60
8 
80,291 224,15
0 
230,83
0 
G3 U.S. 1,484 2,534 532 3,066 841 1,271 2003 
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$ 
G4 U.S.
$ 
3,077 1,453 2,206 3,659 3,010 3,115 3,357 
LR1 No. 9 6 5 11 6 11 11 
 
The total smallholder rice harvest in the PRAT was used to indicate changes in 
smallholder rice production. This trend is shown in Figure 3.4 along with the total harvest 
in Costa Rica during the same time period. It was assumed all smallholder farms that 
dropped out of rice production during this time period transferred to sugarcane 
production (SENARA, 2012). 
 
 
Figure 3.4 – Domestic rice harvest in Costa Rica (Arroyo et al., 2013; CONARROZ, 
2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012); this data is the summed total of up to three rice 
harvests per year per farm in the DRAT; smallholders in the PRAT typically grow two 
crops per year, and some grow three, and this is reflected in this figure, and it represents 
the dependent variable (SF1) in my regression.  
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The results of my linear regression model, provided in Table 3.3, show that the 
number of rice mills in the PRAT and the average irrigation water deficit during rice 
planting are significantly correlated with reductions in smallholder farmers' rice harvests 
from 1993 to 2012. Smallholder farmer rice harvest reduction is a function of (1) farmers 
switching to sugarcane production, (2) farmers voluntarily reducing their rice harvests, 
and (3) involuntary rice-yield reductions caused by water scarcity. Through my rapid 
rural appraisal, these three components were determined to be the primary outcomes that 
were driving smallholder farmer livelihood losses in the PRAT. These results show that a 
one-unit decrease in the number of rice mills in the PRAT is correlated with a decrease in 
smallholder rice production of 2,688 metric tonnes. Similarly, a one-unit increase in the 
average irrigation water deficit during rice planting (i.e. total water deficit during the 
months of December and January in m/s3, averaged over that time) is correlated with a 
reduction in smallholder rice yield of 1,293 metric tonnes. 
 
Table 3.3 – Results of linear regression modeling 
Variable B Std. 
Error 
Beta t Sig. 
CC1 -1293.4 500.997 -0.42 -2.58 0.02** 
CC2 2.533 1.879 0.107 1.348 0.203 
G1 -0.036 0.04 -0.11 -0.91 0.379 
G2 -0.042 0.03 -0.25 -1.37 0.193 
G3 0.399 4.844 0.025 0.082 0.936 
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G4 -4.135 5.35 -0.13 -0.77 0.455 
LR1 2688.27 1294.225 0.471 2.077 0.06* 
Dependent Variable: SR3; R Square: 0.93, Adjusted R Square: 0.90 
**Significant at the 0.05 level 
*Significant at the 0.10 level 
 
6. Discussion  
6.1 Exploration of effect of rice mill consolidation on smallholder rice farming 
In the early 2000s, almost all smallholder farmers in the PRAT produced rice. 
Therefore, they were very exposed to any changes in Costa Rica’s rice-policy responses. 
In 2002, threats of international trade liberalization, specifically the pending ratification 
of the “Dominican Republic – Central America Free Trade Agreement” (CAFTA-DR) 
drew attention by nationally and internationally owned industrial rice farms in the PRAT 
to vulnerabilities in Costa Rica’s rice sector (Frajman, 2012). Both industrial rice 
producers and arrozarias (i.e. industrialized rice mills) in the PRAT lobbied San Jose and 
argued that Costa Rica should keep its tariff protection for rice imports intact, thereby 
supporting domestic producers (Monge-González, Rivera, & Rosales-Tijerino, 2010). 
However, current rice production in Costa Rica was not able to meet the increasing 
consumption demands. So, on May 23, 2002, CONARROZ was created (Law 8285) as a 
publicly funded, privately operated hedge fund, managed by a board that included in its 
entirety representatives from industrial rice farms and arrozarias. CONARROZ was 
granted the exclusive right to import rice into Costa Rica with zero tariffs. A right given 
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to the board under the assumption that CONARROZ would import rice only when it was 
required to meet national demand.  
Since 2002 rice imports by CONARROZ have increased, which is the result of 
lower international prices (Monge-González et al., 2010), compared to Costa Rica’s high 
fixed rice prices. Rice on the world market is consistently and considerably less 
expensive than domestically produced rice due to the production efficiency of rice 
produced in the USA, China, and Thailand (Arroyo et al., 2013). From 2005-2012, 
approximately 40% of rice consumed in Costa Rica was imported (Arroyo et al., 2013). 
CONARROZ sells the imported rice to the arrozarias (that smallholder farmers attempt 
to sell their rice to), which also transfers the zero-tariff-based rents, based on a 
performance clause in Law 8285 (CONARROZ) that dictates that imported rice will be 
distributed to industrial mills and producers based on the amount of domestically 
produced rice they have acquired. This initiated a rapid consolidation and vertical 
integration of industrial rice producers and arrozarias. This in turn has displaced 
smallholder farmers from the rice market because mills no longer need to buy 
smallholder farmers’ rice harvests. This trend was most significant in the Tempisque 
River Basin, which grows 45% of the country’s rice (CONARROZ, 2012). Large mills 
and industrial rice producers in the PRAT have been able to gain significant economic 
rents through consolidation. In 2001, there were 11 arrozarias operating in the PRAT 
(Arroyo et al., 2013). In 2012 there were 5 (CONARROZ, 2012). The larger the mill, the 
more inexpensive, tariff-free rice they obtain and sell to the domestic market at prices 
equivalent to the more expensive, domestically produced, smallholder rice.  
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The economic rents won through the concentration of industrial rice producers 
and rice mills allowed for even more drastic vertical integration, which in turn brought 
more tariff-free rice into the PRAT. This process has helped extricate smallholder rice 
farmers from rice production – for each mill-consolidation in the PRAT, 2,688 metric 
tonnes of smallholder-produced rice is extricated from the domestic market. As of 2013, 
two types of rice producers exist in the Tempisque River Basin: (1) non-integrated and 
independent smallholder producers, with no guarantees that their rice harvests will be 
purchased; and (2) integrated agribusinesses who purchase imported rice from 
CONARROZ and supplement their supply with domestic harvests, first from their 
production, and then through contracts with smaller farmers. Faced with mounting debts 
due to their inability to sell their rice, smallholder farmers have voluntarily reduced their 
rice plantings or transitioned to less lucrative, but in some ways more secure sugarcane 
production. Netting (1998) argues that security, not profit, often motivates farmer’s 
decisions about risk management. This may be the case among some smallholder farmers 
in the PRAT. 
 
6.1.1  Idiosyncratic risks from globalization  
In agriculture in general, globalization includes multiple, simultaneously 
occurring processes: 1) Changes in demand for different types of crops; 2) redistribution 
of power and profit among farmers engaged in global crop production systems; and; 3) 
transformations of resources and labor across scales (Leichenko & O’Brien, 2008). In the 
PRAT, one type of agricultural globalization initiated these processes: Trade 
liberalization. Trade liberalization refers to the reduction of tariffs on and barriers to 
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agricultural trade, to the corresponding reductions in state agricultural subsidies and 
institutional support (Kennedy & Koo, 2002), and to the restructuring of state support 
that often entails “reworking” this support in ways that are less visible in the market 
(Eakin, 2014). 
In Costa Rica, the threats of liberalized trade have caused politically powerful 
farmers to change the national crop production and agricultural business policies, which I 
have shown has produced uneven gains among farmers in the PRAT. It was not trade 
liberalization itself that drove these changes, as has been the case in agriculture in many 
other sectors throughout Latin America. Rather, large mills and farms, in response to 
threats of trade liberalization, rigged the game so that the domestic rice market was 
protected while also capturing the rents of lower priced imports, rather than passing those 
rents on to other Costa Rican farmers and consumers. In this case, those with political 
power rigged liberalization processes. A reduction in smallholder farmer rice-market 
access is the idiosyncratic risk that was created through the adaptations of more 
politically powerful industrial farms. 
 
6.2 Effect of irrigation water deficit on smallholder rice farming 
At the start of the New Year in 2013, the PRAT experienced its largest irrigation 
water shortfall to date due to unprecedented drought through the previous summer’s rainy 
season (May-November). Water shortages throughout the PRAT primarily occur during 
the dry season from November to January due to the high water demand resulting from 
the new season’s rice and sugarcane plantings. The system operated under scarcity for the 
first time September 2006, and because there was no precedent for water scarcity in the 
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PRAT, no allocation plan existed. The PRAT water management agency, SENARA 
(Servicio Nacional de Aguas Subterráneas Riego y Avenamiento), devised a plan to 
irrigate by sector on a rotating cycle in an attempt to provide farmers with enough water 
to plant without yield reductions. The water managers informed farmers that irrigation 
would be provided in ‘shifts’ by sector regardless of farmers’ requests for water. 
SENARA then alternated irrigation allocations between sectors on a weekly alternating 
basis until the rice planting was completed and demand reduced. Within this scheme, 
even though some are forced to wait to plant, all farmers should receive ample water to 
plant, and then harvest prior to the next rainy season.  
SENARA allocates water in times of scarcity on the basis of farmer equality, 
regardless of crop type or farm size. SENARA only has the power to cycle irrigation to 
manage scarcity and prevent yield losses. This allocation strategy has delayed 
smallholder farmers’ rice plantings up to one month, in some years. While water cycling 
doesn’t directly affect yields at harvest, it does limit the ability of smallholder farmers to 
sell their harvests to increasingly vertically integrated mills. Because mills no longer need 
to rely heavily on smallholder rice harvests, they have increasingly shortened the window 
of time in which they buy non-contract rice from smallholders. This rice is purchased by 
mills early in the harvest season on a ‘first-come first-served’ basis. Delayed water 
allocations, delay smallholder harvests. This, in combination with limited access to the 
rice market during harvest, has forced farmers to fight for water, and has caused water 
piracy throughout the PRAT. This process has created water scarcity for many 
smallholders.  
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Smallholder farmers in the PRAT illegally modify irrigation infrastructure to gain 
early access to water allocations so they can plant and harvest as early in the season as 
possible. Many farmers furthest down stream plant rice but then lose their water access as 
a result of the actions of upstream farmers, and therefore many farmers have been forced 
to abandon rice crops. Water scarcity and the subsequent conflict among smallholder 
farmers can be attributed to the adaptations of more powerful rice farmers to the threat of 
trade liberalization. Those farmers in the PRAT without illegal access to alternative water 
sources lose both their crop harvests and their access to the market. This redistribution of 
wealth and global change risk has undermined the development goals of the PRAT. In 
December of 2012, the situation reached a boiling point resulting in death threats to 
SENARA employees and upstream farmers, and the attempted murder of a SENARA 
employee who confronted a farmer about illegal water access. Ultimately many farmers 
furthest downstream have been forced to abandon their rice harvests and transition to 
sugarcane production since 2006.  
 
6.2.1 Idiosyncratic risks from Climate Change 
All farmers in the PRAT rely on water distribution infrastructure for irrigated crop 
production due to the region’s semi-arid climate. Drought, while well managed by 
SENARA, has nonetheless resulted in water scarcity for some farmers. The power to alter 
water access was in the hands of upstream farmers, who were able to manipulate 
irrigation infrastructure to plant and harvest their rice crops before the purchasing 
windows at arrozarias closed. Interestingly, if arrozarias did not gain access to the rents 
from the import of tariff-free rice, they would still rely almost entirely on rice supplies 
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from smallholder rice farmers. Increasing drought would have likely had negligible 
affects on smallholder farmers’ livelihoods because SENARA’s water cycling scheme 
would provide all farmers with enough water to successfully produce rice each season. 
Smallholders would have had no incentive to plant and harvest before their neighbors. 
However, because CONARROZ now imports rice, arrozarias only purchase smallholder 
harvests if they have production and storage capacity that has not been met through 
imports or vertical integration. Farmers who are able to harvest their rice early in each 
harvest season have the best chance of selling their harvests. This interaction of systemic 
stressors has created new idiosyncratic risks that have caused many downstream farmers 
to lose rice harvests and suffer livelihood losses. 
 
6.3 Pathways of idiosyncratic risks: lessons from the PRAT 
The production processes of some idiosyncratic risks in industrial-based 
development programs may appear to be easily understood, which means the cause for 
the risk appears to be known, the negative consequences seem to be obvious, and the 
uncertainty about the risk’s origins seems to be low. The example of upstream farmers 
limiting water availability to downstream farmers in the PRAT appears, at first, to be 
relatively simple from a political economic perspective:  Upstream farmers have the 
power to manipulate irrigation infrastructure to meet their own need in the face of 
drought, and so they do so. However, I have shown that the actual pathway through 
which water scarcity emerges in the PRAT can only be understood by analyzing the 
relationship between regional drought and trade liberalization. This added complexity 
from the interaction of these two systemic risks reduces the ability of water managers in 
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the PRAT to address the root causes of this idiosyncratic risk because they only have the 
authority to combat livelihood losses through water allocation; they have no control over 
smallholder farmers market access. The passage of CONARROZ in response to threats of 
Costa Rican trade liberalization also generated uncertainty among smallholder farmers 
about the future of rice production in the PRAT. I consider this to be a second 
idiosyncratic risk to smallholder farmers. This uncertainty, while difficult to quantify, 
requires a deeper understanding of a region’s political economy.  
Reflecting on this case study, and on my theoretical framing of idiosyncratic risks, 
I posit there are four interacting pathways through which idiosyncratic risks may develop 
that must be assessed simultaneously to understand the actual impacts of systemic risks 
on industrial-based rural development programs: 
1. Amplification of exposure to impacts – farmer responses to systemic risks can 
amplify systemic risk exposure for others. For example, as drought increased, 
farmers upstream in the PRAT were able to manipulate infrastructure and shirk 
allocation institutions in order to gain access to scarce water; this left downstream 
farmers with less water. While drought was not the only driver of water scarcity 
in the PRAT, the adaptations of upstream farmers ultimately amplified the 
impacts of drought on downstream farmers.  
2. Increasing sensitivity to impacts – farmer responses to systemic risks can increase 
the sensitivity of other farmers to impacts by modifying the biophysical or 
institutional context of a development program. Most development programs 
provide some buffer between global risks and their local impacts through, for 
example, resource provisioning at subsidized rates or crop insurance programs. 
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Farmers can respond to the threat or impacts of risks by manipulating a 
development program’s context to further buffer themselves from impacts. 
However, this process may leave other farmers more sensitive to the impacts of 
systemic risks.  
3. Reducing adaptive capacity – Some farmer reactions to systemic risks can 
directly limit the adaptive capacity and adaptation options of other groups. For 
example, in the PRAT, farmers with the financial means to install wells have done 
so as an adaptation to drought. Many neighboring farmers without the capacity to 
drill wells have adapted by drawing water from rivers and streams to supplement 
water supplies, given they have access to surface water. Through time, increasing 
drought combined with water tables being drawn down by well extractions may 
limit surface water availability. This risk is a common worry among smallholder 
farmers in the PRAT with access to surface water. 
4. Redirecting impacts –some farmers can redirect or deflect the impacts of global 
risks onto others. This type of idiosyncratic risk often occurs prior to impacts. 
Those groups with access to information can deliberately take advantage of the 
uncertainty of others. The passing of CONARROZ in response to threats of Costa 
Rican trade liberalization illustrates this pathway from my case study. Industrial 
rice farms were able to protect themselves from an influx of inexpensive rice by 
manipulating Costa Rica’s rice policy and unintentionally redirecting the impacts 
of trade liberalization onto smallholder farmers. 
These pathways begin with overlapping global change (e.g., drought) and 
globalization (e.g., trade liberalization) processes that individually affect rural 
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development, posing interacting, systemic risks. Farmers within the PRAT – an 
industrial-based development system – were exposed in different ways to the impacts 
from these systemic risks. Large industrial farms and mills, controlling rice-market 
access for everyone, responded to risks of trade liberalization in anticipation its impacts, 
and maneuvered politically to alter Costa Rican rice-market policies to gain substantial 
economic rents. The outcomes of this adaptation fed back and changed the status quo for 
smallholder rice farmers – this produced an idiosyncratic risk. Industrial farms redirected 
the impacts of trade liberalization and acted to profit from their adaptation. Smallholder 
farmers lost access to the domestic rice market, and in turn, were forced to fight for water 
to plant early to gain the little-remaining market access. This produced water scarcity for 
the most vulnerable farmers in the PRAT. 
This study of idiosyncratic risks in the PRAT provides an example of the utility of 
the concept in understanding multiple and interacting pathways through which 
idiosyncratic risks may emerge by focusing researchers and practitioners on the variables 
necessary to understand how the interdependencies among farmers may create 
vulnerabilities for some groups. This application shows the insights gained from my 
proposed framing of idiosyncratic risks, as opposed to current paradigms that may only 
focus on systemic risks to development projects, provides new and useful information on 
the particular risks faced by the most vulnerable. 
 
7. Conclusion 
We have long known that many smallholder farm-based communities in 
developing regions can be characterized as complex, diverse and risk-prone, and that they 
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are often plagued by persistent poverty, limited access to resources, and environmental 
degradation (Chambers, Pacey, & Thrupp, 1989). Agro-industrialization programs are 
one category of solutions to these rural development problems that has proven effective 
among diverse smallholder farm-based economies. These industrial-based development 
projects link agricultural supply chains between smallholder farmers and larger 
commercialized farms to increase production efficiency and access to markets, thereby 
bolstering rural livelihoods. These projects may also advance the use of agro-
technologies with the aim of increasing the resilience of all farmers to climate hazards. 
However, industrial-based rural development may also produce unique, or idiosyncratic 
risks to the rural poor, as I have shown in the case of the industrial-based PRAT. These 
risks may emerge from industrial-agriculture responses to globalization and climate 
change that calls into question the ability of agro-industries to promote rural development 
and poverty-fighting strategies in the face of global changes.  
Increasingly, uncertainties about change are key features of rural development 
programs. The capacity of the poor and vulnerable to cope with and adapt to idiosyncratic 
risks is at the core of a changing role for rural development, and it inextricably links the 
capacity of less powerful players to successfully adapt within the context of larger rural 
development programs. Through this lens, rural development programs are required to 
conceptualize the production of risks as a product of the interaction between global 
changes and the feedbacks produced by different groups’ adaptations to these risks within 
the rural development context. As industrial-based rural development programs expand 
with the support of UNIDO, we must be cognizant of new risks to the rural poor that can 
emerge from the adaptations of different groups to systemic risks. I presented the new 
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concept of idiosyncratic risk, and demonstrated the efficacy of this concept by applying it 
to the current situation in the Guanacaste agricultural region of Costa Rica. I suggest that 
future research should compare case studies of industrial-based rural development 
programs across LDCs to refine and better define our theoretical understanding of the 
origins, implications, and pathways of idiosyncratic risks. We must better understand 
how and what types of policy interventions should be used to manage the pathways 
through which idiosyncratic risks in rural development programs emerge, in order to 
promote the goals of increasing living standards, and equitable distribution of resources, 
benefits, and risks. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ADAPTING TO INTERACTING GLOBAL CHANGE RISKS: DETERMINANTS OF 
ADAPTATION LIMITS AMONG NORTHWEST COSTA RICAN SMALLHOLDER 
RICE PRODUCERS  
 
1. Introduction 
Multiple types of global change processes increasingly impact rural development 
programs in arid and semi-arid areas; these include regional drought and changes in 
international crop markets and trade liberalization policies, among others. The interplay 
between these processes can impact rural livelihoods in unforeseen and surprising ways 
(Leichenko, Brien, & Solecki, 2010; Leichenko & O’Brien, 2008; O’Brien & Leichenko, 
2000). The study of climate change induced drought, or the study of impacts of global 
economic changes on rural livelihoods by themselves may not account for the dynamic 
interrelations and feedbacks between these global change processes. In order to promote 
the sustainability of rural development in arid and semi-arid regions, we must begin to 
systemically address these global changes, and focus on outcomes of these processes at 
the local scale (Morton, 2007). Global change scientists have studied how these changes 
can transfer among spatial scales (Turner et al., 1990), and how they increase the 
vulnerability of the poor (Turner et al., 2003). Here, I study how global changes can and 
do interact to increase the vulnerability of the poor, and then force households to confront 
adaptation limits beyond which they may no longer meet valued livelihood goals, and 
therefore are forced to live with intolerable risk of losses, revise attitudes about what is a 
valued objective, or change behavior radically to avoid the intolerable risk of loss.  
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Recent research and understanding about adaptation limits in rural areas provides 
a working framework to address the impacts of climate changes on local smallholder 
farm populations (Dow, Berkhout, & Preston, 2013; Martin, Müller, Linstädter, & Frank, 
2013; McDowell & Hess, 2012). Research on the determinants of adaptive capacity has 
shown that the household socio-economic context often dictates differences in the 
outcomes of climate change impacts at the local scale (Below et al., 2012). These 
contexts dictate the specific adaptation limits of households throughout lesser-developed 
countries (Dow, Berkhout, Preston, et al., 2013). To date, much of this research has 
focused on the impacts of and adaptations to climate change, and more commonly 
climate change induced drought. However, smallholder farming communities often face 
and interact with multiple risks simultaneously, and the outcomes of the impacts of these 
risks vary among individual households (Morton, 2007). Some are forced to cope, only to 
become more vulnerable to future impacts and move closer to adaptation limits, while 
others are able to better manage the impacts of multiple global change risks by pursuing 
new opportunities.  
In this research, I seek to understand how socio-economic determinants of 
adaptive capacity among smallholder farmers in Northwest Costa Rica determine their 
ability to meet valued livelihood goals in the face of the impacts of multiple global 
change risks. I analyze the significance of household-level socio-economic variables to 
farm adaptations to the impacts of two interacting global change risks. I focus on those 
adaptations that represent an adaptation limit, indicated by a forced livelihood 
transformation, and on those determinants that are more or less likely to make some 
farmers confront an adaptation limit. I discuss the trade-offs between determinants that 
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may make farmers less vulnerable to one type of risk, but more vulnerable to another. 
Specifically I ask: How do socio-economic determinants of adaptive capacity among 
smallholder farmers in Northwest Costa Rica determine their ability to avoid adaptation 
limits in the face of the impacts of multiple global change risks?  
My research approach follows Morton's (2007) ontological framework, that 
dictates that research on smallholder farm adaptations and vulnerabilities should (1) 
recognize the complexity and location specificity of production systems and (2) 
incorporate both climate and non-climate stressors on rural livelihoods and their 
contributions to vulnerability. The Arenal-Tempisque Irrigation Project (Projecto de 
Riego del Arenal-Tempisque, PRAT) in Guanacaste, Costa Rica, my chosen case study, 
has been heavily impacted by drought and trade liberalization. These interacting global 
changes have caused many smallholder farmers to cope and ultimately to confront 
adaptation limits, indicated by their abandonment of valued livelihood pursuits.  
In this paper, I first describe my theoretical framework, which builds off Morton’s 
(2007) work by incorporating insights from recent studies of the impacts of multiple, 
interacting global changes on rural livelihoods in less-developed countries (LDCs). I then 
describe my case study and data collection methods that included workshops, focus 
groups, and household surveys and interviews. Finally, I report the results of my analysis 
and discuss their significance in the context of the Arenal-Tempisque Irrigation Project 
and the body of research on the determinants of adaptation and vulnerability among 
smallholder farmers. 
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2. Theoretical framework 
 Morton's (2007) ontological framework underlies the theoretical framework used 
in this study. I build on this work by integrating recent research that has considered how 
groups or individuals adapt to the impacts of global change processes, which include 
changes in both the economy and the climate (Adger, Eakin, & Winkels, 2009; 
Christoplos, 2010; Eakin, Winkels, & Sendzimir, 2009; Eakin, 2003, 2005; S. Eriksen & 
Silva, 2009; R. M. Leichenko, Brien, & Solecki, 2010; R. Leichenko & O’Brien, 2008; 
Neil Adger, 1999; O’Brien & Leichenko, 2000; O’Brien, Quinlan, & Ziervogel, 2009). I 
focused on rural smallholder farming households in the Arenal-Tempisque Irrigation 
Project (Projecto de Riego del Arenal-Tempisque, PRAT), and conceptualized global 
change processes as impacting vulnerable farmers in different ways, resulting in 
determinate outcomes for rural households. These outcomes depend on household 
exposure and sensitivity to an impact, and on whether and how households can and do 
adapt; exposure represents the condition of being impacted (Leichenko & O’Brien, 
2008). Farmer vulnerability is also determined by sensitivity and exposure to global 
change impacts. For the purposes of this study, I define vulnerability as the degree to 
which an individual or group may be impacted adversely by the consequences, or the 
potential consequences, of global change risks (Eriksen & O’Brien, 2007; Eriksen et al., 
2011).  
I define adaptations as livelihood responses to observed or expected global 
change risks—their effects and impacts—in order to alleviate adverse impacts of change 
or take advantage of new opportunities (Adger, Arnell, & Tompkins, 2005; IPCC, 2001). 
These adaptations, including coping measures, can be taken either in anticipation of or 
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following from exposure. Marshall & Marshall (2007) show these adaptations are a 
function of (1) a farmer’s perception of risk associated with change, (2) the ability of a 
farmer to change, (3) their proximity to adaptation limits (i.e., the point at which a farmer 
is forced to give up valued livelihood goals) and (4) the level of interest in change.  
I distinguish coping mechanisms as specific to a type of adaptation practice 
(UNDP, 2005). I define coping mechanisms as adaptations taken by farmers that diminish 
their ability to meet valued livelihood goals in the face of future impacts (Smit & 
Wandel, 2006). As farmers cope with global change impacts, their proximity to 
adaptation limits changes, as do their perceptions of risks and their ability to continue 
coping. Adaptation limits represent thresholds beyond which farmers can no longer adapt 
or cope with the impacts of global change risks to meet existing valued livelihood goals. 
As risks associated with global changes increase toward these thresholds, risks to valued 
objectives may become intolerable, at which point farmers must either live with 
intolerable risk of losses, revise attitudes about what is a valued objective, or change 
behavior radically to avoid the intolerable risk of loss (Dow, Berkhout, & Preston, 2013). 
Research on farmer responses to global change impacts shows that repeated or prolonged 
coping can reduce their capacity to cope and thereby force farmers past these limits, 
beyond which they cannot recover (Jones, 2001; Roncoli, Ingram, & Kirshen, 2001).  
Farmer livelihood goals are critical within this theoretical framework. 
Smallholder farmer adaptations to global changes that result in their ability to better meet 
valued goals are considered successful within this context. These successful adaptations 
are a function of their ability to pursue new opportunities and to utilize adaptive capacity 
to reduce their sensitivity and exposure to the impacts of global change risks. The ability 
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of a farmer to modify their vulnerability to the impacts of global change risks to meet 
valued livelihood goals depends on their capacity to adapt; this is dependent on the 
underlying socio-economic context and on the larger political economy (Cohen, 
Demeritt, Robinson, & Rothman, 1998; Klein et al., 2007; Yohe et al., 2007).  
Some farmers have the capacity to incrementally adapt to the impacts of global 
change risks without limiting their ability to adapt to future impacts; they may pursue 
opportunities that may distance them from adaptation limits. Others may only have, or 
they may only utilize, their capacities to adapt to the same risks by coping; this may make 
them more vulnerable and more likely to confront adaptation limits in the future. 
Livelihood transformations, or transformative adaptations, at adaptation limits may be 
necessary as the final response taken by some households to escape the impacts of current 
risks to current livelihood goals. Adaptation limits represent thresholds beyond 
individuals and groups can no longer adapt or cope with the impacts of global change 
risks to meet existing valued livelihood goals (Dow, Berkhout, & Preston, 2013). As risks 
associated with global changes increase toward these thresholds, risks to valued 
objectives may become intolerable. At this point, one must live with intolerable risk of 
losses, revise attitudes about what is a valued objective, or change behavior radically to 
avoid the intolerable risk of loss.  
For the most vulnerable in less-developed countries (LDC), perceptions of rural 
individuals about the efficacy of transformation and adaptation capacities may be closely 
linked to their ability to manage adaptation limits and avoid devolution into long-term 
poverty. Following this logic, the determinants of adaptation limits may provide insight 
into farmer vulnerabilities that can be addressed in rural development programs to better 
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allow farmers to meet valued livelihood goals in the face of global change risks. 
However, the same socio-economic determinants of successful adaptation to one type of 
impact may increase farmer vulnerability to another type. This interplay is not well 
understood in many rural development programs, but it is critical to their success in the 
face of interacting global change risks. 
 
3. Research site and design 
3.1 Research site 
The Arenal-Tempisque Irrigation Project (Projecto de Riego del Arenal-
Tempisque, PRAT) in Guanacaste, Costa Rica provides up to 5,616,000 m3/day of water 
to farmers in the Tempisque River Valley from Lake Arenal to the east (Figure 4.1). 
Water provision occurs through a series of irrigation channels and aqueducts. A series of 
expansions between 1983 and 2006 have increased the PRAT’s size to just over 28,000 
hectares of irrigated land in 2014. The PRAT is the largest irrigation system in Central 
America, and the largest rural development project in Costa Rica (Ballestero et al., 2007). 
Roughly 1125 farms benefit from the project, generating over 20,000 jobs (~40% are 
seasonal) and income of approximately US$163 million annually (SENARA, 2013). The 
Agricultural Development Institute of Costa Rica (Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, IDA) 
transferred at no cost, or at greatly reduced cost, over 600 of those farms, totaling just 
under 5,300 hectares, to smallholder farmers through the agrarian reform initiatives of the 
PRAT between 1983 and 2006. The remaining 22,700 hectares were brought under 
irrigation through a series of public-private agreements requiring lands to be used 
“effectively” in exchange for subsidized water.  
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Figure 4.1 – Arenal-Tempisque Irrigation Project within the Tempisque River Basin in 
Guanacaste, Costa Rica; this map shows topography, PRAT canal infrastructure, and IDA 
parcels. 
 
The original goals of the PRAT were (1) to take advantage of the waters 
discharged by the hydroelectric dam at Lake Arenal; (2) to improve living conditions in 
the semi-arid Tempisque River Valley by generating agro-employment, redistributing 
land from large land owners to smallholder farmers, and changing cropping systems; and 
(3) to promote integrated regional development with complementary smallholder and 
agro-industrial sectors. To reach these goals, the government provided smallholder 
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farmers with parcels of land ranging in size from one to 12 hectares, and then the PRAT 
was to supply these parcels with irrigation water during the dry season (November-
March). Market access was to be provided to smallholder farmers by agro-industries who 
relied on smallholder farms for the production of rice.  
While these original goals of the PRAT never changed, the government’s capacity 
to successfully implement them did change. The Latin American debt crisis, beginning in 
the early 1980s brought a restructuring of Costa Rica’s economy, and along with it a 
restructuring of its agrarian institutions (see Edelman, 1992; Honey, 1994; Marois, 2005). 
The Costa Rican government abandoned many of its public-private partnerships in the 
PRAT in order to meet the economic restructuring demands of the International Monetary 
Fund, the World Bank, U.S.AID, and the Inter-American Development Bank in return for 
financial support. Today, smallholder farmers in the PRAT are adapting to increasing 
water scarcity and decreasing rice-market access. These global changes are undermining 
farmer livelihoods as farmers are forced to abandon their traditional rice production and 
rent their land to industrial sugarcane mills, resulting in yearly incomes well below the 
Costa Rican poverty line. Between 2002 and 2012, 40% of farmers represented in this 
study abandoned rice production by transferring their lands to industrial sugarcane mills, 
and many more claim they will abandon agriculture within the next five years. I consider 
farmer abandonment of rice production through the transition to sugarcane production as 
representing an adaptation limit. This abandonment may also be considered a livelihood 
transformation. In either conceptualization, the hardship associated with a farm’s 
transition to sugarcane production must not be discounted. And, while there are always 
tradeoffs among livelihood strategies, a transition to sugarcane production brings many 
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great economic hardship and forces farmers to forfeit their valued identities as rice 
farmers (see Chapter 5 for a discussion of the importance of rice in smallholder farmer 
identities). 
 
3.2 Data collection 
A qualitative participatory rural appraisal (Chambers, 1994) was applied in the 
PRAT to initially assess farmer vulnerabilities, the impacts of global changes, and farmer 
responses to these changes. The appraisal consisted of two workshops with researchers, 
farmers, and PRAT managers. The workshops were held in 2010 and 2013. The first 
workshop, entitled “Coordinating sustainability science research in the Rio Tempisque 
Basin,” was held on August 14th and 15th, 2010 in Palo Verde National Park, Guanacaste, 
Costa Rica. Attendees included 10 researchers and farmers from multiple research 
organizations including CATIE, the Organization for Tropical Studies, and Arizona State 
University; all were engaged in sustainability research or farming in the region. PRAT-
sustainability problems raised throughout this workshop included (1) smallholder rice 
farmers are demanding more water, but the PRAT has been operating under scarcity since 
2006, (2) smallholder farmers are increasingly selling and renting their lands to large-
scale sugarcane companies to escape both agriculture and the debts accrued through rice 
production, and (3) smallholder rice farmers are losing access to the regional rice market 
due to changing regulations brought about by the “Dominican Republic – Central 
America Free Trade Agreement” (CAFTA-DR). We defined these as sustainability 
problems because their solutions lie in contradictory, piecemeal, and varying 
requirements that were difficult to understand. See Rittel & Webber (1973) for a 
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complete definition of sustainability, or “wicked,” problems as we defined them in this 
workshop. 
The second workshop, entitled “Guanacaste collaborative workshop on water 
governance,” was held on March 14th, 2013 at the National University of Costa Rica, 
Nicoya, Costa Rica. Forty-six total workshop participants included representatives from 
11 rural water administrations (ASADAs), farmers, agricultural water managers, and local 
water-environmental non-governmental organizations. Participants, including irrigation 
and agricultural managers, overwhelmingly agreed with farmers that a strong 
smallholder-farming sector is in Costa Rica’s best interest, but that the challenge was 
determining how water should be managed to support smallholder farming. Participants 
agreed that water scarcity was heavily impacting agriculture in a negative way. See 
Kuzdas, Yglesias, & Warner (2013) for a detailed summary of workshop findings. 
I used the findings from this participatory rural appraisal to formulate and revise a 
household survey that included questions that would allow me to understand how 
household level socio-economic variables correlate with farmer abandonment of 
livelihood goals (indicated by their transition from rice production to sugarcane 
production) due to either water scarcity or limited rice-market access. If farmers had 
transitioned to sugarcane production, questions were asked to collect socio-economic 
data about their time as a rice farmer. Also, all questions were structured to collect socio-
economic data that could be categorized using all eight of Yohe & Tol’s (2002) 
determinants of adaptive capacity. These include (1) resources and their distribution, (2) 
critical and functional institutions, (3) human capital including education and security, (4) 
social capital including the definition of property rights, (5) access to risk spreading 
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processes, (6) ability and credibility of decision-makers to manage information, (7) 
available technical options for adaptation, and (8) perceived attribution of the source of 
stress and the significance of exposure.  
The household survey was developed following the guidelines for the collection 
of quantitative primary data in developing countries as described by the United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2008). Each survey also included a short 
semi-structured interview to collect farmer perspectives on their efforts to adapt to risks 
and on the future of smallholder farming in the PRAT. Following the iterative process 
defined by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, I refined my 
household survey by holding three focus groups with smallholder farmers in the IDA 
districts of San Martin and San Ramon (shown in Figure 4.1) in February 2013. Each 
focus group lasted approximately one hour and included 4-8 farmers, and each was held 
in or outside the home of a farmer. In each focus group I asked farmers to talk openly 
about, and then attempt to reach a consensus description of: 
1. Smallholder farmer valued livelihood goals;  
2. The adaptations smallholder farmers employ to adapt to water scarcity and limited 
rice-market access. 
A Spanish/English speaking research assistant, trained at Centro Agronómico 
Tropical de Investigación y Enseñanza (CATIE) in facilitation techniques, facilitated all 
focus groups. Focus groups were documented using facilitator notes, and analyzed using 
the content analysis method described by Sandelowski (2000). I looked for major themes, 
insights, common phrases and words, and specific moods and tones across the notes from 
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all three focus groups. The facilitator first coded all focus group documentation, and then 
I recoded the documentation to ensure consistency. 
The revised household survey was pretested by surveying five households in the 
San Martin district. I then further revised the survey for clarity based on the feedback 
from these farmers. The final survey was comprised of questions structured in order to 
collect socio-economic data including information about demography, assets and wealth, 
access to markets and services, and perceptions of climate risks. If farmers had switched 
to sugarcane production (40% of farmers surveyed had rented their land to sugarcane 
companies), they were asked to specify if the switch was in response to the debts accrued 
through a failed crop resulting from water scarcity, or in response to limited rice-market 
access.  
A Spanish/English speaking research assistant administered all surveys. My 
sampling frame were all smallholder farmers in each of the seven IDA districts. 
According to our sampling strategy, I visited every household in each of these seven 
districts, shown in Figure 4.1, on a regular basis, multiple times, and at random times. 
During these visits, farmers who were found in their homes or in their fields were 
interviewed, if they agreed to be. In total, 94 surveys were administered from February to 
November 2013. Each survey lasted from 20 minutes to 30 minutes. Some farmers 
invited us into their homes for the interview portion of each survey, which lasted up to 
1.5 hours. I audio recorded interviews and the University of Costa Rica, School of 
Anthropology transcription service transcribed all recorded interviews. No names and no 
specific locations were recorded with surveys or interview data to ensure the responses of 
farmers remained anonymous, in accordance with my IRB certification. 
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3.3 Data analysis 
The data from the quantitative household survey were analyzed using descriptive 
statistical methods and logistic regression models, which are described below. 
Frequencies of nominal socio-economic variables and measures of the central tendency 
of scalar socio-economic variables were used to describe farmer socio-economic 
household characteristics and farm characteristics. This description was supplemented 
with data from the workshops and the focus groups. Predictors of farm transitions to 
sugarcane production were analyzed using IBM SPSS Statistics 22.0 software (SPSS Inc., 
www.spss.com). Qualitative and contextual data was then used to describe these 
predictors as determinants by drawing assumed causal links between each predictor and a 
household switch to sugarcane production. Binary and multinomial logistic regression 
models were assumed to be appropriate for my analysis because continuous and 
categorical predictor variables were included in my model and my dependent variables 
were dichotomous and categorical.  
 
3.3.1 Logistic regression models 
I analyzed and transformed farmer socio-economic data into independent 
variables to meet the assumptions of logistic regression, including assumptions of 
independence and non-co-linearity. I analyzed the relative influence of the socio-
economic variables on farm transitions from rice to sugarcane production using a binary 
logistic regression model. I used a multinomial regression model to determine 
correlations of predictors of farm transitions to sugarcane production due to both water 
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scarcity and limited rice-market access. The functional form of the logistic function I 
used was:  
𝑔! = 𝑙𝑛 𝑝!1− 𝑝! =   𝛽! +   𝛽!𝑥!,! +⋯+   𝛽!𝑥!,! +   𝜀!  
 
where 𝑔!   was a “log odds” (i.e., the logarithm of the odds p/(1-p), where p is probability), 𝛽! was constant, 𝛽! to 𝛽! were vectors of coefficients and 𝜀! was an error term. In this 
equation, the coefficient calculated change in log odds of the dependent variable, not the 
change in the variable itself. Therefore, I simplified the model’s interpretation by 
converting it to an odds ratio using the exponential function: 
 𝑂𝑑𝑑𝑠  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =    𝑝!1− 𝑝! =   𝑒!!!  !!!!,!!⋯!  !!!!,!!  !! 
 
The odds ratio is the ratio of the probability that the household will transition to 
sugarcane relative to the probability that they will not convert. The multinomial logistic 
regression model utilizes two logistic functions of the same form, each relative to the 
reference group (rice production). I utilized a multinomial regression in this study 
because my dependent variable in question consisted of more than two categories (i.e., 
(1) rice production, (2) transition to sugarcane due to limited rice-market access, and (3) 
transition to sugarcane due to water scarcity). 
For dichotomous independent variables in both models, the exponential of the 
respective coefficient gives the proportion of change in odds for a shift in the given 
variable. If the variable was scalar, both the coefficient and exponential of the coefficient 
were associated with the effect of per unit change. The sign of the coefficient revealed the 
direction of change in both types of variables. Socio-economic independent variables 
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were incorporated into both logistic regression models to control for each distinct 
category in Yohe & Tol’s (2002) framework to interpret the results while holding other 
important adaptive inputs constant. The omnibus test and the Hosmer and Lemeshow 
goodness-of-fit test were used to test model fit and significance. The null hypothesis was 
that no relationship existed between a household transition to sugarcane and any socio-
economic variable. 
 
4. Results and discussion 
In this section I use descriptive statistics, focus group and workshop findings to 
describe changes in smallholder farmer livelihoods between 2002 and 2012. I provide a 
descriptive analysis of farmer livelihoods, and then I present and discuss the results of my 
logistic regression analysis and describe the determinants of farm transitions to sugarcane 
production. I analyze why some farmers have confronted adaptation limits by presenting 
and discussing the results of my logistic regression analyses. I look for similarities and 
differences between the determinants of adaptation limits due to water scarcity, and those 
due to limited rice-market access. I compare my findings to Yohe and Tol’s (2002) 
determinants of adaptive capacity. 
 
4.1 Limited rice-market access, water scarcity, and smallholder farming in the PRAT 
Since the PRAT began providing irrigation water to farmers in 1983, rice has 
been the crop of choice for the smallholder farmers represented in this analysis. 
Arriagada, Sills, Pattanayak, Cubbage, & González (2010) show that in the early 2000s, 
almost all farmers in my case study produced rice. This percentage has decreased and 
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today, 40% of the farmers surveyed have transitioned to sugarcane production (see Table 
4.1). These transitions were driven by the impacts of two interacting global change risks 
(described in detail in Chapters 2 & 3). First, a rapid vertical integration of industrialized 
rice mills has occurred in the region, brought about by State rice-policy responses to 
CAFTA-DR. This vertical expansion greatly limited rice-market access for smallholder 
farmers in the PRAT. Second, increasing regional drought has forced many rice farmers 
in the region to abandon rice crops between 2006 and 2014. The remaining smallholder 
rice farmers in the PRAT continue to plant rice because if they are able to grow and sell 
their harvest, they may earn a fair profit.  
 
Table 4.1 – Number and percent of surveyed farmers that abandoned rice production to 
produce sugarcane due to (1) water scarcity or (2) limited rice-market access; N=94. 
Number that 
switched 
due to water 
scarcity: 17 
Percent that 
switched 
due to water 
scarcity: 
18% 
Number that 
switched due 
to limited 
market 
access: 21 
Percent that 
switched due 
to limited 
market 
access: 22% 
Total 
number 
that 
switched: 
38 
Total 
percent 
that 
switched: 
40% 
 
The successful production and sale of a 10-hectare rice harvest brought 
approximately US$33,000 in 2012 (CONARROZ, 2012). Over 75% of their gross 
income covers input and milling costs, which provides smallholder farmers with a stable 
livelihood above Costa Rica’s average gross national income of US$8,820 (World Bank, 
2012). However, without securing a sales contract from any one of the remaining five 
  120 
industrial rice mills in the region, they have no guarantee that their harvests will be 
purchased, and they must search for remaining capacity at regional mills after every 
harvest to sell their rice. The increasingly vertically integrated rice mills now produce 
much of their own rice, which means they rely less on the purchase of smallholder-farm 
rice harvests. The limited amount of rice that is purchased by rice mills from smallholder 
farms is purchased early in the harvest season. This has created competition among 
smallholder farmers to harvest and sell rice earlier in the growing season, before mills 
reach storage and processing capacities. 
 
4.1.1 Water scarcity in the PRAT 
The Tempisque River Basin experienced drought conditions in six of the eight 
years between 2006 and 2014. Downscaled regional climate models for Northwest Costa 
Rica predict higher temperatures and water deficits in the region within the next two 
decades (Anderson, Flores, Perez, Carrillo, & Sempris, 2008). Wet season precipitation is 
expected to decrease as much as 27% during this time, creating soil-moisture deficits and 
reducing the amount of surface water available for irrigation by half (Karmalkar, Bradley, 
& Diaz, 2008). These changes are already apparent in the Tempisque River Basin and 
farmers included in this study overwhelmingly realize this; 99% of farmers interviewed 
perceived decreases in rainfall and almost 90% perceived warmer temperatures from 
2002 to 2012.  
Beginning in September 2006, for the first time, the PRAT operated under 
conditions of water scarcity. The PRAT water managers devised a plan to cycle irrigation 
water by sector in an attempt to provide farmers with enough water to plant and harvest 
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and not lose harvests. Water shortages primarily occurred during the high water demand 
months of December and January, during which time both rice and sugarcane are planted. 
Both rice and sugarcane require large inputs of water during planting, and both crops 
must be planted near the start of the dry season so they can be harvested prior to the 
beginning of the next rainy season. The water-cycling program was designed to spread 
farmer-planting dates across a series of 6 weeks, thereby allowing all farms to 
successfully plant and harvest prior to the beginning of the next rainy season, which 
usually begins in May of each year. Allocation priorities are created anew each December 
when the seven agronomists, employed by the PRAT water management to oversee each 
of the seven IDA districts in the PRAT, meet to determine which sections of the districts 
gain priority during the water-cycling program. Interviews with water managers indicated 
this process was “fluid,” as no legal precedent exists to dictate allocation priorities 
through time. While this water-cycling program could allow all smallholder farmers to 
plant their rice crops and harvest before the rains begin, farmers who are forced to wait to 
plant have more difficulty selling their harvests because their later harvest dates limit 
their ability to sell their harvests before rice mills stop buying smallholder rice harvests 
for the season. And, while it is possible for smallholder farmers to store their production, 
the debts accrued through the planting and harvesting process necessitate the timely sale 
of their harvests. 
Delayed water allocations, in combination with limited access to the rice market 
during harvest, have caused water piracy among farmers throughout the PRAT. This has 
created water scarcity for some. Farmers upstream in the PRAT illegally modify 
irrigation infrastructure to gain early access to water allocations (Figure 4.2 shows 
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examples from 2012). Many farmers furthest down stream plant rice but then lose their 
water access as a result of the actions of upstream farmers, and therefore many 
downstream farmers have been forced to abandon rice crops. 
 
 
Figure 4.2 – The picture on the left is of a pump illegally drawing irrigation water from a 
PRAT canal; when water managers are not patrolling the canals, farmers can use pumps 
to transport water from the canals to their crops during the cycling process, and this limits 
water availability downstream. The picture on the right is of a makeshift dam, built by a 
farmer in a remote region of the irrigation district (an area that is infrequently patrolled). 
Farmers build these dams to gain access to water, and their neighbors typically destroy 
them as they are affected by the water loss.  
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4.1.2 Transitions to sugarcane production, the outcome of global change impacts on 
smallholder farmers 
The transition of smallholder rice production to sugarcane production is brought 
about by one of two impacts: (1) the debt accrued through a the inability of a farmer to 
sell their rice harvest, or (2) through the loss of one or more rice crops to water scarcity, 
which leaves farmers without income. When a smallholder farmer switches to sugarcane, 
they do so by entering into long-term (>10 years) full-land-management-production 
contracts with one of three industrialized sugarcane mills in the PRAT. Full-land-
management-production contracts between smallholder farmers and sugarcane mills are 
often negotiated through the purchase of the smallholder farm rice debts. The sugarcane 
mills then plant, manage, and harvest smallholder farm fields, and smallholder 
landowners receive a flat fee per hectare depending on their debt. On average they 
receive approximately 150,000 colones (US$300 US) per hectare per year, well below the 
Costa Rican poverty level for the majority of landholding sizes. 
Farmers and PRAT water managers overwhelmingly agree that a strong 
smallholder-farming sector is needed in the PRAT because it would promote Costa Rican 
food security and bolster the region’s non-migrant based economy. Farmers in my focus 
groups agreed that their valued livelihood goals included security of well-being for their 
households and the preservation of their identities as rice farmers. Household interviews 
further verified this finding and provided rich insights into these values (see Chapter 5). 
Allowing smallholder farmers to achieve these livelihood goals would strengthen the 
PRAT smallholder-farming sector. Despite this seemingly unanimous agreement 
regarding the importance of smallholder-rice farming in the PRAT, few solutions have 
  124 
been proposed to help farmers overcome the impacts of water scarcity and limited rice-
market access. This has left farmers struggling to adapt to these impacts with little 
support from local, regional, or State institutions. Because of this, many have reached the 
point at which their valued livelihood goals cannot be met through adaptive actions, 
meaning they have abandoned valued livelihood goals and transferred their land to one of 
the three sugarcane companies in the PRAT. These valued goals, identified and 
articulated within my three focus groups, fell sharply along two lines: security of well-
being and personal identity. Farmers sought (1) security of education, healthcare, and the 
maintenance of assets and land for all family members, and (2) the maintenance of their 
rice-producer-specific identities as parcelaros (i.e. smallholder rice-farmers who were 
given land or who were sold land at discounted rates by the government). A farm-
transition to sugarcane production most often forced farmers to sacrifice both (which 
resulted in increased poverty and destitution), or to trade-off their identities for security 
and seek alternative employment if those opportunities existed for them. See Chapter 5 
for a detailed explanation of valued livelihood goals within the context of PRAT 
smallholder farming. 
The transition to sugarcane production represents a long-term loss of the 
smallholder rice-farmer parcelaro identity. The transition to sugarcane entails long-term 
land-management contracts, required because sugarcane mills purchase rice debts and in 
return require long-term use of the land to justify the purchases. While smallholder 
farmers could independently plant sugarcane and independently sell it to a mill, the price 
they would receive is much less per hectare-yield than that of rice. The sugarcane 
economy of scale is much greater than that of rice. Given the high cost of human and 
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mechanical inputs that are unique to sugarcane, labor and machinery must be utilized 
efficiently on larger scales to profit through sugarcane production. This creates the 
opportunity for syndication to exploit economies of scale in sugarcane harvesting, 
loading and transport by spreading high capital and management costs over a large 
tonnage (Moor, 1998). Almost all sugarcane in the PRAT is mechanically loaded infield. 
Approximately 50% of sugarcane grown in the region is cut and windrowed manually 
(TABOGA, 2014), which requires large sources of migratory labor. The remainder is cut 
and windrowed mechanically, requiring substantial fixed capital investments by the mill. 
These investments require multiple sugarcane harvests over multiple years to become 
profitable. Therefore, sugarcane mills seek long-term land management contracts from 
smallholders, so no “fail safe” or “short-term” transitions to sugarcane currently occur in 
PRAT smallholder agriculture. There is substantial irreversibility in the transition to 
sugarcane that entails the loss of both livelihoods and parcelaro identities.  
 
4.2 Determinants of adaptation limits:  Smallholder farm transitions to sugarcane 
production 
In my household survey, I asked farmers who had transferred their land rights to 
sugarcane mills to describe why they did so. While many farmers who had switched to 
sugarcane production reported to have suffered losses from both water scarcity and 
limited rice-market access, all could attribute a majority of their livelihood losses and 
their ultimate transition to sugarcane production directly to one of the two impacts. In all, 
40% of all farmers surveyed had transitioned to sugarcane, and 45% of those switched 
due to the loss of one or more crops from water scarcity. The remaining 55% reported 
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that they had switched to sugarcane production because they had accrued insurmountable 
debts due to the inability to sell their rice crops. These farmers had utilized their capacity 
to switch to sugarcane as a means to mitigate the impacts of water scarcity and the debts 
accrued due to limited rice-market access. However, this transition forced many farmers 
included in this study into conditions of food insecurity and poverty. There was also 
evidence (e.g., vacant homes on sugarcane producing parcels) of out-migration (complete 
abandonment of farming and change in values) in some sectors within my study site. 
While these farmers were not included in my study, it is important to point out that some 
farmers did appear to have the capacity to transition out of agriculture and migrate from 
the region. 
I assumed that some household-scale socio-economic variables (Table 4.2), 
collected through my household survey would be predictors of farm transitions to 
sugarcane production, and I used logistic regression models to assess the correlation of 
each. Also, I coded each independent variable using Yohe & Tol’s (2002) determinants 
of adaptive capacity to discuss my findings in the context of my theoretical framework. 
In total, I found that four of the 15 socio-economic variables were predictors of farmer 
transitions to sugarcane production in the PRAT. 
 
Table 4.2 – Household-scale socio-economic variables expected to be significantly 
correlated with farmers’ coping mechanisms, N=94 
Categorical 
socio-
Determinant 
following 
Response category  #  Percent 
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economic 
independent 
variables 
Yohe and 
Tol (2002)* 
Owns land  D2 0 = No  19 21 
1 = Yes 75 79 
Owns 
equipment  
D1, D2 0 = No  54 57 
1 = Yes  40 43 
Has crop 
insurance  
D6, D3 0 = No  60 64 
1 = Yes  34 36 
Cattle 
ownership 
D2 0 = No  44 47 
1 = Yes  50 53 
Only receives 
market 
information 
from purchaser 
of harvest  
D6 0 = No  30 32 
1 = Yes  64 68 
Formal 
agriculture 
training among 
any member of 
household 
D4 0 = No  70 75 
1 = Yes  24 25 
Friends outside D5 0 = No  67 71 
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of farming** 1 = Yes  27 29 
Relatives with 
livelihoods 
outside of 
farming  
D6 0 = No  53 56 
1 = Yes  41 44 
Agriculture is 
sole income 
source 
D6 0 = No  18 19 
1 = Yes  76 81 
Perception of 
precipitation 
decrease 
D8 0 = No 1 1 
1 = Yes  93 99 
Perception of 
temperature 
increase  
D8 0 = No  10 11 
1 = Yes  84 89 
Scalar socio-
economic 
independent 
variables 
 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev Range Min Max 
2
0
% 
4
0
% 
6
0
% 
8
0
% 
Years spent 
farming  
D7  22 7.2 34 2 36 1
7 
2
2 
2
2 
2
8 
Age of head of 
household  
D7  51 14.3 63 20 83 3
8 
4
9 
5
5 
6
2 
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Children in 
household  
D4  2.9 1.9 10 0 10 2 2 3 4 
No. of 
household 
members who 
work on farm 
D4  0.8 1.4 8 0 8 0 0 1 2 
Size of Farm  D2  8.8 8.0 49.2 0.8 50 2
.
5 
5 1
0 
1
3 
*(D1) available technological options for adaptation, (D2) resources and their 
distribution, (D3) critical and functional institutions, (D4) human capital including 
education and security, (D5) social capital including the definition of property rights, 
(D6) access to risk spreading processes, (D7) ability and credibility of decision-makers to 
manage information, and (D8) perceived attribution of the source of stress and the 
significance of exposure.  
** Farmer has “close” friends outside of farming that they at lease four times per year. 
 
4.2.1 Determinants of transitions to sugarcane production 
In my analysis of the predictors of farm transitions to sugarcane, I first explored 
predictors of all farm transitions to sugarcane production included in my study. This 
analysis (see Table 4.3) included all farms that transitioned to sugarcane production for 
any reason and those that continued to plant rice at the time of the survey. My analysis 
showed that three predictors were significantly correlated with farm transitions to 
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sugarcane; these were cattle ownership, agriculture as a principle income source, and 
years spent farming.  
 
Table 4.3 – Parameter estimates from binary logistic regression model, N=94 
Change crop type to sugarcane: total (0 = no change to sugarcane; 1 = change to 
sugarcane) 
Predictors B S.E. Wld z Sig. Exp(B) 95% C.I. 
Cattle ownership -0.97 0.38 6.52 2.55 
0.011
** 
0.379 0.18 0.79 
No. of household 
members on farm 
-0.65 0.42 2.35 1.53 0.125 0.517 0.223 1.2 
Size of Farm  0.037 0.03 1.00 1.00 0.317 1.037 0.966 1.11 
Agriculture 
is/was sole 
income  
0.536 0.24 4.84 2.20 
0.028
** 
1.709 1.06 2.75 
Owns equipment  0.539 0.59 0.81 0.90 0.368 1.714 0.53 5.54 
Friends outside of 
farming  
0.096 0.53 0.03 0.17 0.858 1.101 0.385 3.15 
Years spent 
farming  
-0.30 0.13 5.57 2.36 0.018 0.736 0.571 0.94 
Perception of 
temperature 
19.30 1174 0 0.00 0.999 - - - 
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increase  
Has crop insurance  -0.48 0.60 0.63 0.79 0.424 0.617 0.189 2.01 
Formal 
educational 
training in 
household  
-0.94 0.67 1.95 1.39 0.162 0.388 0.103 1.46 
Age of head of 
household  
-0.02 0.02 0.82 0.90 0.363 0.979 0.936 1.02 
*Significant at the 0.10 level; **Significant at the 0.05 level; ***Significant at the 0.005 
level. 
Cox & Snell R Square 0.396, Nagelkerke R Square 0.533 
Omnibus tests of model coefficients: Chi-square 47.411, df 11, Sig. 0 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test: Chi-square 3.615, df 8, Sig. 0.89 
 
Farms that had cattle (data included those that had cattle before their transition 
from rice production to sugarcane because some farms sold their herds after the 
transition) were 62% less likely to transition to sugarcane production. Among rice 
farmers in the PRAT, cattle were used as buffers against the impacts of risks. As the only 
type of livestock reared by farmers in my study, they were regularly bought and sold 
between farms, and at regional auction houses. Farmers did so, in large part, to overcome 
debts assumed through the inability to sell a rice crop, or to supplement income if farms 
lost rice crops to water scarcity. In global change research, selling cattle is often 
considered a coping mechanism, in contrast to an adaptation in pursuit of an opportunity. 
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This is often the case because cattle are considered to be a primary source of capital; by 
selling cattle, farmers become more vulnerable to future impacts. Cattle have also been 
shown to play a role in the adaptations of some farming households following traditional 
risk management strategies of income diversification – farmers may complement their 
crop income with livestock income (for some discussion of the role of livestock 
ownership in farmer adaptation, see Eakin & Bojórquez-Tapia, 2008). While these 
processes were occurring among farmers in this study, surveyed farmers also perceived 
cattle as “supporting” their rice-crop production. They did not perceive cattle as a part of 
their identities. This distinction is critical. I had originally classified cattle per Yohe & 
Tol’s (2002) adaptive capacity classification as a “resource” that made farms more 
adaptive to risks. However, among farmers in the PRAT, the process of cattle rearing 
operates more as a “risk spreading process,” or as a form of savings to smooth out 
variations in income. The rich history of cattle rearing in Guanacaste provides ease of 
market access, and the renewable nature of the resource seems to draw farmers to invest 
in cattle rather than other types of economic or physical capital. Farmers often described 
cattle ownership as a premeditated coping mechanism. For example, one farmer 
described smallholder cattle rearing within his livelihood in this way: 
The small cattleman is extinct [in the PRAT]. I own cattle 
because rice is bad business, and I am a rice farmer 
(Survey respondent #53, 14-hectare rice farmer, February 
24th, 2013). 
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Another farmer provided a description of the role cattle play in his ability to avoid losses 
from water scarcity as he “plays the lottery” (Eakin, 2003) and plants rice. 
I lose my harvest [to water scarcity], but I have 11 
Brahman and a Parda so it doesn’t matter, we can still eat 
(Survey respondent #56, 1.4-hectare rice farmer, February 
24th, 2013). 
 
However, Dercon (2002) shows that risk and “lumpiness” limit the opportunities to use 
cattle as insurance for some farmers, and that informal risk-sharing provides only limited 
protection, leaving some of the poor exposed to very severe negative impacts of risks. 
This insight calls into question this risk spreading process for some farmers in the PRAT 
as conditions of water scarcity and limited rice-market access worsen. While my data 
shows cattle have allowed farmers to better manage risks of water scarcity and limited 
rice market access, this strategy may only be useful to a point. 
A second significant determinant of farm transitions to sugarcane production was 
a sole reliance on farm-related income before the transition. Those rice farmers who 
solely relied on farm income were 1.7 times more likely to transition to sugarcane 
compared to those farms with multiple income sources. Yohe & Tol (2002) show that the 
access to risk-spreading processes is a determinant of adaptive capacity, and I categorized 
diversified income sources as such (similar to my re-categorization of cattle). A majority 
of farms represented in this study relied solely on farm-related income, but twenty 
percent of farms had diversified their income sources. This allowed them to spread the 
risks of both water scarcity and limited market access. This risk spreading process better 
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allowed these farming households to continue meeting their valued livelihood goals of 
security of well-being and retain their identities as rice farmers. The standard methods of 
livelihood diversification among households represented in this study were chambas (i.e., 
odd-jobs), and transportation- and tourism-sector employment. While the “number of 
household members who worked the farm” was not significantly correlated with a 
transition to sugarcane in my study, Eakin (2006) found that among irrigated farms in 
Mexico, labor-intensive farming prohibited diversification because it demanded more 
household labor to be dedicated to production. However, farmers who transferred to less 
intensive grain production gained opportunities to diversify, which in turn subsidized 
agricultural production. Rice production in the PRAT is very household-labor intensive, 
and a transition to sugarcane frees this labor. Many of the farmers interviewed in this 
study had recently transitioned to sugarcane, and so many were still in the process of 
adapting household labor. However, there was some evidence of this labor adaptation 
process as some farmers were pursuing employment in the transportation and tourism 
sectors.  
The third significant determinant of a household transition to sugarcane 
production in this study was “years spent farming” by the head of the household. I 
classified this determinant as “the ability and credibility of a decision-maker to manage 
information” within Yohe & Tol's (2002) classifications of adaptive capacity. Farmers 
included in this study farmed between 2 and 36 years. I had assumed that increased 
“years spent farming” would better allow a farmer to manage risk and make good 
decisions that would allow them to continue farming. However, many of the farmers 
included in this study who had farmed the longest also resided in those PRAT-sectors that 
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were first incorporated into the PRAT in 1983. The older sectors had a higher percentage 
of rice growers than the newer sectors. So, while experience did seem to play a role in the 
ability of a farmer to avoid the livelihood losses, it seemed collective action was also 
incorporated into this variable. Farmers in the oldest sectors were better organized around 
rice production. They cooperatively rented and shared planting and harvest equipment. 
This collective action seemed to allow small groups of rice farmers to better adapt. Also, 
it seemed “years spent farming” might be related to the insecurities associated with 
younger farm families. Farmers who were beginning to farm and who had not yet had the 
opportunity to acquire key assets to face significant insecurity may have been drawn to 
forfeit their parcelaro identities (which were limited in younger farmers) to pursue 
alternative livelihoods. 
 
4.2.2 Limited rice-market access-driven transitions to sugarcane production 
Twenty-two percent of all farms included in this study claimed to have 
transitioned from rice to sugarcane production as a result of increasingly limited rice-
market access. My analysis found two predictors of this transition among those farmers: 
“size of farm” and “cattle ownership” (Table 4.4). Farmer cattle ownership was shown to 
decrease the odds that a farm would transition from rice to sugarcane production. Farms 
with cattle were 56% less likely to transition to sugarcane for reasons described above.  
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Table 4.4 – Parameter estimates from multinomial logistic regression model, N=94 
Driver  Predict B S.E. Wald z Sig. Exp(B) 95% C.I. 
Transition to 
sugarcane 
because of 
reduced rice-
market 
access 
Size of 
Farm  
0.088 0.047 3.582 1.893 0.05
* 
1.092 0.9 1.1 
Cattle 
owners 
-1.49 0.729 4.223 2.055 0.04
** 
0.223 0.0 0.9 
No. of 
member 
on farm 
-0.94 0.628 2.268 1.506 0.13 0.388 0.1 1.3 
Ag 
is/was 
sole 
income  
0.247 0.348 0.505 0.711 0.47 1.28 0.6 2.5 
Years 
spent 
farming 
-0.26 0.175 2.241 1.497 0.13 0.769 0.5 1.0 
Age of 
head of 
house 
-0.00 0.031 0.091 0.302 0.76 0.991 0.9 1.0 
Owns 
equip 
-0.61 0.811 0.571 0.756 0.45 0.542 0.1 2.6 
Percep -14.7 2040 0 0.000 0.99 - - - 
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Temp 
inc  
Formal 
training 
in 
house 
1.67 1.016 2.701 1.643 0.1 5.312 0.7 38. 
Friends 
outside 
of 
farming  
3.352 2319 0 0.000 1 - - - 
Has 
crop 
insuran-
ce 
0.472 0.84 0.316 0.562 0.57 1.603 0.3 8.3 
Transition to 
sugarcane 
because of 
water 
scarcity 
Size of 
Farm  
-0.31 0.156 4.009 2.002 0.04
** 
0.732 0.5 0.9 
Cattle 
owners 
-0.82 0.481 2.94 1.715 0.08
* 
0.438 0.1 1.1 
No. of 
member 
in 
house 
-0.64 0.579 1.238 1.113 0.26 0.525 0.1 1.6 
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Ag 
is/was 
sole 
income  
0.74 0.301 6.037 2.457 0.01
** 
2.096 1.1 3.7 
Years 
spent 
farm 
-0.31 0.163 3.722 1.929 0.05
* 
0.731 0.5 1.0 
Age of 
head of 
house 
-0.02 0.031 0.625 0.791 0.42 0.976 0.9 1.0 
Owns 
equip 
-0.19 0.815 0.056 0.237 0.81 0.825 0.1 4.0 
Percept  
of temp 
increase  
-14.5 2284 0 0.000 0.99 - - - 
Formal 
ed 
training 
in 
house 
0.301 0.859 0.123 0.351 0.72 1.351 0.2 7.2 
Friends 
outside 
-17.4 0.93 352.8 18.78 0 - - - 
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of 
farming  
Has 
crop 
insuran-
ce  
-0.64 0.95 0.453 0.673 0.50 0.527 0.0 3.3 
Reference category is: Rice producer 
*Significant at the 0.10 level; **Significant at the 0.05 level; ***Significant at the 0.005 
level 
Cox & Snell R Square 0.576, Nagelkerke R Square 0.674, McFadden 0.445 
Goodness-of-Fit: Pearson Chi-square 194.938, df 160, Sig. 0.031 
 
Increasing farm size was significantly correlated with a transition to sugarcane 
production due to the impacts of limited rice-market access. For every hectare increase in 
farm size, a farm was 1.1 times more likely to transition to sugarcane production. Larger 
farms included in this study, over ten hectares, were typically mechanized and they 
greatly relied on labor from outside the household. Farmers would assume large debts 
through the planting and harvesting of rice each season. Average debts assumed by farms 
in this study were US$2,679 per hectare (CONARROZ, 2012). The successful sale of a 
10-hectare rice harvest could bring up to US$33,000, and this sale was used to pay debts 
and to support household livelihoods. Larger farms that were unable to sell their rice 
crops were sometimes able to access credit to pay their debts, and then sell their harvests 
to one of the remaining rice mills during the next harvest. However, the inability of larger 
  140 
farms to sell multiple rice crops often left them with insurmountable debts. Larger 
smallholder farms would often transition to sugarcane production because of these debts. 
The transition to sugarcane farming included the purchase of smallholder farm rice debts 
in return for decade-long rental agreements with sugarcane mills. Smallholder farming 
households would then be free of debts, but they were no longer independent farmers. 
 
4.2.3 Water scarcity driven transitions to sugarcane production 
Eighteen percent of farmers surveyed had transitioned to sugarcane production as 
a result of lost rice crops due to water scarcity. I found four significant predictors of 
farmer transitions to sugarcane in this context (Table 4.4). “Cattle ownership,” “farm is 
sole income,” and “years spent farming” were again found to have significant 
correlations for the reasons stated above. The third determinant was “size of farm.” 
Larger farms were less likely to suffer losses from water scarcity. As described above, 
larger farms represented in my study were largely mechanized, and most had access to 
large amounts of credit. Most highly mechanized farms installed and relied on wells and 
surface water sources on their properties to supplement decreases in irrigation water. 
Larger farms typically had the capital and expertise to install wells that could be used 
season after season. While this practice is illegal under Costa Rican water law, the lack of 
enforcement mechanisms limits the usefulness of the law. Larger farms may have also 
had the political capital to better avoid the ramifications of enforcement. Smaller farms 
included in this study, less than five hectares, rarely relied on groundwater to supplement 
their water supplies because they lacked the resources necessary to access it. Few had 
access to credit, and few could pay the high costs of well installation. Smaller farms 
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sometimes did pump water from surface water sources if they were fortunate enough to 
have access to a river. 
When water managers initiate the PRAT water-cycling program during December 
and January of each year, smaller farms downstream are made vulnerable to water 
scarcity. Many lose their access to water supplies during planting due the now 
commonplace practices of water piracy throughout the PRAT. Smaller farms are often 
forced to abandon their harvests if they plant rice with the expectation of receiving 
irrigation water, but then fail to receive that allocation due to water piracy upstream. 
Through interviews with the smallest farm households, I learned that these farms are 
typically able to avoid debts when they lose rice crops because much of the planting is 
done by household labor, and they are relatively non-mechanized. However, while the 
loss of a rice crop does not indebt smaller farming households, the loss of a rice crop 
means the loss of household income for the season. This is why many of the smallest 
farms have given up their rice-production livelihoods and have transitioned to sugarcane 
production. 
 Eakin (2006) showed that a similar process of transition occurred among 
vegetable farmers in Mexico transitioning to maize production. While no market existed 
for maize in the region, farmers were able to remain in agriculture through subsistence 
farming. Among those rice farmers most vulnerable to water scarcity in the PRAT, many 
were able to cope with lost crops for multiple seasons through the same process. 
However, ultimately a “retreat” to sugarcane often resulted after multiple seasons of 
coping. Thereby, farmers sacrificed agriculture, but did gain some income security. 
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Unfortunately, this security often appeared to come at the price of poverty and food 
insecurity, unless smallholders were able to diversify their livelihoods. 
 
4.3 Adapting to water scarcity, the “catch-22” of successful adaptations to multiple 
risks in the PRAT 
In my analysis, “size of farm” was shown to be a determinant of farm transitions 
to sugarcane production, driven by both water scarcity and limited rice-market access 
independently, but contradictory depending on nature of transition. “Farm size” 
represents a resource within Yohe & Tol's (2002) classifications of adaptive capacity. 
Those farms with more debt were more vulnerable to limited rice-market access, but they 
were better able to adapt to water scarcity due to their increased access to resources. 
Smaller farms, with few resources and that were heavily reliant on household labor, were 
shown to be better able to cope with the impacts of limited rice-market access, yet were 
more vulnerable to the impacts of water scarcity. From the perspective of farmers most 
vulnerable to water scarcity in the PRAT, this situation is akin to Heller's (1961) “catch-
22.” As smallholder farmers pursue their livelihood goals, which are structured around 
rice farming, the pursuit of increased rice production efficiency through mechanization or 
through the purchase or rental of additional land and resources would make them more 
vulnerable to the impacts of limited rice-market access. If farmers attempted to expand 
their farms and grow their livelihoods, they would accrue debts that may ultimately 
undermine their livelihoods if they failed to sell a rice crop. However, without attempting 
to expand their livelihoods by making investments in either additional land (to gain 
access to surface water) or in wells or water saving technologies, they would continue to 
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be vulnerable to the impacts of water scarcity. This, also, could undermine their 
livelihoods and ultimately force them into sugarcane production.  
This situation also seems to place many smallholder farmers within Banerjee & 
Duflo's (2011) “S-curve.” Those farmers who do not believe they can adapt successfully 
to water scarcity to “get over the hump” may not try. They may give up and stop taking 
interest in adaptation. However, this behavior creates a poverty trap, even where none 
existed in the first place. If farmers give up, they will never find out if they could have 
successfully adapted to water scarcity. In contrast, those farmers who assume that they 
can adapt, or those that don’t want to accept the consequences of non-adaptation, tend to 
be those larger farms with more access to resources.  
It was not apparent that a subset of medium sized farms in the PRAT existed that 
was less susceptible to both forms of risk. There seemed to be a threshold above which 
farmers produced sufficient surplus to have more clout in rice markets, which required 
some specialization of labor and capital. Therefore, no smallholder farms, regardless of 
size would be viable in rice markets since mills are increasingly selecting for larger 
producers. Smallholders who could not participate in the rice market were forced to 
diversify to meet livelihood stability goals or become sugarcane producers. Both may be 
considered adaptations to stabilize volatility rather than get out of poverty or increase 
wealth (Eakin, 2014). Ultimately, it is the combination and interaction of both risks that 
has forced these farmers to face adaptation limits in the PRAT between 2002 and 2012. 
From the perspective of water and agriculture managers in the PRAT, any 
solution, seeking to promote smallholder farming and meet the original development 
goals of the project must address both the impacts of limited rice-market access and water 
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scarcity on the most vulnerable farmers. That said, water scarcity is largely driven by 
competition among smallholder farmers for water to plant early in each season, which is 
driven by their limited rice-market access. The water cycling scheme, developed and 
implemented by water managers, has been shown to successfully allow smallholder 
farmers to plant and harvest rice without losing yields. Therefore, a focus on rice-market 
provisioning through storage schemes (as the State provides in Thailand) or pay-forward 
schemes, would largely resolve problems with water scarcity in the PRAT for the time 
being.  
The two primary challenges faced by PRAT managers in developing a sustainable 
solution to these problems are (1) the region’s increasing aridity, and (2) a lack of 
authority to change rice-market access in the PRAT. Lake Arenal, the source of PRAT 
irrigation water, is predicted to continue to decrease in water volume over the next two 
decades (Karmalkar et al., 2008). This will continue to increase water-cycling times and 
further delay rice planting each season. If water allocations push planting dates into 
February of each year, farmers will be forced to harvest in the rainy season, thereby 
forcing them to pay expensive drying fees or abandon their harvests. While increasing 
aridity in the PRAT is driven by global climate change, the management of its impact in 
the PRAT is a regional issue, for which regional decision makers are largely responsible. 
Drought resistant rice varieties and the implementation of water saving agro-technologies 
could greatly prolong smallholder rice production in the drying region.  
Limited rice-market access among smallholder farmers was created by the Costa 
Rican policy response to threats of international trade liberalization, and these decisions 
were made at the national level. Local PRAT managers have little authority over national 
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rice-market policies, even as the PRAT produces 45% of the rice consumed in Costa 
Rica. Costa Rican rice politics throughout the 2000s initiated a rapid consolidation and 
vertical integration of industrial rice mills. In 2002, there were 11 rice mills purchasing 
smallholder harvests in the PRAT; in 2013, there were five (CONARROZ, 2007, 2008, 
2009, 2010, 2011, 2012). In Chapter 3, I show that the consolidation of one mill in the 
PRAT corresponds to the elimination of 2,688 metric tonnes of smallholder-produced 
rice from the market. This in turn displaced smallholder farmers from the rice market 
because mills no longer needed to buy smallholder farm rice harvests.  
Current Costa Rican protectionist rice policies only benefit large-scale, 
commercialized rice producers and mills, and they drive the increasing inequities in 
Costa Rican agriculture (Hidalgo, 2014). The current Costa Rica agro-economic model is 
designed to benefit more powerful farmers at the expense of smaller farmers, particularly 
the most vulnerable (Hidalgo, 2014; Monge-González et al., 2010). Today, rice 
production in Costa Rica exists as an oligopsony, where a few powerful farms control 
almost all the entire market. Any solution that may curtail the loss of the PRAT 
smallholder-farming sector must incorporate rice-market reforms that compete with or 
eliminate the power of domestically and internationally owned rice mills to completely 
control rice market access for smallholder farmers. This type of reform, be it smallholder 
rice-farm cooperatives or other, would reduce competition for water among smallholder 
farms in the PRAT, and better allow smallholder farmers to maintain their rice-farming-
based identities and meet their goals of security of household well-being. 
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6. Conclusion 
In this study of determinants of adaptation limits, I attest that Morton (2007) was 
correct in his proposition that farmer adaptations to climate change cannot be understood 
without incorporating the impacts of multiple global changes and place-based 
complexity. I show that while some socio-economic determinants can allow farmers to 
overcome water scarcity, they can simultaneously make farmers vulnerable to market 
changes, as was the case with increasing land size in the PRAT.  
Farmer livelihood goals of are critical in the understanding of adaptation limits. 
Among smallholder farmers in the PRAT, farmers agreed that their goals of preserving 
their rice-farmer identity were valued, and these aligned closely with State development 
goals. However, farmer goals of security of well-being for their households did not 
entirely depend on agriculture. Some farmers explored other livelihood opportunities as 
they transitioned to sugarcane production, and some farmers were shown to trade-off 
their valued identities to seek more secure livelihood sources. More research is needed to 
understand how farmers trade-off valued livelihood goals as they make decisions to adapt 
near adaptation limits, how much heterogeneity in one's livelihood matters for identity, 
and the costs one is willing to incur to continue to adapt to maintain an identity. Lerner & 
Appendini (2011) show that farmer identities may be malleable; farmers in peri-urban 
Mexico were shown to maintain their “campesino” identities even when they were no 
longer farming. 
As rural development programs in arid and semi-arid areas are increasingly 
impacted by multiple, interacting global changes, this interplay can stand as a barrier to 
farmer livelihood goals and to sustainable rural development. The development and 
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application of solutions to singular risks may prove fruitless because they may not 
address underlying causes of problems, or they may not address the interaction between 
multiple risks. Continued research on the impacts from interactions between market and 
climate change on local systems is needed as global changes increase in scope and scale.  
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CHAPTER 5 
EXPLORING ADAPTATION LIMITS AMONG SMALLHOLDER FARMERS TO 
RISKS OF WATER SCARCITY AND DECREASED RICE-MARKET ACCESS IN 
NORTHWEST COSTA RICA 
 
1. Introduction 
The majority of studies on the local impacts of global changes report on recent 
and incremental changes (Park et al., 2012), characterized by short-term adaptations that 
reduce the losses or enhance the benefits of variations in climate (Kates et al., 2012; 
Pelling, 2010). Recently, scientists and policy-makers have started calling for research on 
forward-looking adaptations to global changes (Kates et al., 2012). Some of these calls 
prioritize emphasis on limits to individual adaptations (Dow, Berkhout, & Preston, 2013). 
The benefit of perception-focused adaptation research is that it should allow us to better 
understand how short-term adaptations to global change may link to future options to 
ensure that management decisions do not undermine the abilities of farm households to 
avoid adaptation limits (Howden et al., 2007). 
The abilities of households to avoid adaptation limits in the face of risks are 
dependent on their capacities to adapt to these changes, which include their perceptions 
about (1) the efficacy of their adaptations (Grothmann & Patt, 2005), or (2) their ability 
to revise their valued goals and transform their livelihoods. For the purposes of this study, 
I define a livelihood transformation as a fundamental change in the foundations of a 
livelihood from one form to another, thereby enhancing the capacity for desired values to 
be achieved given perceived or real changes in the present or future environment (Park et 
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al., 2012). These future adaptations and future impacts are also a product of present 
adaptations because these will determine future outcomes and limits. For the purposes of 
this paper, adaptation limits represent thresholds beyond which farmers can no longer 
adapt or cope with the impacts of global change risks to meet existing valued livelihood 
goals. As risks associated with global changes increase toward these thresholds, risks to 
valued objectives may become intolerable. At this point, farmers must live with 
intolerable risk of losses, revise attitudes about what is a valued objective, or change 
behavior radically to avoid the intolerable risk of loss. For the most vulnerable in less-
developed countries (LDC), the efficacy of transformation and adaptation may be closely 
linked to the ability to manage adaptation limits and avoid devolution into long-term 
poverty.  
For the purposes of this study, I define vulnerability as the degree to which an 
individual or group may be impacted adversely by the consequences, or the potential 
consequences of a risk (Eriksen & O’Brien, 2007; Eriksen et al., 2011). I define risk as 
the possibility that adverse consequences from events or activities will negatively affect 
something that people value (Kates, Hohennemser, & Kasperson, 1985). The intrinsic 
vulnerability of smallholder farmers in arid and semi-arid regions has been shown to be a 
product of the diverse non-climate risks to which smallholder farmers are subject 
(Morton, 2007). Therefore, research on limits to adaptation in this context must consider 
multiple types of risk.  
The interactions of non-climate risks with risks posed by a changing climate may 
limit the capacity of vulnerable farmers to manage change (Adger, Huq, Brown, Conway, 
& Hulme, 2003). These conditions have been shown to drive smallholder farmers in arid 
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and semi-arid regions beyond recoverable adaptation limits (Jones, 2001; Roncoli, 
Ingram, & Kirshen, 2001). However, these limits are rarely explicitly defined, and we 
know little about how and if farmers perceive and manage them. Drawing from recent 
literature on adaptation limits (Dow, Berkhout, & Preston, 2013; Dow, Berkhout, 
Preston, et al., 2013), I argue we must better understand what constitutes adaptation 
limits within any one system among any one group; what researchers and policy-makers 
perceive as adaptation limits may not always correlate with farmer perceptions of 
adaptation limits. Also, we must better understand how some successfully transform 
livelihoods to manage adaptation limits while others are forced to live with intolerable 
risk of losses. 
In this study of smallholder farming in Northwest Costa Rica, I asked: What are 
adaptation limits in smallholder rice farming in the region? How do farmers perceive 
adaptation limits given plausible impacts of future global change risks? To answer my 
questions, I structured this research using the adaptation-limit framework proposed by 
Dow et al. (2013). I begin this paper by I describing the theory upon which I based my 
study. I describe the methods I used to understand adaptation limits and garner farmer 
perceptions of adaptations given different plausible near-term risks. I present my results 
and discuss their significance in the context of adaptation limits. 
 
2. Theoretical framing of adaptation limits 
When we study farmer perceptions of adaptation limits, given plausible risks, we 
must inherently consider the ability of individuals to consider future risks. Our ability to 
consider the future and act on our perceptions has been a significant part of our success as 
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a species (Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997). Although the importance of thinking about 
future risks is apparent to many researchers and policy-makers, and this has been done in 
global change research for decades, the study of our ability to perceive ex-ante adaptation 
is less robust. While there are relatively few studies of the role of human perception on 
adaptation to plausible global change risks, even less focus on limits to adaptation and 
livelihood transformations among the rural poor in LDCs.  
The ability of an individual to contemplate an adaptation limit lies in the efficacy 
of their adaptation appraisal, which is defined as perceptions about their ability to 
successfully react to changes in external factors to meet valued livelihood goals. Such 
perceptions are based on individual cognition that include their perceptions about the 
objective adaptive capacity available to them (Grothmann & Patt, 2005). According to 
the framework proposed by Dow et al. (2013), an adaptation is only appraised if an 
individual perceives a risk to a valued livelihood goal because a minimum level of 
concern must exist before individuals will consider the need for action and thus deliberate 
on their ability to take action.  
As risks change in severity and complexity, individuals may appraise adaptations 
differently. If risks are perceived as non-threatening to livelihood goals, individuals may 
cease to consider them. Also, individuals may value many goals simultaneously, and 
some may be considered more valuable than others in terms of what personal cost, 
monetary or otherwise, individuals will take on themselves to try to achieve different 
goals. The valuation of goals may be different from individual to individual across a 
group. Some may give up a great deal to meet any one specific goal, others less so. The 
challenge in understanding adaptation limits among individuals in any group is not to 
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conflate "cannot adapt" with "chooses not to adapt" (Abbott, 2014). Understanding how 
some may live with intolerable risk of losses, revise attitudes about what is a valued 
objective, or change behavior radically to avoid the intolerable risk of loss to adapt to 
secure revised or new livelihood goals is crucial to adaptation limit research as it speaks 
to the fluidity of adaptation limits among farmers. However, the hardship of livelihood 
transition cannot be discounted in the study of adaptation limits among the most 
vulnerable with few alternative livelihood options.  
 
3. Research site and design 
3.1 Research site 
The Costa Rican government established the Arenal-Tempisque Irrigation Project 
(Projecto de Riego del Arenal-Tempisque, PRAT) in 1983 to increase the livelihood 
stability of smallholder farmers in the area. The Inter-American Development bank, 
which funded its development, states that 1125 farms benefit from the project. These 
farms primarily produce rice and sugarcane. In the early 2000s, almost all smallholder 
farmers in the PRAT grew rice (Arriagada, Sills, Pattanayak, Cubbage, & González, 
2010). The PRAT (Figure 5.1) supplies farmers with 100% of their irrigation water for 
five months of each year during the dry season (November-March), but due to prolonged 
drought in combination with a changing domestic rice market, smallholder farmers have 
suffered livelihood setbacks. The Costa Rican government has responded to the 
increasing regional drought in Guanacaste by attempting to expand the PRAT and thus 
the number of farmers receiving irrigation water. The Central American Bank of 
Economic Integration loaned approximately US$20 million to the Costa Rican 
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government in 2014 to expand the PRAT by 8,000 ha. The government claims that this 
irrigation expansion will increase the competitiveness of Costa Rican agriculture, 
increase agricultural innovation and development, and promote the livelihoods of 
smallholder farmers outside the PRAT who rely on rain-fed crops in this increasingly arid 
region because they will be provided with steady supplies of irrigation water. However, 
both water managers and smallholder farmers increasingly worry that the expansion will 
further over-allocate scarce water. Furthermore, a dwindling water supply is only one of 
the complex global change risks facing smallholder farmers in the region. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 – The PRAT provides up to 5,616,000 m3/day of water to farmers from Lake 
Arenal in the east to irrigation channels (shown in green) near Bagaces and Cañas. The 
PRAT irrigates approximately 28,000 ha. The total investment in the PRAT infrastructure 
shown here is estimated at US$67 million. This does not include the 8,000 ha expansion. 
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The risks faced by smallholder farmers in the PRAT stem from the interactions 
between regional drought and threats of international trade liberalization. From 2005-
2012, approximately 40% of rice consumed in Costa Rica was imported (Arroyo, Lucke, 
& Riveara, 2013). The Costa Rican agency overseeing these imports sells the imports to 
rice mills (the same mills that control market access for smallholder farmers). Along with 
these sales comes a transfer of economic rents (i.e., a return in excess of the resource 
owner's opportunity cost; Tollison, 1982); rice on the global market is less expensive for 
rice mills to buy compared with domestically produced rice. Imported rice is allocated to 
these industrial mills based on the amount of domestically produced rice they have 
acquired. This has initiated a rapid consolidation of industrial rice mills in Guanacaste, 
where 45% of Costa Rican rice is grown. This in turn has displaced many smallholder 
farmers from the rice market because mills no longer need to buy more expensive rice 
from local smallholder farmers. The situation is expected to become worse as Dominican 
Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) 
increasingly requires Costa Rica to diminish import tariffs on rice, and ultimately 
dissolve them by 2025. As smallholder farmers are displaced from the rice production 
supply chain, they are forced to live with intolerable risk of losses, revise attitudes about 
what is a valued objective, or change behavior radically to avoid the intolerable risk of 
loss. While income from sugarcane production is stable, the production of sugarcane 
typically leaves smallholder farmers unable to secure well-being for their families 
because yearly incomes are well below Costa Rica’s poverty level. Many smallholder 
  155 
farmers are forced to live with intolerable risk of losses, which drives them further into 
poverty. 
Smallholder farmers in the PRAT are being forced to adapt to these complex and 
interacting risks from global climate change and globalization. Reductions in 
smallholder-farm rice harvests are a function of: (1) farmers switching to sugarcane 
production, (2) farmers voluntarily reducing hectares planted with rice, and (3) 
involuntary rice harvest reductions caused by water scarcity. These three components 
were the primary outcomes of the impacts of risks that were driving smallholder farmer 
livelihood losses in the PRAT. The consolidation of two rice mills in the PRAT was 
correlated with a loss of 2,688 metric tonnes of smallholder rice from the market. 
Similarly, a one m3 sec-1 increase in the average irrigation water deficit during rice 
planting was correlated with a reduction in smallholder rice yield of 1,293 metric tonnes.  
 
3.2 Scenario development 
I developed six plausible future scenarios of the PRAT following the guidelines 
proposed by Kriegler et al. (2012), van Vuuren et al. (2012), and Vuuren et al. (2013), 
which include: (1) the number of scenarios should be as small as possible; (2) scenarios 
should include different levels of global changes to span a range of plausible futures; (3) 
scenarios should facilitate comparison by providing common assumptions about climate 
outcomes and socio-economic developments; (4) scenarios should be scalable to support 
development of assumptions for studies at finer scales; (5) scenarios should be structured 
in a consistent way, and; (6) scenarios should be contextually accurate to ensure policy 
relevance. 
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3.2.1 Development of plausibility across scenarios 
I used scenarios of plausible risks to gain insight into how farmers thought about 
avoiding limits, and into the costs farmers perceive themselves as bearing to 
incrementally adapt to meet valued livelihood goals. The two primary risks facing 
farmers in the PRAT are water scarcity and decreased rice-market access. I designed my 
six scenarios (Table 5.1) to incorporate plausible impacts of each of these risks. My “best 
case” scenarios mimicked the intensities of both risks from 2002 to 2012. During this 
time, farmers in the PRAT faced 15% reductions in water availability at the time of 
planting (a reduction of approximately 10 m3 sec-1 across the PRAT) and 30% reductions 
in rice market access on average (Chapter 3). My “worst case” scenarios were developed 
using recent regional global change predictions. The first three scenarios present only 
risks of water scarcity. Risk intensities increase between each subsequent scenario, 
thereby creating an analytical connection between all three. The final three scenarios, 
labeled CM1, CM2, and CM3, include subsequently increasing intensities of both water 
scarcity and decreased rice-market access, also in an effort to create an analytical 
connection between the three. 
 
Table 5.1 – Scenarios provided to each farmer designed to garner perceptions about how 
they would adapt to future changes 
Scenario 
#* 
Scenario description provided to farmers 
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C1 Let’s assume all debts are cleared, and you are once again growing rice 
[this first sentence was only read if smallholder farmer had switched to 
sugarcane production]. Over the next ten years, assume you were 
guaranteed rice-purchase contracts with fair purchase prices that ensured 
you could sell anything you produced to a rice mill, but you were not able 
to purchase insurance to protect against insufficient water during planting 
[December-January]. Then, if the increasing drought reduced the water that 
SENARA [Costa Rican ministry responsible for water allocation in the 
PRAT] was able to allocate to you by 1/6, which of the following actions 
would you take, and what would be required to take each action? And, if 
you would do something differently, what would it be? [A list of adaptive 
actions taken by farmers in the PRAT from 2002 to 2012 was then provided 
to each survey participant] 
C2 Let’s assume all debts are cleared, and you are once again growing rice. 
Over the next ten years, assume you were guaranteed rice-purchase 
contracts with fair purchase prices that ensured you could sell anything you 
produced to a rice mill, but you were not able to purchase insurance to 
protect against insufficient water during planting. Then, if the increasing 
drought reduced the water that SENARA was able to allocate to you by 1/3, 
which of the following actions would you take, and what would be required 
to take each action? And, if you would do something differently, what 
would it be? 
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C3 Let’s assume all debts are cleared, and you are once again growing rice. 
Over the next ten years, assume you were guaranteed rice-purchase 
contracts with fair purchase prices that ensured you could sell anything you 
produced to a rice mill, but you were not able to purchase insurance to 
protect against insufficient water during planting. Then, if the increasing 
drought reduced the water that SENARA was able to allocate to you by 1/2, 
which of the following actions would you take, and what would be required 
to take each action? And, if you would do something differently, what 
would it be? 
CM1** Let’s assume all debts are cleared, and you are once again growing rice. 
Then, assume you were not guaranteed a contract with a fair purchase 
price, and assume mills and middlemen reduced their purchases from 
parcelaros [smallholder farmers who were given land or who were sold 
land at discounted rates by the government; surveyed participants were 
parcelaros] by 1/3 over the next ten years. Also, if no insurance was 
available to protect against insufficient water during planting and 
increasing drought reduced the water that SENARA was able to allocate to 
you by 1/6%, which of the following actions would you take, and what 
would be required to do so? And, if you would do something differently, 
what would it be? 
CM2 Let’s assume all debts are cleared, and you are once again growing rice. 
Then, assume you were not guaranteed a contract with a fair purchase 
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price, and assume mills and middlemen reduced their purchases from 
parcelaros by 1/2 over the next ten years. Also, if no insurance was 
available to protect against insufficient water during planting and 
increasing drought reduced the water that SENARA was able to allocate to 
you by 1/3%, which of the following actions would you take, and what 
would be required to do so? And, if you would do something differently, 
what would it be? 
CM3 Let’s assume all debts are cleared, and you are once again growing rice. 
Then, assume you were not guaranteed a contract with a fair purchase 
price, and assume mills and middlemen reduced their purchases from 
parcelaros by 2/3 over the next ten years. Also, if no insurance was 
available to protect against insufficient water during planting and 
increasing drought reduced the water that SENARA was able to allocate to 
you by 1/2%, which of the following actions would you take, and what 
would be required to do so? And, if you would do something differently, 
what would it be? 
*The designation ‘C’ (climate) represents scenarios including only water scarcity; the 
designation ‘CM’ (climate-market) represents scenarios including both water scarcity and 
decreased rice-market access. 
**Scenario CM1 was designed to mimic changes in water availability and market access 
from 2002 to 2012 among smallholder farmers in the PRAT. 
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The 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reported strong consensus 
among climate models that temperature will increase and precipitation will decrease in 
much of Pacific Central America in the next four decades (Magrin et al., 2007). 
Downscaled regional climate models for northwest Costa Rica predict higher 
temperatures and water deficits in the region within the next two decades (Anderson, 
Flores, Perez, Carrillo, & Sempris, 2008). Wet season precipitation is expected to 
decrease as much as 27%, creating soil-moisture deficits and reducing the amount of 
surface water available for irrigation by half. Dry season river flow is also expected to 
decrease due to reduced cloud cover on mountain ridges (Karmalkar, Bradley, & Diaz, 
2008). A trend towards increasing aridity is already evident in NW Costa Rica (Birkel & 
Demuth, 2006), and this is already having impacts on agriculture and water availability 
(Poveda, Waylen, & Pulwarty, 2006; Waylen, Quesada, & Caviedes, 1996). These 
studies indicated that a reduction of irrigation water in the PRAT of 50% (32 m3 sec-1) is 
not an unreasonable future scenario. Also, the upcoming expansion will increase the 
irrigated area by over 8,000 hectares, almost certainly leading to further over-allocation 
of scarce water resources. 
Costa Rica ratified CAFTA-DR in 2007, and the treaty took effect on January 1, 
2009. Under CAFTA-DR, approximately 80% of industrial and consumer goods from the 
United States can enter Costa Rica tariff-free. However, Costa Rica was able to preserve 
its high import tariffs on many agricultural goods, at least initially. As part if its 
ratification, Costa Rica agreed to a slow phase-out of its 35% import tariff on rice. By 
2025, there will be no import tariff for rice in Costa Rica, and domestic producers will be 
competing with even cheaper imported rice. Notably, rice is already less expensive on the 
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world market than domestically produced rice. This is due to the production efficiency of 
rice in the USA, China, and Thailand, which averages 7 metric tons per hectare, 
compared with Costa Rica’s average of 4 metric tons per hectare (Arroyo et al., 2013). 
Many worry that this slow phase out of the import tariff will drive small rice producers 
from the market. My scenarios reflect this slow reduction in rice import tariffs between 
2013 and 2025. While exact predictions of reduced market access per year for 
smallholder rice farmers were impossible, a complete reduction by 2025 may be expected 
unless government price supports are enacted.  
 
3.3 Data collection and analysis 
Three types of data—focus groups, household surveys, and household 
interviews—were collected and analyzed in different ways to understand limits to 
adaptation. I drafted a household survey that included questions about how farmers have 
adapted to changes in water scarcity and decreased rice market access over the last ten 
years, and about how farmers would adapt given my six scenarios that portrayed differing 
severities of future water scarcity and decreased rice-market access. The household 
survey was developed following the guidelines for the collection of quantitative primary 
data in developing countries as described by the United Nations Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs (2008). Following the iterative process defined by the United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, I refined the household survey by holding 
three focus groups with smallholder farmers in the communities of San Martin and San 
Ramon, within the PRAT, in February 2013. Each focus group lasted approximately one 
hour and included 4-8 farmers, and each was held in or outside the home of a farmer. 
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Focus groups were documented using facilitator notes. In each focus group I asked 
farmers to talk openly about, and then attempt to reach a consensus description of: 
1. Smallholder farmer valued livelihood goals; 
2. The strategies smallholder farmers employed to adapt to water scarcity and 
decreased rice-market access;  
3. Which strategies were used to adapt to tolerable and intolerable levels of risks (as 
described below, tolerable risks are perceived as threatening but worth assuming 
in pursuit of livelihood goals, and this perception initiates individual adaptations 
to these risks within reasonable levels and intolerable risks are those that exceed 
the value of pursuing current valued livelihood goals), and; 
4. The capital required to implement each strategy. 
A bilingual research assistant, trained at Centro Agronómico Tropical de 
Investigación y Enseñanza (CATIE) in facilitation techniques, facilitated all focus 
groups. Focus groups were documented using facilitator notes, and I analyzed these notes 
using the content analysis method described by Sandelowski (2000). I looked for major 
themes, insights, common phrases and words, and specific moods and tones across the 
notes from all three focus groups. The facilitator first coded all focus group 
documentation, and then I recoded the documentation to ensure consistency. Common 
themes in these data were categorized into clusters representing different livelihood goals 
and adaptation resources. The clusters were used to develop a picture of the different 
valued livelihood goals and resources used by farmers to adapt. Scoones's (1999) 
classification typology of “capital,” including human, social, physical, financial, and 
natural was used categorize each adaptation resource.  
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The household survey was pretested by surveying five households in the San 
Martin district of the PRAT. I then revised the survey for clarity based on the feedback 
from these farmers. The final survey was comprised of (1) questions structured in order 
to collect data on demography, assets and wealth, access to markets and services, and 
perceptions of climate changes; (2) the six scenarios described in Table 5.1, and; (3) 
questions structured in order to collect data about which adaptations farmers had 
undertaken in response to changes in the climate, and to combined climate and crop 
market changes between 2002 and 2012. Farmer adaptations were classified by their yes 
or no replies. I also included a short, semi-structured interview in each household survey. 
During these interviews I asked farmers to elaborate on their scenario-based adaptations. 
I also asked farmers: “do you think these adaptations will be necessary in the future, and 
why or why not?”  
A bilingual research assistant administered all surveys and interviews. My 
sampling frame consisted of smallholder farmers from each of the seven Costa Rican 
Agricultural Development Institute (Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, IDA) districts in the 
PRAT. According to my sampling strategy, I visited every household in each of these 
seven districts, on a regular basis, multiple times, and at random times. During these 
visits, farmers who were found in their homes or in their fields were interviewed, if they 
agreed to be. In total, 94 surveys were administered from February to November 2013. 
Each survey lasted from 20 minutes to 30 minutes. Some farmers invited us into their 
homes for the interview portion of each survey, which lasted up to 1.5 hours. I recorded 
interviews and the University of Costa Rica, School of Anthropology transcription 
service transcribed them. No names and no specific locations were recorded with surveys 
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or interview data to ensure the responses of farmers remained anonymous, in accordance 
with my IRB approval. 
 
4. Results and discussion 
Rice was the crop of choice among surveyed farmers, and it was traditionally the 
only smallholder crop that drew profit in a consistent market. In 2002, virtually all 
smallholder farmers in the PRAT grew rice (Arriagada et al., 2010). This percentage has 
decreased as farmers have switched to sugarcane production because it has become 
increasingly difficult for smallholder farmers to secure contracts with rice mills, and 
because water scarcity is increasingly threatening rice crops. In my analysis, 40% of 
farmers declared sugarcane as their primary crop type (Table 5.2), and 60% continued to 
plant rice, many without gaining the livelihood security of a contract from a rice mill. 
Rice production without a contract means that farmers must search for remaining 
capacity at regional mills to sell their rice after harvest. Those farmers who transitioned 
to sugarcane production did not identify themselves as ‘farmers’ in the same way that rice 
farmers did, and they were often ostracized by their rice-producing neighbors. They 
claimed that they were forced to abandon their agricultural goals because the risks to rice 
production were not worth the opportunities that it afforded them.  
 
Table 5.2 – Summary of livelihood characteristics of surveyed farmers (N=94) 
Description (categorical 
variables) 
Type  Frequency 
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Primary crop (type) Rice 60% 
Sugarcane  40% 
Land Tenure (type) Own 72% 
Rent  20% 
Both  7% 
Farm equipment ownership (type) Own 34% 
Rent 57% 
Both  9% 
Respondent has crop insurance No  64% 
Yes  36% 
Respondent owns livestock  No  47% 
Yes  53% 
Presence of formal educational 
training in household  
No  75% 
Yes 26% 
Farming is household’s principle 
income source  
No 19% 
Yes 81% 
Description (scalar variables) Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Years spent farming (years) 22 7.2 2 36 
Age of head of household (years) 51 14 20 83 
Children in household (count) 2.9 1.9 0 10 
Children in agrarian employment 0.8 1.4 0 8 
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(count) 
Size of Farm (hectares) 8.8 8.0 0.8 50 
 
4.1 Defining farmer adaptation limits 
4.1.1 Valued livelihood goals among smallholder rice farmers in the PRAT 
Within the framework proposed by Dow et. al. (2013), adaptation limits represent 
thresholds beyond which farmers can no longer adapt or cope with the impacts of global 
change risks to meet existing valued livelihood goals. As risks associated with global 
changes increase toward these thresholds, risks to valued objectives may become 
intolerable, at which point farmers must live with intolerable risk of losses, revise 
attitudes about what is a valued objective, or change behavior radically to avoid the 
intolerable risk of loss. To understand the conditions under which rice farmers in the 
PRAT may abandon their goals, I first identified and articulated these goals.  
Among the farmers included in this study, these goals fell sharply along two lines: 
security of well-being and personal identity. Farmers sought (1) security of education, 
healthcare, and the maintenance of assets and land for all family members, and (2) the 
maintenance of their identities as parcelaros (i.e. smallholder farmers who were given 
land or who were sold land at discounted rates by the government). The preservation of 
household well-being was a primary concern among smallholder farmers because many 
had suffered livelihood setbacks between 2002 and 2012, and most were worried about 
the impacts of future risks. Many farmers cited recent examples of neighbors’ 
misfortunes and resulting abandonments of farming. Both security and well-being were 
defined as broad concepts, but participants were clear that either concept, independently, 
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would not constitute a valued livelihood goal. Farmers sought a condition of prosperity 
within their households (i.e., well-being), but the maintenance of this condition was only 
possible if it was protected from risk (i.e., security). 
Participants also referenced the past and a perceived disappearance of their 
“parcelaro identity.” In these references, farmers portrayed themselves as rice farmers 
that were being forced out of their trade by the Costa Rican government, international 
rice imports, and by rice mills. Torres (1997) shows that most parcelaros throughout the 
1990s refused all efforts by the Ministry of Agriculture to provide extension services to 
assist in a transition to “non-traditional” crop types as required by the demands of the 
Costa Rican economic restructuring. Extension agents promoted non-traditional 
agriculture as a means to increase the production of internationally valuable crop types, 
but parcelaros refused, citing their history in rice production. 
This parcelaro identity is unique among Costa Rican farmers, and it reflects the 
wider Guanacasteco identity—one of conservative self-reliance—that reflects the long-
standing agrarian culture of Guanacaste Province. Guanacaste, and specifically the 
Tempisque River Basin, is rich in arable land, with large expanses of flat, fertile alluvial 
soils, so agriculture developed as a primary economic sector within the region. 
Parcelaros have traditionally considered themselves the “last holdout” in Costa Rica 
against increasingly globalized agriculture (see Edelman, 1999 for rich historical 
descriptions of smallholder agriculture in Guanacaste). In this context, parcelaros 
referenced their identity as self-reliant, community-oriented, loyal to their own, and 
deeply respectful of their lands and environment. This identity is unique to rice 
production in Northwest Costa Rica because parcelaros perceive rice to be of greatest 
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importance to Costa Rican culture and food security, and less impactful on the 
Guanacaste environment. This pride was evident among farmers in my study. Participants 
referenced a transition to sugarcane as giving up on these values. One farmer explained 
why his decision to continue to farm rice entailed more than profit. 
“Even though the banks no longer finance rice [for 
smallholder farmers], and even though everyone who used 
to buy rice no longer does so, I still sow rice. Now some 
people tell me to plant sugarcane, but the sugarcane 
impoverishes the land and the sugarcane removes the 
vitamins from the land. It is like I will be removing the food 
from the land. That is why I grow rice, even if I will not 
gain what I used to. Here in Bagatsí, it is not worth it, it is 
not worth it. I do not ever sow sugarcane” (Interviewee 
#25, 11.2-hectare rice farmer, February 20th, 2013). 
 
Another farmer explains his traditional ties to rice production, and contrasts this with his 
perceptions of the environmental damage caused by the harvest of sugarcane (sugarcane 
fields are burned before harvest to remove leaves). 
“I do not like sugarcane in the least. For me, I do not like 
sugarcane because I have always sowed rice, and I always 
like to see it grow. When you flood [the rice paddy], it is 
something that is totally beautiful, when it sprouts and you 
see the green – beautiful. Sugarcane is not this way. I do 
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not like what sugarcane does to the environment. When 
they burn [sugarcane], and then when they cut the 
sugarcane it is extremely, for me, it is extremely polluting. 
Because when they harvest, even [when they harvest 
sugarcane] miles from here, you just see smoke, and we are 
surrounded by about 2000 hectares, or more than 2000 
hectares of sugarcane” (Interviewee #64, 5-hectare rice 
farmer, March 4th, 2013). 
 
A third farmer describes the process of transition to sugarcane production in the PRAT 
and compares this with his own values. 
“Before, this area used to be all rice. Now it is all 
sugarcane, and rice will disappear. Why? Because there is 
no financial support, you cannot sell it, the government lets 
in rice from other countries and they forget the small 
producer. Sugarcane has some advantages–you rent your 
land to the ‘ingenio’ and they take care of everything, but I 
lose everything” (Interviewee #22, 2-hectare rice farmer, 
February 20th, 2013, note: ‘ingenio’ is Taboga S.A., the 
largest industrial sugarcane producer in Costa Rica, see 
TABOGA, 2014). 
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Within the adaptation-limit framework used in this study, an adaptation limit 
would entail that the risks to household security of well-being or to the parcelaro identity 
have become intolerable and thus change is required. This would require farmers to live 
with intolerable risk of losses, revise attitudes about what is a valued objective, or change 
behavior radically to avoid the intolerable risk of loss and conserve goals. Livelihood 
goals are widely acknowledged to play a significant role in defining adaptive actions 
(Dow, Berkhout, & Preston, 2013; Pelling & Dill, 2009; Renn, 2008). The integration of 
these goals into my examination of adaptation limits was critical because the ultimate 
objective of any farmer adaptation to global change risks is to meet valued livelihood 
goals (Füssel, 2007). Following this logic, increased incremental demand for adaptive 
actions among rice farmers in the PRAT was driven by individual perceptions of 
increased risks to valued livelihood goals, to a point. Among farmers represented in this 
study, increased severity of risks to their identity and security of well-being should be 
associated with increased efforts to adapt, but the ability to increase adaptive efforts relies 
on the availability of resources (i.e., objective adaptive capacity) and on the perception of 
costs of adaptation compared to the value of livelihood goals. 
Grothmann & Patt (2005) defined objective adaptive capacity in terms of 
resources such as time, money, staying power, knowledge, entitlements, and institutional 
support. The ability of smallholder rice famers in my study to adapt to pursue livelihood 
goals depended, in part, on those resources to which they had access. I asked farmers in 
my focus groups to define both the actions they used to adapt to water scarcity and 
decreased market access and the resources required to implement each (Table 5.3). I 
classified the resources required to implement each action using Scoones's (1999) 
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classification typology. This typology includes five different types of capital: human, 
social, physical, financial, and natural. Following this logic, farmers in my study may 
combine the capital endowments to which they have access and control in order to 
respond to water scarcity and decreased rice market access. Through time, these capital 
portfolios were dynamic as farmers responded to risks. Continued adaptation to risks may 
deplete the portfolio of a farmer, thereby forcing them to take an action that undermines 
their goals of security or identity.  
 
Table 5.3 – Summary of farmer adaptations to global change risks in the PRAT, 
including the corresponding acceptability and objective adaptive capacity required to 
perform each adaptation; this capacity is defined in terms of capital types, and costs of 
each adaptation. 
Farmers 
adaptations 
Description Acceptability 
of risk 
Objective adaptive 
capacity required: types 
and ‘costs’ of capital 
required for adaptation 
(cost levels in 
parenthesis) 
Voluntarily 
decrease 
planted area  
Farmers reduced their 
planted area in response to 
threats of water scarcity. 
Farmers also reduced the 
Tolerable None 
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number of plantings per 
year, typically in response 
to a failure to sell their rice 
crop. Farmers in the PRAT 
may grow two or three rice 
crops per year if they 
obtain rice contracts. 
Diversify 
crops 
Farmers switched their rice 
varieties to those better 
suited to a changing 
climate. These new 
varieties were more 
drought/heat tolerant and 
some have a shorter 
growing period. Some 
farmers also started 
experimenting with 
different crops that were 
better suited to a changing 
climate like watermelon. 
Tolerable Human capital: 
Knowledge of new type 
or variety (low) 
Social capital: Access to 
appropriate labor for new 
crops (low) 
Natural capital: 
Appropriate soil; 
appropriate micro-
climate (varies) 
Physical capital: Access 
to planting, maintenance 
and harvest equipment 
(high) 
Financial capital: 
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Capital to obtain 
equipment, and initial 
and continuing input 
costs (high) 
Sell land  Some farmers sold their 
land in response to debts 
accrued through the loss of 
a rice crop, or the failure to 
sell a rice crop. These 
farmers in our study had 
sold their land, but still 
farmed that land under 
contract with other farmers 
or with larger mills. 
Intolerable Social capital: Access to 
buyer (low) 
Financial capital: Money 
to cover legal costs (low) 
Rent land to 
other 
farmers 
Farmers rent their land to 
neighbors or mills. Rental 
agreements vary widely, 
but many are long-term. 
This is especially true 
when farmers rent their 
land to sugarcane mills. 
These farmers often live on 
Intolerable Social capital: Access to 
renter (low) 
Financial capital: Money 
to cover legal costs (low) 
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the parcel and continue to 
engage in agriculture as a 
chambaro (i.e. odd-job 
worker, or farm-hand). 
Sell assets 
(if owned) 
Farmers sold their 
harvesting and planting 
equipment  
Tolerable/ 
Intolerable 
Social capital: Access to 
buyer (low) 
Diversify 
household 
employment 
Many households engage 
in less-climate-change-
sensitive off-farm 
activities, which include 
either (1) chambas (i.e. odd 
jobs) or (2) a migration of 
household members to 
cities in search of 
employment. 
Tolerable Human capital: 
Alternative knowledge 
and skill set (depending 
on the job this varies in 
cost from low to high 
cost) 
Social capital: Access to 
labor market (high) 
Physical capital: Means 
of access to new 
locations (high) 
Financial capital: Money 
for transportation and the 
development of new 
skillsets (high) 
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Utilize river 
or ground-
water 
Farmers with access to 
river or ground water and 
an efficient means to 
maintain that access often 
install wells or pump water 
to their fields. Pumping 
rivers was the most 
common method of among 
farmers in this study. And, 
only those farmers with 
access to river water were 
able to utilize this 
adaptation. 
Tolerable Social capital: Access to 
drilling expertise (high) 
Natural capital: 
Groundwater/river 
availability (varies) 
Financial capital: Money 
to cover drilling and 
equipment costs 
(medium) 
Engage in 
conflict  
Conflict included 
threatening neighbors or 
water managers, destroying 
or altering irrigation 
infrastructure, and 
protesting. 
Tolerable Social capital: Support 
and collaboration from 
neighbors (high, as 
people engage in conflict 
when other actions have 
proven unsuccessful or 
are blocked) 
Financial capital: Money 
to cover transportation 
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and lodging costs (low) 
Change 
planting 
date 
The majority of the farmers 
in our study have altered 
their cropping sequence by 
moving the planting date of 
their first rice crop back 
from mid-December into 
January at least one time; 
many have moved their 
planting date back four to 
five times between 2002 
and 2012. This change is in 
response to reductions in 
water allocations for many 
farmers in the PRAT. 
Those farmers furthest 
downstream in the 
irrigation system are most 
affected.  
Tolerable None  
Transition 
to sugarcane 
production 
Sugarcane mills purchase 
smallholder farmer rice 
debts, and in return farmers 
Intolerable None 
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grow sugarcane under the 
supervision of one of three 
industrial mills. Farmers 
retain their land but are 
unable to pursue valued 
livelihood goals. 
 
4.1.2 Risk tolerability 
The ‘time element’ was a crucial part of the study of farmer limits to adaptation in 
this case because different farmers seemed to perceive their ability to efficiently use 
objective adaptive capacity through time differently. As farmers in this study expended 
capital to meet valued livelihood goals, in the face of increasing water scarcity and 
decreasing rice market access between 2002 and 2012, they adopted multiple, 
incremental adaptations (Table 5.4). This is consistent with, and supports Park et al.'s 
(2012) modification of Loorbach's (2007) Transition Management Cycle to reflect the 
relative difference between incremental and transformative adaptation processes in terms 
resources used. Farmers took multiple adaptations when risks were perceived as tolerable 
but increasing through time. Other, transformative adaptations were taken when farmers 
perceived risks as intolerable. Transformative adaptations to intolerable risks required 
farmers to revise attitudes about what is a valued objective, or change behavior radically 
to avoid the intolerable risk of loss. 
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Table 5.4 – Adaptations taken by surveyed smallholder farmers to risks between 2002 
and 2012. These risks included a reduction in local rice market access by one-third, and a 
water deficit during planting season of one-sixth. Not all farmers experienced these risks 
equally as some were able to respond to continue to pursue their valued livelihood goals 
while others were not. ‘Climate specific adaptations’ shown here reflect the total number 
of adaptations taken by surveyed farmers to water scarcity; ‘Combined water scarcity and 
rice market adaptations’ represent the sum of adaptations taken to both. 
Farmers adaptations Climate 
specific 
adaptations 
Climate 
freq.  
Combined 
adaptations to 
water scarcity 
and rice 
market 
changes 
Combined 
freq. 
Voluntarily decrease 
planted area  
35 37% 35 37% 
Diversify crops 22 23% 24 26% 
Sell land  0 0% 1 1% 
Rent land to other 
farmers 
1 1% 9 10% 
Sell assets  1 1% 10 11% 
Diversify household 
employment 
6 6% 26 28% 
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Utilize river or 
ground-water 
22 23% 22 23% 
Engage in conflict  13 14% 14 15% 
Change planting date 65 69% 65 69% 
Transition to 
sugarcane production 
17 18% 37 40% 
TOTAL: 182 TOTAL: 243 
 
 Dow et al. (2013) and Grothmann & Patt (2005) both stressed the need to 
incorporate individual perceptions of risks into the study of adaptation. Across farmers in 
this study, there were a range of attitudes and responses with respect to the acceptability 
or tolerability of risks. These differences translate to different adaptation limits among 
households. Leiserowitz (2005) argued that these discrepancies occur across any one 
group because the same global change process may appear very risky and intolerable for 
one individual, but tolerable for another. Dow et al. (2013) built on this understanding of 
a range of levels of risk acceptability or tolerability, and provided three categories into 
which individuals may perceive global change risks and initiate adaptive actions based on 
these perceptions: 
1. Acceptable risks are perceived as not threatening to livelihood goals, and 
therefore no risk reduction efforts are needed.  
2. Tolerable risks are perceived as threatening but worth assuming in pursuit of 
livelihood goals, and this perception initiates individual adaptations to these risks 
within reasonable levels.  
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3. Intolerable risks are those that exceed the value of pursuing valued livelihood 
goals, requiring individuals to live with intolerable risk of losses, revise attitudes 
about what is a valued objective, or change behavior radically to avoid the 
intolerable risk of loss. 
Farmers in this study maintained their livelihood goals and implemented 
incremental adaptations to tolerable risks when risks of water scarcity and decreased rice 
market access were perceived to be within tolerable levels, and livelihood goals were 
more highly valued than the costs of the adaptations to preserve them. Other adaptations 
were adopted in the face of intolerable risks. Those adaptations adopted in the face of 
intolerable risks represented adaptation limits. Of the ten types of adaptations utilized by 
farmers in this study (Table 5.4), three were classified by farmers as adaptations to 
intolerable levels of water scarcity and decreased market access. The implementation of 
those adaptations required farmers to revise attitudes about what is a valued objective, or 
change behavior radically to avoid the intolerable risk of loss. One adaptation, “sell 
assets,” was employed in the face of both tolerable and intolerable levels risks, depending 
on the context. Some famers may sell their harvesting and planting equipment to pay 
debts, then rent that equipment back to pursue their valued livelihood goals. This allowed 
farmers to maintain their identity and continue to provide security of household well-
being. However, many farmers who liquidated their assets also did so as part of a 
transition out of rice farming.  
The adaptation “renting land to other farmers” was typically used to escape debts 
accrued through rice farming. Most farmers who rented their land continued to involve 
themselves in agriculture, but they no longer self-identified as parcelaros. Rental 
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agreements varied widely, but many were long-term (e.g., 10 years). These farmers often 
lived on the parcel and continued to engage in rice-related agriculture as chambaros (i.e. 
odd-job worker, or farm hand). Farmers who sold their land, a third adaptation to 
intolerable risks, typically did so in a response to debts accrued through the loss of 
multiple rice crops due to water scarcity, or the failure to sell multiple rice crops. Those 
farmers who had sold their land often farmed that land under contract with other farmers 
or with larger mills. These farmers also typically worked as chambaros to diversify their 
household incomes.  
The “transition to sugarcane production” was also considered an adaptation to 
intolerable risks of water scarcity and decreased rice market access. This adaptation was 
the most common transformative adaptation to the impacts of intolerable levels of risks 
among farmers included in this study, as 40% had implemented this adaptation. Between 
2002 and 2012, sugarcane mills pushed full land management sugar contracts in an effort 
to bolster production (Stange & Attaché, 2013). These contracts involved the purchase of 
rice debts that smallholder farmers accrued through failed rice crops or through the 
inability to sell their harvests. Under these contracts, the sugarcane mills managed and 
farmed plots, and smallholder landowners received a flat fee per hectare depending on 
their debt, but that fee often left farmers below the Costa Rican poverty level. Most 
farmers were able to retain their homes and land through a transition to sugarcane 
production, but this transition required farmers to forfeit their parcelaro identities as well 
as considerable well-being. Many farmers in this situation tried to engage in full-time 
non-farm employment after transitioning to sugarcane, typically in the transportation, 
farm equipment maintenance, and tourism sectors. However, many were (at the time of 
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this study) forced to live with losses as they had few alternative livelihood options due to 
their remote location, lack of education, and limited connections outside of agriculture. 
The common thread to farmer adaptations to these intolerable risks is that they 
have an element of irreversibility about them in the sense of giving up a livelihood goal, 
and therefore requiring some type of livelihood transformation. Farmers could not 
“transition livelihoods for one-year,” to then return to rice production. Farmers seemed to 
only implement such adaptations if the alternative was even worse (e.g., dealing with 
debt collection services or suffering from food insecurity). This irreversibility forces 
farmers to make difficult adaptation choices about trade-offs among goals and values, or 
about their ability to radically change behavior, which for many, came at large costs. 
 
4.2 Smallholder farmer adaptation appraisal  
I used scenarios of plausible risks to gain insight into how farmers thought about 
avoiding limits, and into the costs farmers perceive themselves as bearing to meet valued 
livelihood goals. Among farmers included in this study, the impacts of water scarcity and 
decreased rice market access were apparent, but the processes driving these risks were 
debated. Therefore, I designed my six scenarios to elicit adaptation responses from 
farmers regardless of farmer believes about the causes of risks. After presenting each 
scenario to all farmers included in my survey, I asked each farmer to evaluate his or her 
ability to adapt to the proposed risks, along with the costs of taking such actions by 
defining all of the ten common adaptations they would apply in each case. I summed and 
ranked perceived adaptations across all farmers (Figure 5.2).  
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Figure 5.2 – Summary of adaptations to scenarios presented to farmers during household 
surveys; “sell land,” “rent land to other farmers,” “sell assets,” and “transition to 
sugarcane production” are adaptations used by farmers when faced with intolerable risks, 
the remainder are used to adapt to tolerable risks. 
 
The four most widely used adaptations to increased water scarcity across water-
scarcity-only scenarios (C1, C2, and C3) were “change planting date,” “voluntarily 
decrease planted area,” and “diversify household employment.” In scenario C3, having 
the largest number of perceived adaptations in response to risks, “change planting date” 
and “voluntarily decrease planted area” were typically cited as the first (84% of farmers 
indicated their first adaptation would be to “change planting date”) and second (35% of 
farmers indicated their second adaptation would be to “voluntarily decrease planted 
area”) adaptations to be taken, respectively. “Diversify household employment” was cited 
as the third adaptation to water scarcity (30% of farmers indicated their third adaptation 
would be to “diversify household employment”). This ranking again supports Park et al.'s 
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(2012) idea of incremental adaptation to tolerable risks. None of the four adaptations to 
intolerable risks were widely perceived as necessary given the risks presented in 
scenarios C1, C2, and C3. Almost all farmers perceived themselves as being able to 
successfully and incrementally adapt to conditions of 50% less water in the future 
without needing to abandon their household security of well-being or their personal 
identity as parcelaros. 
The adaptations most relied upon among farmers to the conditions presented in 
water scarcity/limited rice-market access scenarios CM1 and CM2 were (in order of 
application) “change planting date,” “voluntarily decrease planted area,” “diversify 
crops,” and “diversify household employment.” Farmer responses to the conditions 
presented in both of these scenarios included very few adaptations to perceived 
intolerable risks. Roughly one in eight farmers perceived themselves as responding to the 
risks presented in scenario CM2 by selling their land, and most farmers would first rent 
their land and sell their assets.  
A transition in farmer perceptions of the tolerability of the risks presented in my 
scenarios for many farmers occurred between the risks presented in scenario CM2 and 
those presented in CM3. In CM3, 39% of farmers claimed that they would ultimately 
abandon agriculture if conditions in the PRAT matched those described in the scenario. 
Interestingly, few farmers perceived themselves as transitioning to sugarcane production. 
Many quickly realized that the risks presented in scenario CM3 were too costly and a 
transition would be needed. In scenario CM3, I also found a decrease in perceived 
reliance on household income diversification and crop diversification before a land sale, 
when compared to adaptations to the risks presented in scenario CM2. This drop was 
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most likely a result of my scenario exercise because farmers seemed to quickly perceive 
the risks presented in scenario CM3 as intolerable, and therefore were less willing to take 
the time to cite and rank every adaptation they would take prior to an adaptation limit. 
 
4.2.1 Costs of adaptations within an adaptation appraisal  
Almost all surveyed farmers perceived themselves as assuming increasingly 
costly adaptations throughout my scenarios, and most agreed that they would continue to 
pursue their current livelihood goals under all scenarios rather than bear the costs of 
transitioning out of rice production. In each scenario, most farmers ranked adaptations in 
order of increasing cost. In this way, farmers seemed to think rationally about avoiding 
limits by implementing increasingly costly adaptations, but most were unwilling to admit 
that they would ever transition to sugarcane production. Even of the farmers who had 
transitioned to sugarcane production, few were willing to admit to another transition to 
sugarcane. 
Grothmann & Patt (2005) showed that an adaptation appraisal process includes 
perceived adaptive capacity, which includes perceptions about the willingness to use 
available capital to adapt to risks. These perceived adaptation costs are the assumed 
capital costs of taking the adaptive response (shown in Table 5.3 as associated with 
specific adaptations). In this scenario exercise, farmers perceived themselves as relying 
heavily on those adaptations requiring the lowest cost of implementation. The cost of 
implementation of any adaptation is comprised of the capital and the transactions 
associated with an adaptation. The opportunity costs of another adaptation type are 
assumed to play a role in decisions of farmers to utilize one adaptation over another. 
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Within this definition, “change planting dates” and “voluntarily decrease planted area” 
were considered the least costly and most easily implementable, as both required few 
transactions and few resources. 
“Crop diversification” and “household income diversification” were the costliest 
adaptations available to farmers in terms of cost, taken in response to tolerable risks in 
the PRAT. Each required multiple types of costly capital to enact, and both required 
much time and effort on the part of a farmer. “Crop diversification” typically represented 
the switching to rice varieties that were better suited to the changing climate. “Household 
income diversification” was primarily an adaptation to reductions in rice market access, 
which typically included either (1) chambas (i.e. odd jobs) or (2) a migration of 
household members in search of employment in transportation or tourism. In farmer 
rankings of their perceived adaptations to each scenario, farmers overwhelmingly 
perceived themselves as implementing the lowest cost adaptations first. As risks 
increased in severity, farmers perceived themselves as relying on higher-cost adaptations. 
There appears to be a continuum of more and more costly adaptations that come at 
increasing personal cost. As adaptations increase in costs, almost 40% of farmers seemed 
willing to contemplate adaptation to intolerable risk, which includes decisions between 
living with intolerable risk of losses, revising attitudes about what is a valued objective, 
or changing behavior radically to avoid the intolerable risk of loss.  
 
4.3 Limits to adaptations and livelihood transformation 
Dow et al. (2013) showed that individuals may revise their attitudes about what is 
a valued livelihood goal, or they may greatly change their behavior and perception to 
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avoid intolerable risks. This is a key insight into the nature of adaptations to risks among 
farmers in this study, as it speaks to the fluidity of their limits to adaptation, and to their 
transformative capacity. In circumstances where an individual is given a lack of 
adaptation options or resources, or given high uncertainty about the nature of a risk, 
individuals may revise their attitudes and trade-off livelihood goals to transform their 
livelihoods. The perceived adaptations of farmers in this study to tolerable and intolerable 
risks constitute a range of perceptions of costs and irreversible commitments indicating 
differences in household risk exposure, sensitivity, capacity, and vulnerability to 
decreased rice market access and water scarcity. In the context of risks presented in my 
scenarios, many farmers were able to admit to the possibility that the future may bring 
intolerable risks, and this may suggest that farmers may be well grounded in the realities 
they face (Eakin, 2014). However, some farmers refused to consider the plausibility of 
the stated risks. This diversity, reflected in my results, may reflect the long-understood 
complexity among groups of smallholder farmers (Morton, 2007). 
Responses to my semi-structured interviews provided insight into the complexity 
of limits to adaptation among those smallholder farmers who participated in my study. 
When asked, “do you think these adaptations [referencing scenario responses] will be 
necessary in the future, and why or why not?” farmers responded with a range of 
perspectives on the future. For example, one farmer responded with concern, but also 
with an unwillingness to discuss adaptation options. When asked about water scarcity, he 
responded by stating 
“A big water shortage [of the magnitude described in 
scenario C3] has never happened, and it will not happen” 
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(Interviewee #11, 17-hectare rice farmer, Playitas, February 
11st, 2013). 
 
Then, when asked about the plausibility of risks presented in scenario CM3, the same 
farmer responded by stating 
“I do not know [what I would do], things have never been 
that bad” (Interviewee #11, 17-hectare rice farmer, 
Playitas, February 11st, 2013). 
 
His neighbor seemed more willing to discuss and contemplate his potential actions, and 
also seemed more willing to abandon agriculture rather than transition to sugarcane 
production. When asked about the risks presented in scenario CM3, he stated 
“If I lose rice-market access, I will consider selling my 
land. I will not change [to sugarcane production]” 
(Interviewee #12, 7-hectare rice farmer, Playitas, February 
11st, 2013).  
 
Another farmer in the same district seemed more willing to abandon rice production, but 
unwilling to abandon his farm. He stated  
“If it becomes impossible to sell [rice], I will grow 
sugarcane and seek another job. I will never sell [my 
land]” (Interviewee #13, 8-hectare rice farmer, Playitas, 
February 11st, 2013). 
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A farmer in the neighboring district offered a different perspective when asked what he 
would do in the face of the risks posed in scenario CM3. 
“When things get bad, we get into fights with the 
government because they do not like small farmers. That is 
what we will do. We go to the docks to keep the ships from 
unloading their rice, and that forces the people to buy local 
rice. We have been maced [by the police] before and 
everything was alright” (Interviewee #23, 8-hectare rice 
farmer, Bagatzi, February 20th, 2013). 
 
Farmer willingness to consider these multiple types of responses, including 
alternative non-farm income, and trading-off their parcelaro identities to maintain a 
connection to agriculture or to maintain some level of security suggests that this may be 
an adaptive population. The switch to sugarcane is indicative of a resignation of a farmer 
to insurmountable change (a “limit”), but a section of surveyed farmers have already 
confronted this limit and, as a result, are transforming their livelihoods while maintaining 
a connection to agriculture. This speaks to their transformative capacity. However, the 
anguish and hardship associated with these choices and transformations was also 
apparent, and must not be discounted in a discussion about livelihood transformation.  
Park et al. (2012) show that incremental adaptation decision-making processes 
have distinct characteristics, compared with those used in transformative adaptation. In 
my scenario exercise, I showed that most farmers in this study were easily able to think 
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about incremental adaptations to tolerable risks, but less were willing to think about 
transformative adaptation, seemingly because of the difficult choices it required. My 
semi-structured interviews offered insight into these difficult choices. When asked if 
adaptations the risks posed in scenario CM3 will be necessary in the future, one 
interviewee provided his perception. 
“In my opinion this is a complicated issue. Before, there 
was only rice, and when they dug the [irrigation] channels, 
the only farming was rice farming. Sometime later 
sugarcane came along. Sugarcane does not leave you with 
rice that you cannot sell. But [Sugarcane mills] rent the 
land and they take care of the entire process and we gain 
little. That's one of the problems we have now. With 
sugarcane everyone suffers. In about two years there will 
only be sugarcane, and we will all slowly disappear.” 
(Interviewee #27, 10-hectare rice farmer, February 21st, 
2013) 
 
Another interviewee concurred, but provided a downstream perspective on the difficulty 
of trading off or abandoning livelihood goals. 
“The problem was that it was a very bad winter (May-
August is referenced by farmers as winter), and the lagoon, 
which is the reservoir for the PRAT was very low. SENARA 
(irrigation water managers) started giving us water once 
  191 
every 4 days. But as I am at the end of the channel, there 
was almost no water for me. I lost half of my crop and I 
have no rice-purchase contract. I do not know what I will 
do.” (Interviewee #15, 7-hectare rice farmer, downstream 
in the PRAT, February 13th, 2013) 
 
One farmer with brothers in the transportation sector replied, 
“I realized that this life is not going to lead to anything. 
There is no future. Although I planted rice, I could not sell 
it and I could not get ahead. Why do I not do transportation 
[with my brother]” (Interviewee #55, 15-hectare rice 
farmer, February 28th, 2013)? 
 
Another farmer with relatives outside of agriculture, who had recently switched to 
sugarcane, concurred by saying, 
“The idea was for us to stay here, the idea was that if we 
could dedicate ourselves to rice, we could get ahead. But 
the circumstances did not allow for this. So, out of fear had 
to leave rice” (Interviewee #73, 7-hectare sugarcane 
farmer, March 12th, 2013). 
 
A final farmer shared his thoughts about the future of smallholder farming in the PRAT 
in terms of the migrations of his family by stating, 
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“In about two or three years there will be very few people 
who live here. My family is large and even they are almost 
all gone. The only one left in my house is me, I have a total 
of nine brothers… they are all gone. Only I am here” 
(Interviewee #82, 5-hectare rice farmer, March 18th, 2013). 
 
Through these discussions with farmers, it was apparent that the implementation 
of an adaptation to an intolerable risk for many farmers was largely a ‘negative’ loss in 
terms of identity and security of well-being. However, at the time of this study it was 
unapparent if this loss would force households into long-term poverty. These adaptations 
to intolerable risks that require farmers to live with intolerable risk of losses, revise 
attitudes about what is a valued objective, or change behavior radically to avoid the 
intolerable risk of loss, while difficult and negative in the short-term, may not necessarily 
be failures in adaptation. Stated another way, a limit to adaptation does not necessarily 
equate to the inability of a farmer to transform their livelihood to meet revised or new 
livelihood goals. In the short-term, adaptation limits may force farmers to make difficult 
choices about adaptations and valued livelihood goals. A failed adaptation may be one 
that sends a household into poverty for a short time, which was apparent among some 
farmers in this study. However, most were critically thinking about their future options, 
which indicates they were not complacent or content bearing the risks of intolerable 
losses.  
This analysis has shown that the successful adaptation of a farmer to intolerable 
risks in this context must incorporate some degree of transformative capacity to be 
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successful. Marshall, Park, Adger, Brown, & Howden (2012) show that among some 
farmers in Australia, attachment to place may limit their abilities to respond to intolerable 
drought because it may act as barrier to transformative adaptation through discouraging 
migration to meet other valued livelihood goals. Hence, changes in objectives of 
adaptation and the in definition of risk may actually comprise successful adaptation near 
limits for farmers in the PRAT. And, the ability of a farmer to make these changes is 
based upon their ability to pursue transformative adaptive responses. In thinking about 
where incremental adaptation ends, and livelihood transformations begin among farmers 
in the PRAT, we may consider both as sub-sets within the broader suite of available 
adaptation strategies (Park et al., 2012). The key difference between the two lies in the 
extent of change, but the suffering and anguish associated with choices to trade-off goals 
and transform livelihoods cannot be discounted. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Forty percent of farmers included in this study had confronted adaptation limits 
and transitioned to sugarcane production between 2002 and 2012. Some of those farmers 
have maintained their homes and lands and have seemingly begun modifying their 
livelihood goals. Others have been forced into poverty, at least at the time of this study. 
The risks faced by the smallholder rice-farming sector in the PRAT are predicted to 
increase in scale and intensity. Following this logic, more farmers may abandon rice 
production and this means that transformations of valued livelihood goals will be 
required by some to successfully adapt to intolerable risks. These transformations may 
represent a switch to distinct new livelihoods where different sets of goals become valued 
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and different sets of risks become intolerable. Our goal as researchers and development 
practitioners must be to provide options to limit the suffering accompanied with these 
transitions. To do this, we must better understand the trade-offs between transformational 
capacity, necessary to adapt to intolerable risks, and the capacity to meet valued 
livelihood goals in the face of tolerable risks. These trade-offs may be inherent in some 
agricultural systems, and successful adaptation to tolerable risks may act as a barrier to 
transformational change. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
1. Introduction 
Between 1980 and 1982, Costa Rica experienced its worst economic crisis since 
its 1948 civil war. During this time the Costa Rican economy compressed by 9.4% and 
annual inflation reached 90%. During these two years, the proportion of the population 
living below the poverty line increased from 35% to 54% (Hidalgo, 2014). The roots of 
the crisis were in the decline of the country’s economic model that was based on the 
import-substitution-industrialization (ISI) concept, which promoted the local production 
of industrialized goods and services over imports of foreign-produced products. Between 
1950 and 1982, numerous inefficient state-owned enterprises arose within the ISI model. 
The ISI model was adopted in Costa Rica in 1949 in an effort to fight mass poverty and 
to compete with more developed nations. The government protected its new industries 
using import tariffs in the hopes that capital and a comparative advantage would develop, 
and it supported and managed many sectors of industrial and agricultural supply chains to 
promote this advantage.  
The ISI model in Costa Rica encouraged a growing financial burden that 
overwhelmed the economy. Government spending was 54% of the gross domestic 
product by 1980 and Costa Rica’s debt quadrupled during President Rodrigo Carazo’s 
(1978–1982) term in office (Edelman, 1992). The cost of government financing also 
increased with increasing international borrowing rates, and President Carazo responded 
to the government’s deteriorating finances by printing money, which devalued the 
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currency. Inflation skyrocketed, sending hundreds of thousands of Costa Ricans into 
poverty (Hidalgo, 2014). Following this crash, in 1980s and early 1990s the Costa Rican 
economy underwent significant structural reforms.  The International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), World Bank (WB), U.S.AID, and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), 
in return for financial support, mandated these reforms. Reforms included the 
privatization of most state-owned enterprises and the reduction or abolition of tariffs on 
many consumer goods. In 1985, the mean tariff rate was 55% while in 2013 it was 5.4% 
(Gwartney, Lawson, & Hall, 2013). While Costa Rica is no longer beholden to the IMF, 
WB, USAID, or the IADB, these reforms restructured economic institutions and 
contributed to Costa Rica’s significant improvement in economic freedom. The State lost 
the ability manage many sectors of its economy, but the economy grew an average 4.7% 
per year between 1987 and 2013, one of the fastest rates in Latin America (Hidalgo, 
2014). 
Despite healthy growth rates, poverty in Costa Rica has remained at about 20% 
since 1990. In 2013 the poverty rate was 20.7% (INEC, 2014). Equally disturbing, and 
perhaps more concerning, is the fact that economic inequality has steadily risen across the 
country since 2000. Only three countries across Latin America have seen this kind of 
increase in economic inequity over the past decade, and Costa Rica is among them 
(CEPAL, 2014). The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC) reported that Costa Rica’s Gini Index (a comparison of income 
distribution used to measure inequity) increased from 0.47 to 0.50 between 2000 and 
2011, which is a large decadal change (Hidalgo, 2014). This trend is nowhere more 
apparent than in Guanacaste, in northwestern Costa Rica – one of the two poorest 
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provinces in the country. Within Guanacaste, this trend persists even as the government 
continues to fund agrarian development projects in this region, with the goal of using 
agriculture to boost households out of poverty. According to the National Statistics and 
Census Institute (INEC), the Tempisque River Basin region of Guanacaste is the poorest 
in the country, with almost 30% of the population below the poverty line and 15% living 
in extreme poverty (INEC, 2014). The region also has the highest rate of unemployment 
in the country—10.1% 
The Arenal-Tempisque Irrigation Project (Projecto de Riego del Arenal-
Tempisque, PRAT) in Guanacaste, Costa Rica is an agrarian development project that 
was initiated with the creation of the Agrarian Development Institute (Instituto de 
Desarrollo Agrario, IDA) in 1982, and the National Subterranean Waters, Irrigation, and 
Drainage Service (Servicio Nacional de Aguas Subterraneas, Riego y Avenamiento, 
SENARA) in 1983. These new agencies were given legal authority to dictate land use 
objectives for rural development. The development project was designed to address the 
high poverty rates in the region by providing irrigation water to farmers in the semi-arid 
Tempisque River Basin; the water comes from Lake Arenal in the east (see Figure 6.1). 
However, the project was born during this massive political economic transition.    
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Figure 6.1 – Arenal-Tempisque Irrigation District (DRAT), Tempisque River Basin, 
Guanacaste, Costa Rica, watersheds, canal infrastructure, and water source 
 
The PRAT was designed to address this extreme poverty that has persisted since 
before the structural reform. The idea was to provide smallholder farmers with plots of 
land, governmental extension services, and irrigation water. Market access was to be 
provided to smallholder farmers by the government. Agro-industries, funded in part and 
regulated by the state, were to provide milling and refining capacity for the smallholder 
farmers. While the original goals of the PRAT never changed, the government’s capacity 
to see them through to fruition did, largely due to the structural reforms. Costa Rica’s 
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structural reforms during the 1980s and 1990s fundamentally changed the ability of the 
PRAT to support the most vulnerable farmers, and this vulnerability only became evident 
as global change risks began impacting Costa Rican agriculture. However, the reform 
itself did not undermine the project. Rather, the adaptations of large, economically and 
politically powerful farms manipulated structural reforms and created barriers to 
smallholder rice farmer adaptations. Specifically, these barriers to trade liberalization 
were created by foreign and domestically owned, large-scale industrialized rice farms, 
and these barriers limited rice market access for smallholder farmers. A perhaps 
unintended consequence of these political maneuvers was water scarcity for many 
vulnerable farmers in the PRAT. 
Rice is the crop of choice for smallholder farmers in the PRAT. Because rice is a 
very water-intensive crop, it has become more difficult to produce in the region. As 
drought increasingly affects the region, the adaptations of industrialized farms to 
international trade liberalization have changed Costa Rica’s rice production institutions.  
The combination of these two phenomena has increased livelihood losses among 
smallholder farmers in the Tempisque River Basin. These specific barriers to smallholder 
farm adaptations in the PRAT have developed at the national policymaking level and 
they now undermine the development program. Here, I recap and summarize barriers and 
limits to adaptation among smallholder rice farmers in Northwest Costa Rica that were 
detailed in my research. I summarize why they exist, and the relationship between them. 
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2. Barriers and limits to the adaptation of smallholder rice farmers in 
Northwest Costa Rica 
Barriers to adaptation restrict an individual’s ability to identify, assess and 
manage the impacts of risks (Monirul Islam, Sallu, Hubacek, & Paavola, 2014; Moser & 
Ekstrom, 2010). Adaptation limits are defined as the point at which a valued livelihood 
goal cannot be met through adaptive actions, at which point one must transform one’s 
livelihood, or bear the intolerable risks of loss. An adaptation is an action aimed at 
maintaining valued livelihood goals in the face of global change risks by avoiding 
intolerable risks and by managing tolerable risks (Dow et al., 2013). Barriers impede 
individual adaptations to meet valued livelihood goals. Both limits and barriers to 
adaptation are the products of risks, individual and group vulnerabilities to those risks, 
and the political economies and ecosystems within which the individuals and groups 
operate.  
The development of barriers and limits to the adaptation of smallholder rice 
farmers in the PRAT are deeply ingrained in the political economy of the region, and of 
Costa Rica in general. In the Arenal-Tempisque Irrigation Project (Projecto de Riego del 
Arenal-Tempisque, PRAT) in Guanacaste, 40% of smallholder farmers surveyed in my 
study switched from rice to sugarcane production between 2002 and 2013. This transition 
has undermined the primary development goals in the PRAT. These goals include (1) 
improving living conditions in the semi-arid Tempisque River Basin by generating agro-
employment, (2) redistributing income, and changing cropping systems, (3) promoting 
integrated regional development with complementary smallholder and agro-industrial 
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sectors, and (4) contributing to the improvement of the country’s economic situation by 
exporting agricultural products. 
 
2.1 Barriers to adaptation  
The IMF, World Bank, and U.S.AID economic restructuring demands greatly 
changed Costa Rica’s socio-economic development model.  That model created and 
legitimized IDA/SENARA, and these entities have effectively dictated the development 
trajectory of the PRAT since 1983. The national economic restructuring impacted the 
PRAT in four primary ways:  
1. The liquidation of Costa Rican Development Corporation, S.A. (Corporación 
Costarricense de Desarrollo, CODESA) made smallholder farmers dependent on 
private rice mills for market access.  
2. The creation of private agricultural extension services that replaced state 
agricultural agencies were not viable for the smallholder farm sector throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s due to the high costs of these services, requiring smallholder 
farmers to continue producing rice or leave farming.  
3. The abandonment of land size restrictions in the PRAT allowed vertical 
integration (i.e., the combination in one agro-business of two or more stages of 
production) by private farms and mills and enabled a competitive advantage for 
some. This ultimately excluded many smallholder farmers from lucrative 
agricultural supply chains.  
As the national political economy changed, so did the PRAT’s development path. 
Costa Rica’s shift to a neoliberal development model eliminated the potential for State-
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driven wealth redistribution across the PRAT. The initial agrarian development goals of 
wealth, land, and water redistribution were never realized due to the inability of the State 
to prioritize rural development. The Agrarian Development Institute and SENARA 
continued to work toward the original goals of the project, but within the changed 
institutional structure. What has resulted is a resettlement program that redistributed land 
to the rural poor without providing them with the capacity to use that land for their own 
livelihoods or to respond to changing climate and crop markets, thus making them 
vulnerable to these changes. 
Costa Rica’s economic restructuring also instilled an institutional structure that 
disproportionately burdened the most vulnerable farmers in the PRAT by redistributing 
the impacts of global change risks. Global changes, specifically trade liberalization, drove 
rice mills lobby for domestic rice protection policies that limited the market access of 
smallholder farmers. Increasing drought in the Tempisque River Basin exacerbated 
smallholder farmer vulnerability. President Oduber Quirós’s vision of agriculture in the 
Tempisque River Basin brought livelihood security to almost 700 smallholder farms and 
almost 2,500 farm hands (chambaros) throughout the 1990s.  But in combination with the 
national economic restructuring his vision also created a dependence on government-
supplied irrigation water and market access. As the economic restructuring stripped away 
state provisions in the PRAT, such as State-provided market access and extension 
services, smallholder farmers and the larger agrarian economy were left dependent on 
larger, private farms. Smallholder farmers were left vulnerable to risks created by the 
ability of larger farms to better adapt to the impacts of global changes. These 
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vulnerabilities were exposed as the debate on the “Dominican Republic – Central 
America Free Trade Agreement” (CAFTA-DR) began.  
Smallholder farmers, while very aware of the situation, were largely powerless to 
weigh in on the emerging trade-liberalization debates around CAFTA-DR due to their 
lack of influence on legislators in San Jose. Rice mills and large producers in the 
Tempisque River Basin were able to lobby legislatures through the efforts of the Costa 
Rican National Association of Rice Millers (La Asociación Nacional de Industriales del 
Sector Arrocero de Costa Rica, ANINSA), and thereby adapt to increasing trade 
liberalization and secure their goals by changing institutional structures. Through the 
efforts of ANINSA, large-scale rice producers were able to successfully lobby for a tariff 
on imported rice of 35% (Hidalgo, 2014), and for a domestic rice-price fixing scheme. 
Despite the CONARROZ rhetoric about protecting smallholder rice farmers, this 
agricultural protectionism in Costa Rica almost entirely benefits large producers and 
mills. All industrial rice producers and mills in the Tempisque River Basin, and most 
across the country, belong to a publicly funded but privately managed hedge fund called 
Corporación Arrocera (CONARROZ). CONARROZ is the only private entity allowed to 
import rice duty-free, per Costa Rica Law 8285. 
With the formation of CONARROZ, ANISA was able to secure continued 
government price controls on rice, which is the only agricultural product in Costa Rica 
that is still subject to price controls. Since domestically produced rice only supplies half 
of consumer demand in Costa Rica, CONARROZ supplements supply by purchasing 
internationally grown rice, tariff-free, at a much reduced price and sell it to consumers at 
the same high fixed price as domestic harvests. Instead of passing the savings to 
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consumers, the earnings are distributed among CONARROZ members according to the 
amount of rice they produce and process each year. There are over a thousand rice 
producers in Costa Rica but a group of 100 large producers is responsible for 70% of the 
country’s production (Arroyo, Lucke, & Riveara, 2013), and they are the beneficiaries of 
the current protectionist scheme.  The economic rents (i.e., profit from the price 
differences between rice bought on the domestic market and rice bought by the mills 
from the international market through CONARROZ) won by CONARROZ and 
transferred to industrial producers and mills reached $104 million in 2012 (Barquero, 
2013).  
The 11 rice mills in the Tempisque River Basin, responsible for almost half of 
Costa Rican rice production, gain half of the economic rents captured by CONARROZ 
each year. By doing so, they are simultaneously able to secure a larger share of the 
domestic production market. This is allowed because no limitations on land ownership 
exist in the PRAT as a result of the lobbying efforts of Guanacaste’s private landowners 
during the passage of the IDA legislation in 1982. As mills and industrial rice farms 
increase production, they no longer need to purchase smallholder rice at the more 
expensive rate set by the federal government. This has increasingly limited rice-market 
access for smallholder farmers in the PRAT. As of 2013, mills only purchased 
smallholder rice to make up the difference between their harvests and their processing 
and storage capacities, and this smallholder rice is purchased early in the season. This 
means that those smallholder farmers who harvest early in the season have a better 
opportunity to gain access to the rice market. 
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Increasing drought in the Tempisque River Basin compounds barriers to 
adaptation among smallholder farmers posed by limited access to rice markets. Water 
shortages primarily occur in the PRAT during the high water demand months of 
December and January, during which time both rice and sugarcane are planted. Both rice 
and sugarcane require large inputs of water during planting, and both crops must be 
planted near the start of the dry season so they can be harvested prior to the beginning of 
the next rainy season, typically in May. A water-cycling program developed by SENARA 
was designed to spread farmer-planting dates across a series of 6 weeks, thereby allowing 
all farms to successfully plant and harvest prior to the beginning of the next rainy season. 
While the water-cycling program could allow all smallholder farmers to plant their rice 
crops and harvest before the rains begin, farmers who are forced to wait to plant have 
more difficulty selling their harvests because later harvest dates limit their ability to sell 
their harvests before mills stop buying smallholder rice harvests for the season. And, 
while it is possible for smallholder farmers to store their harvests, the debts accrued 
through the planting and harvesting process necessitate the timely sale of their harvests. 
Delayed water allocations, in combination with limited access to the rice market 
during harvest, have led to conflicts such as water piracy among farmers throughout the 
PRAT. This has created water scarcity for some. Farmers upstream in the PRAT illegally 
modify irrigation infrastructure to gain early access to water, depriving downstream 
farmers of their water allocations. Many farmers furthest downstream plant rice but then 
lose their water access as a result of these actions of upstream farmers, and therefore 
many downstream farmers have been forced to lose their rice crops after planting. Water 
scarcity and the subsequent conflict among smallholder farmers result from the 
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adaptations of more powerful rice farmers to the threat of trade liberalization. Those 
farmers downstream in the PRAT without illegal access to alternative water sources loose 
either their crops or their access to the market. Thus, the compounding impacts of 
drought and limited rice market access comprise the barriers to adaptation faced by 
smallholder rice farmers in Northwest Costa Rica. 
 
2.2 Limits to adaptation  
I defined adaptation limits among smallholder rice farmers in the PRAT based on 
their ability to meet valued livelihood goals of security of household well-being and 
preservation of their parcelaro identities. Based on this definition, 40% of farmers 
included in this study had faced adaptation limits and were forced to transition their 
livelihoods or bear the risk of intolerable losses. The risks faced by the smallholder rice-
farming sector in the PRAT are predicted to increase in scale and intensity. Following 
this logic, more smallholder farmers may continue to face adaptation limits in the coming 
years unless barriers to their incremental adaptations are reduced through rice market 
reforms.  
Some farmers I surveyed were better able to avoid crossing adaptation limits, and 
some seemed better able to transition livelihood goals after facing adaptation limits. 
Those farmers who were better able to avoid facing limits were those who were better 
able to spread the impacts of risks. Also, I found that those farms with more debt were 
more vulnerable to limited rice-market access. Smaller farms—those with few resources 
and that were heavily reliant on household labor—were better able to cope with the 
impacts of limited access to rice markets, yet were more vulnerable to the impacts of 
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water scarcity. As smallholder farmers pursued their rice farming livelihood goals, the 
pursuit of increased production efficiency through mechanization or through the purchase 
or rental of additional land and resources made them more vulnerable to the impacts of 
limited rice market access. If farmers attempted to expand their farms to grow their 
livelihoods, they would accrue debts that often undermined their livelihoods—
particularly if they failed to sell a rice crop. However, they continued to be vulnerable to 
the impacts of water scarcity if they didn’t attempt to expand their livelihoods by making 
investments either in additional land (to gain access to surface water) or in wells or 
water-saving technologies. This, also, often undermined their livelihoods and ultimately 
forced them into sugarcane production.  
 
3. Sustainable solutions in the Arenal-Tempisque Irrigation District 
Policy reforms are required to address the current distribution of risk across farmers in 
the PRAT. To pursue sustainability in the irrigation district, these reforms must 
incorporate (1) long-term perspectives on the future, (2) synergies and trade-offs between 
current and future goals, and (3) open and transparent decision-making processes. The 
policy reform process may take the form of a systematic assessment of the sustainability 
of the irrigation district, and it must include an assessment of each of the district’s five 
goals, and propositions about (1) modifications to those goals based on the new global 
changes, and (2) a solutions spaces within which modified goals can be met.  Here, I 
define a solution space as the set of all possible resolutions to sustainability problems in a 
given context, which includes plausible futures and realistic constraints. The current 
PRAT-goals of hydropower effluent utilization, increased crop production efficiency, and 
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increased production of exportable crop types have seemingly been met while increased 
living standards among the rural poor and supply-chain linkages between smallholder 
farmers and industrial mills have been largely overlooked. This is because these goals 
have been re-prioritized over the last thirty years by those with the political power to do 
so. Therefore, participation of all stakeholders will also be needed in the development of 
a solution space, and the creation of specific sustainable solutions in the district. This 
process may better address the political power differentials between groups of farmers, 
which limit the ability of the PRAT to meet its goals. 
The two primary challenges faced by PRAT managers in developing any 
sustainable solutions in the district are: (1) the region’s increasing aridity, and; (2) a lack 
of authority to change market access in the PRAT. Water scarcity, while driven by 
competition among smallholder farmers for limited water to plant early in the season, 
may ultimately limit agricultural productivity in the region due to increasing drought 
alone. Lake Arenal, the source of PRAT irrigation water, is predicted to continue to 
decrease in water volume over the next two decades due to climate change (Karmalkar, 
Bradley, & Diaz, 2008). This will continue to increase water-cycling times, will reduce 
overall water availability, and will further delay rice planting each season. If water 
allocation schedules push planting dates into February, farmers will be forced to harvest 
in the rainy season, thereby forcing them to pay expensive drying fees or abandon their 
harvests. While increasing aridity in the PRAT is driven by global climate change, the 
management of its impact in the PRAT is a regional issue, for which regional decision-
makers are largely responsible. Drought-resistant rice varieties and the implementation of 
water saving agro-technologies are solutions that may stabilize smallholder rice 
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production, but a sustainable solution must address increasing drought, and the solution 
space must include possible alternatives for those solely reliant on irrigation water for 
their livelihoods.  
It is apparent that any solution seeking to connect smallholder farming to the 
larger agrarian economy, and thereby support smallholder livelihoods, must in some way 
provide market access for smallholder farmers. Access to the rice market was limited by 
the Costa Rican policy response to threats of international trade liberalization, and these 
decisions were made at the national level. Local PRAT managers have little authority 
over national rice market policies, even as the PRAT produces 45% of the rice consumed 
in Costa Rica. Current Costa Rican protectionist rice policies only benefit large-scale, 
commercialized rice producers and mills, and they are driving the increasing inequities in 
Costa Rican agriculture. The current Costa Rica agro-economic model is designed to 
benefit more powerful farmers at the expense of the most vulnerable smallholder farmers. 
Today, rice production in Costa Rica exists as a cartel, where a few powerful farms 
control most of the market. Any solution that would curtail the loss of the PRAT 
smallholder-farming sector must include fundamental market reforms that eliminate the 
power of domestically and internationally owned agribusinesses to completely control 
market access for smallholder farmers. The solution space needed to address market-
access issues for smallholders must include changes in national-level policies. In their 
absents, agricultural solutions to smallholder farmer livelihood losses may not be 
sustainable.  Furthermore, predicted increases in trade liberalization may necessitate that 
the solution space include the facilitation of livelihood transitions and the provision of 
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alternative livelihood options that may limit the suffering associated with the devaluing 
of valued livelihood goals among smallholder farmers. 
Finally, given predicted increases in the intensity and severity of the impacts of 
global change risks on Guanacaste, the development goals of the PRAT may prove to be 
unattainable regardless of actions by managers and policy-makers, and therefore may 
need to be reestablished. The original five goals of the Arenal-Tempisque Irrigation 
District were developed in 1978, during a time when climate change and globalization 
processes were not yet apparent, and the State played a much larger role in development. 
While a revision of these goals may result in winners and losers, an ex-ante revision, 
sponsored by and carried out by all stakeholders through a transparent and participatory 
process will limit the likelihood that risks of global changes will be felt most strongly by 
the most vulnerable. Farmers and members of agricultural supply chains in the 
Tempisque River basin may be forced to confront intolerable global change risks that 
require transformations of their livelihoods, supply chains and governance systems. If 
PRAT managers address these risks and solutions head-on, those with the power to 
manipulate the status quo may be less able to stack the odds of successful adaptation to 
global change risks in their favor. This may better protect the most vulnerable from 
becoming more exposed and more sensitive to these risks. As the Tempisque River Basin 
suffers from the highest rates of extreme poverty in the country, managers and policy-
makers are left with little choice but to aid in the adaptations of these most vulnerable 
through the development of sustainable solutions in Guanacaste, Costa Rica. 
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